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PREFACE

A literature that does not contain an informing structure
built upon coherent thought is likely to represent a random collection
of ideas without any real cohesion.

Much·of contemporary literary

criticism blithely assumes that the whole of the significance inherent
in a text rests in a simple unfolding of the arrangement of its images
and motifs, as if a story or poem exists independent of its author's
world-view.

This is not to deny that much valuable work has been

accomplished by the formalist approach; rather, the hegemony of that
school of thought has :precluded other possibilities from gaining a wide
understanding.
The need far fresh approaches was made clear to me in. Aprilt1978
at the home of Dr. Timothy Austin, who had invited his graduate class
in lingUistics to meet the eminent British linguist, Dr. Roger Fowler.
Dr. Fowler gave a presentation of current techniques he had been

developing to show the underlying meaning, or deep-structure (to use
the terminology of that branch of English studies), of poems by W. H.
Auden.

After the ensuing discussion, Dr. Fowler was kind enough to

speak to me privately on this topic for well over an hour, reviewing
various possible alternatives to the critical approaches that have held
the field in recent decades.
Though many details of that conversation have disappeared with
the good fellowship of that evening, an extremely interesting

iii

point that remains.

As we continued to talk over new methodologies,

Dr. Fowler left this student with a feeling that he believed he had found
a rock upon which to ground his method of preserving the extra-literary
meaning o:f a text without reducing it to nothing more than a philosoph!cal treatise.

Only at the end of that evening, when Dr. Fowler's Ma.:r:xism

was revealed, was the student forced to defend his orthodox Christianity.
Fowler and the student finally agreed that his method could easily be
used to preserve either ideology (or any other philosophy) for examination in serious literature without wrenching the thought from its
literary context.
The

speaker and the student agreed at that evening's talk that

one school of thought, the pragmatic {which T. S. Eliot once derided as
the "lemon-squeezer school"

1

of criticism), has virtually monopolized

literary analysis for well over a generation; and that any one school
of philosophical inquiry is virtually incompetent to judge the presuppositions and doctrines of any other school without falling into a
hopeless muddle.
Each philosophical system contains an aesthetics appropriate to
its own biases which flows inevitably from its metaphysical and ethical
beliefs.

For idealists, aesthetics is the queen of the sciences.

Mater-

ialists, say, by their own standards, are thus incapable of determining
the artistic quality of a poem by Keats or an essay by Santayana.

Such

1Russell Kirk, Eliot and His Ages T. S. Eliot's Moral
Imagination in the Twentieth Century.
p. 398.
iv

(New York= Random House, 1971),

attempts have produced a great deal of horrendous

communis~

and psycholo-

gical criticism over which it is best to draw a curtain of charity.
a Marxist or Freudian

~

But

tell us whether or not a work is good Marxism

or Freudianism and whether or not it follows the canons of the aesthetics
that flow from those persuasions.
The assumption to be made from this data is that all literature
worthy of the name is to some extent a literature of ideas. ·As Vernon
Parrington observed over half a century ago:
shouldered aside vigorous creative thinkers. "

" ••• poetasters have
2

The object of these pages

is to show the possibility of reengaging literary work with the history
of ideas rather than to cater to "those whose disedged appetites find

no savor in old-fashioned beef and puddings ... 3

2vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought:
An Inter etation of American Literature From the Be innin
to 1 20
New York1 Harcourt, Brace, 1930 , p. vi. Parrington argued for maintaining a critical tradition of discussing literature in terms of its
manifest ideas rather than limiting discussion to formal elements.
3Ibid, pp. vi-vii.
v
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CHAPI'ER I
THE NATURE OF SYSTEMATIC PHILOO<mrY

To comprehend the relationship of philosophy to literature as
it affects the novels of Charles Williams, it is first necessary to establish the

~alidity

of some analytical tool that will allow the inves-

tigator to recognize a generic philosophy, and then to be able to distinguish the specific differences among the individual philosophical
systems.

In this paper, the writer will identify eight distinct schools

of thought and place the thought of Williams in one of these traditions.
It will further be argued why this tradition, better than any of the
others, elucidates the achievement of Williams.
From one point of view, that of Richard McKeon of the University
of Chicago, philosophies may be analyzed into principles, methods and
conclusions. 1 Professor McKeon, perhaps the dean of American philosophy
teachers, has influenced a whole literature that has come to be known as
historical semantics.

McKeon himself was influenced by A. 0. Lovejoy's

The Great Chain of Being~ The best known of the many extrapolations of
1
Richard McKeon, Thoughts, Actions and Passions (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 1-29.
2Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1936).

1

2

McKeon's approach has been the Great Ideas and Great Books programs in the
Syntopicon of Mortimer Adler.J

Less familiar but more rigorously systema-

tic have been the works of Stallknecht and Brumbaugh,

4

who attempted a

synthesis of the oeuvre of McKeon and Steven Pepper, the author of World
Hypotheses.5 The strong influence of Alfred North Whitehead on Stallknecht

and Brumbaugh, however, led to the lasing of their synthesis on numerous
idealistic concepts to be found in The Function of Reason.

6

In this paper,

I have generally followed the descriptions of philosophical systems in a
more contemporary thesis,? one using an approach that neither proliferates
categories like McKeon, nor overly conflates them like Pepper.
The discipline starts with the idea that confronted with any
quandary, the human person discovers that he lacks certain knowledge in
order to be able to solve a given problem.

There are two possible methods

~ortimer J. Adler, ed. The Great Ideal A Srntopicon of
Great Books of the Western World (Chicago• Encyclopedia Britannica,
1952), 2v. (Vols. 2-3 of Gr~t Books of the Western World in 54v.)
4N. P. Stallknecht and R. S. Brumbaugh

~ompa.ss

of Philosophy

(New York: Longmans, Green, 1954).
5steven Pepper, World Hypotheses (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1966).
6
Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason (Bostons
Beacon Press, 1966).
7William Lloyd Smith, "System Construction in Science, Theology and Philosophy& The Myths Men Live By." Thesis. DePaul University,
Chicago, 1971, passim.

3
of filling in the lacunae, both of which begin with experience.

In the

first, the person takes from experience some class of events, gives this
class the dignity of calling it a principle, and then follows the implications of this principle, and treats the conclusions there drawn as
valid, possessing the comparable dignity and certitude of the original
events.

This way of dealing with events is called synthesis.
Alternatively, the second method--that of analysis--takes some

assemblage of events, and reduces the whole to some basic element, type,
form,or purpose in an attempt to discover the original nature of reality.
At this point, it should be noted that the very method or logical approach
selected by the observer results from the class of events chosen to initiate the process, which is an elaborate way of saying that metaphysics
(or first principles) is also a meta-logic, itself determined by the
events selected to begin the rational process.
The term metaphysics has four possible meanings; the first three
derive from Aristotle directly, while the fourth comes from him oy a
barbarism.
that

Three of the meanings are accidental in the Aristotelean sense

distingu~shes

substance from accident.

Because Aristotle's first

principles were taken from logical categories, those thinkers who use
epistemological, anthropologica1,or linguistic principles

b~ve

often

been considered anti-metaphysical; because metaphysics comes to theological conclusions, some shallow thinkers have confused the two, to the disservice of both disciplines.

Finally, metaphysics has been used as a

misnomer for the occult sciences.

It seems more useful to employ the

terms a) metaphysics, b) ontology, c) theology, and d) occult to describe
the four differing concepts.

4
The first (and most proper) meaning of metaphysics is first principles or arche protas.

This designation emanates from a dilemma that

Aristotle states both in the Metaphysics

8 and the Posterior Analytics. 9

He argues persuasively that every argumeni must begin somewhere with
either an unproven statement or with an undefined term, because of the
problem of infinite regress or vicious circle.

If we prove A by B and B

by C to theN, the logical progression must stop at some point, or else
repeat the process, proving C by B and B by A.

Hence, the unproven pre-

mises (gratuitously called self'-evident) of any philosoph:.' constitute
the metaphysics of that school of thought, which in turn will generate
the aesthetic bases of any art flowing from it.

:t is necessary to note

that it makes no difference whether the philosopher starts with undefined
terms (the preference of logical positivists) or with unproven principles
(the preference of classical philosophies) because every principle, being
a proposition, is composed of terms; ar.d the definition of any term is
composed in a sentence.

Therefore,

solve metaphysics in terms of a

i~

follows that the attempt to re-

prefe~ence

first principles leads once again into the

either for first terms or for
dile~~a

of infinite regress

or vicious circle.
':'he metaphysician uses first

prin·~iples

to discover new knowledge.

Not every random thought or prejudice has much of a chance of being generally accepted as a self-evident proposition, nor as an intuitive term.
R

~Aristotle, "Metaphysics," in Basic Works, ed. Richard r1cKeon
(New York: Raudom House, 1941), pp. 715-751.

9Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics," Basic ·works, pp, 110-113.

5
(For these purposes, Newton's length, time,and mass are terms, whereas
Aristotle's laws of identity, excluded middle, and non-contradiction,
are principles.)

From these considerations it follows that the terms of

metaphysical discourse, as well as the concomitant

principle~

must be

posterior to the act of knowing, since the function of metaphysics is to
proceed from the known to the unknown.
To attempt to understand comprehensively, historical semantics
tries to discover perspectives thinkers and writers have used over the
centuries.

The present author has been fortunate enough to have become

acquainted with a systematic analysis which is almost perfect for the
present purpose.

In this system, the act of knowing involves four ele-

ments: a knowing subject (anthropology), a way of knowing (epistemology),
a language which communicates that which is known (linguistics) and a
known object (ontology).

Each of the possible metaphysical positions has

the general form stating that man is an A (anthropological term like will,
intellect, body or agent) who by E (epistemological term such as intuits,
perceives, senses or alters) the I (a linguistic index such as meaning,
category, matter or utility) of 0 (ontological term such as existence,
essence, event or relation).

Eight possible real philosophies result.

(See Appendix I)
The chart contained in the appendix shows a complete catalogue of
all possible first principles, which can be confirmed by taking a standard
history of philosophy and correlating the first principles of each of
the philosophers discussed with the schema of the chart.

Although this

eight-fold analysis may not be the last word in historical semantics, it
is adequate for the purposes of this study.

6
The statement above that principles determine methods is now
demonstrable.

If a philosopher starts with one principle as he does in

any of the monistic systems, (which reduce

all reality to only mind

or only matter), he must use an analytical logic for the simple reason
that some logical forms, e.g., syllogism, can only begin with two paralel propositions (s isM, and M is P); and a dialectical logic must have
two partially contradictory first principles.

The H-egelians, Marxists,

Buddhists and Spinozans use the notion that every unity eontains internal
contradictions; no such contradictions would be possible unless every
experience contains more than one principle.
The monistic philosophers, who start from one principle and then
analyze it (because all that can be done with one reality is to examine
it), nevertheless differ' from each other in the results of their analysis
by virtue of the content they choose to consider.
Some illustrac,ive examples will be profitable at this point.
(It should be added that the labels employed to designate some of these
philosophies are by no means satisfactory; one hardly thinks of Thoreau
as a r1aturalist, Rousseau as a mystic or Gautama Buddha as a materialist,
but the rigors of logic in this field force
ing anomalies.)

the analyst into such seem-

The mystic begins with his gi·ren revelation, and con-

fronts his opponent by accepting his antagonist.'s :"acts, but denies his
rationale.

Thus, Henri Bergson in Creative Evolution begins with his

all-absorbing intuition of

~he

Hebrew Father-God and then confronts the

Darwinian evolutionists by accepting their data but showing that Darwin's
rationale of the survival of the fittest coupled with the idea of natural

selection is inconsistent with these data.

10

7
Once having shown Dar-

win's mistake, Bergson is free to assimilate evolution as the creative
working of God in the universe.

Rousseau confronts the social contract

theories of materialists like Spinoza and Hobbes with a defense of his
own mystical belief in freedom by arguing that mankind entered the social
contract only to preserve its own freedom, and that when the social contract stands in the way of human freedom, it is null and void.

Thus,

Rousseau is free to use the argument that when any social contract fails
to meet the needs of human freedom, men must revolt and create a new
contract.

This is another example of mystical assimilation.

The idealist finds in his experience (which, ex-hypothesis, is
I

the only possible ground for his empiricism) various categories which are
always two analytical pairs perpendicular to each other, e.g.' the wetdry, hot-cold of

AnaxL~nder.

Perhaps the most fecund modern. example is

contained in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead.

~ Reason, h e

OI

In The Function

11
. t aJ..ns
.
tha t there are f our ways of 1 oo k J..ng
·
a t rea1'J.. t y.

maJ..~.

In his attempt to refute the notions of entropy and the death of the world,
arguments extrapolated from the common understanding of the second law
of thermo-dynamics (the hypothesis that the degenerate form of all energy is heat and, therefore, when all the bodies in the universe have

reached the same temperature, all action--including life--will stop),

01 .L

1~ /

A

)

,

10
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (New York: Henry Holt,
passim.
11

Whitehead, The Function of Reason, nassim.

Whitehead posits an idealist scheme.

8
His two sets of opposite terms are

Bergson's God against Einstein's materialist universe and, perpendicularly, Plato's ideas contrary to Aristotle's prime matter.
dix II)

(See Appen-

While it is perfectly true that the closed-universe, as seen

from Einstein's point of view, is slowly reaching a heat-sink death, an
examination of the other positions on the chart reveals that Bergson's
God continually shovels new Aristotelian prime matter into the universe
and organizes it into the forms of :Plato's ideas.

In this metabolis-

tic analogy, the anabolism that destroys the universe for Dr. Einstein
balances a continuous creation which replaces all which was lost by entropy, and indeed this process increases the intensity of reality and
even its amount by catabolism.

The process involved in all such idea-

listie philosophy is one of categorization.
A light-hearted but apt example of such procedure would be contained in the preparation of spaghetti sauces.

Each tomato-based spaghetti

sauce is unique; but each contains tomato sauce, onions, garlic, and
olive oil.

It is important to note that for every idealist, all four of

his categories are immanent, but that only one is also transcendent (e.g.,
Bergson's God, or whatever is the principal ingredient giving the spaghetti sauce its essential savor).

The model Whitehead erects derives

from Plato's idealistic trilogy (The Sophist, The Statesman,and
Parmenides) in which it is taught that the four categories are motion
and rest perpendicular to being and non-being. 12 As the opposite of
1

(New York:

~lato, "The Sophist," in Dialogues, ed. Benjamin Jowett
Random House, 1937), ii. 221-280.

9
1

nothing, Being is transcendent, and as substance it is immanent. 3

It

should be noted in passing that only in this trilogy does Plato use
language precisely in this way.
The naturalist seeks to reduce all reality to only atoms of time
and space.

Two of the more famous examples are the atoms of Democritus

or Epicurus, and the moments of time in David Hume 7 s thought, moments so
radically discreet that they even deny the possibility of any causality.
In a naturalistic novel, two characters cannot even understand each other
unless they share the identical experience, and it follows, from the

s~~e

point of view, that a man and a woman in such literature are never able
to 1mderstand each other because of his masculine and her feminine points
of view.

(Ernest Hemingway's A Farewell to Arms is a classic case in

pcii-t.)

Because abstract no~~s have no meaning for the naturalist, he

will impose no categories.

He can write about Joe or Harry, but not about

mankind, just as Halt Hhitman writes about leaves of grass, or a song of
himself.

The naturalist is usually obsessed with the perverse, the uni-

que, the different, the freak.

Much of the modern American theatre, the

stages of Tennessee Williams and Arthur Miller, is the domain of naturalis~s.

Their works are usually short, because all they can give is

immediate detail.
The pragmatist is concerned solely with the context in which
knowledge is gained.

For

hL~.

there are actions without actors.

The per-

son is the sum total of those actions whose utility he is capable of

10
altering.

An obvious example is Ayn

Ran~

who uses, or perhaps abuses,

Aristotle's rules of logic as captions for her chapters in The Fountain~·

14

The only real people for Miss

ter the world.

Ra_~d

are those who are able to al-

There is a distinctly similar view in neo-Freudianism,

neo-Marxism, and neo-Darwinianism.

The vast majority of American psycho-

analysts are representative of the neo-Freudian viewpoint; Leon Trotsky's
opportunistic communism is the prime example of neo-Marxism; whereas the
relativism of John Dewey or the social parwinians adhere to a pragmatic
neo-Dar,;inianism.

Many, though by no means all, of the attempts of struc-

turalist critics to accept nothing but relationships within a text as
the only valid mode of treating a piece of literature are but further
means of presenting pragmatism as the yardstick by which all insight is
gained.

In another case, that of Jean-Paul Sartxe's

~eing

and. Nothinsness

under the label of "Existential Psychoanalysis," the author gives the
reader the paradigm of the skier who, like all of Sartre's anti-heroes,
possesses an essence that is merely a whim, and who has an existence made
1
manifest only by that essence. 5 · He maintains that the snow by itself is
nothing, or rather, that it is both a bridge and a swamp; it becomes
what it "is" by virtue of·the use that the skier makes of it.
skier only enters reality by using himself as a skier.

14
Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead. 25th
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), passim.
l5Jean-Paul Sartre, Bein and Nothin
menological Ontology, tr. Hazel E. Barnes
1956), passim.

He has no reality

Annivers~J

ess:

But the

Edition

An Essa• in PhenoCitadel Press,

11
in himself; he is only his project, i.e., his being as skier.

16

Turning to the dualistic philosophers (those who hold that
reality has at least two natures, e.g., mind and matter), in the Republic
of Plato, in which both the idealistic mind and the

r~turalistic

body

are principles, it is found in the Allegory of the Cave that the body
truly senses but does not perceive that which must be understood by dialectical climbing.
of the

tr~th

Rationalistic literature, written on the assumption

of this stage of Plato's development, consists of works of

discovery as, say, in the novels of Thomas Wolfe where he delights in
playing with the concepts of Hegel's logic, the sole function of which is
to supply Plato's Republic with a methodology:

"A stick is not a stick,

but also the negation of stick. " 17 A thesis has cha."lged into an antithesis from which synthesis is possible.

In the long,' searching

~ovels

of Wolfe, the actions do not exist for the sake of those actions, but
rather far the sake of the self-revelation of the main character, who
18
only at the end comes to know who he is.
In contra-distinction to the rationalism of Plato is the willintellect dichotomy of Aristotle, or realism (ontologically, St. Thomas
Aquinas's distinction between essence and existence), 19 which in the farm
16

Ibid.

i?Thomas Wolfe, Of Time and the River (New Yo~k: Charles
Scribners' Sons, 1935), Such dialectical horseplay is scattered
throughout the text.
18

Ibid.

passim.

1
9st. Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence (Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949), p. 56.

12
of the Poetics, is probably the source of more verbiage than all the
other critical tools combined; the all-pervasive influence of the Poetics
on nee-classical writing is too well-known to be mentioned except in
p:tssing.

The contemporary audience is perhaps familiar with the films

of Alfred Hitchcock, the actions of which are never very far from

Aristotle's understanding of catharsis.

Hitchcock himself maintained

that he designed his films with the express intention that his audience
20
experience intense emotion, and then be purged from it.

.

It is a truism that because Aristotle treated man as a mixture
of substance and accident, and because he held that only formal and final

causes are of the nature of the divine beast, he regarded only those
emotions capable of universalization as being proper perfections of
humanity.

Hence

~and

happiness make a man to be a man because they

are the same in all men, but fear and anger are ·unique in each man, and
hence they are defects in his humanity which must expunged by catharsis
so that he may return to his universality.
famous opening line in Anna Karen ina'

One may remember Tolstoy's

"Each happy family is happy in

the same way, but that each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. n 21

20
Francois Truffaut and Helen G. Scott, Hitchcock (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1967), passim.
21
Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, tr.
Heritage Press, 1952), p. 15.

Cons~~ce

Garnett (New York:

13
In materialism, which is a combination of naturalism and mysticism ~ee Appendix

17

(Marx would have said base and super-structure,

or Freud would ~Ave said instinct and conscious ego), a writer so minded
produces works with an immense amount of naturalistic detail; every bit
of this detail is organized to some central fruition such as the withering
of the state to be reached at the end of Marx's communism, or the achievement to be attained by Freud's psychoanalyzed man.

The function of

thought to the materialist is to resolve his contradictions so as to
reach his inevitable nirvana.
Herman Hesse's Siddartha.

22

An excellent literary example is found in

The hero (Buddha) conquers temptation by

giving in to it, and is, therefore, no longer bothered by it.

Because

materialist authors by their nature must take their readers through a
seemingly interminable number of contradictions before

a_~iving

at their

ultimate heavens, they tend to produce huge works like the Cowperwood
trilogy of Dreiser, 23 and because they do not believe in a transcendent
good and evil, they must show even capitalistic heroes like Cowperwood
as great and glorious beasts in life's jungle.

Materialistic writers

L~

the guise of Calvinistic determinism (absolute determinism is the hallmark of this philosophy) have provided a wide literature which includes
the works of Melville, Hawthorne, Somerset Maugham and Marcel Proust.
The remaining position is that of the conceptualist, who is determined to retain both Aristotle's distinction between the will and the
22Herman Hesse, Siddhartha, tr. Hilda Rosner.
Series (New York: New Directions, 1951), Passim.

New Classics

23Theodore Dreiser, The Financier (New York: Bell and Cockburn, 1912) The Titan (New York: Bell and Cockburn, 1914); The Stoic
(New York: World Publishing, 1972), passim.

14
intellect, and Plato's distinction between the mind and the body inasmuch
as--for the conceptualist--will, intellect,and body are three separate
principles.

Th~s

position is perhaps best understood by turning to

Dostoevsky's The Brothers

Kararr~zov,

though philosophically it is better

understood in terms of Kant's three types of propositions (synthetic
a priori, analytic,and synthetic a posteriori),

24

Soren Kierkegaard's

Three Stages on Life's Way (aesthetic, ethical,and religious), 25 Dun
Scotus's addition of haecceitas or thisness to matter and form as principles,

26

or the Socra:tic is, could, and ought of the Euthyphro, 27

In The

Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky presents the sensualist Smerdyakov,
the idealist Ivan, and the mystical Alyosha as the three stages in the
life of the whole man Dmitri, who goes through
and mystical stages.

28

sensualist~

intellectual,

The sine qua non of conceptualist aesthetics is

that a work of art should attempt to balance these three etages with each
other, so that it takes b.oth the extra-artistic premise that the artist
holds as a man, and the sensuous aesthetic detail of the world he chooses
to describe, and synthesizes them into a wholly new intellectual form
created for a specific resolution, i.e., the individual work of art.
24

Immanuel Kant, The Criti
Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press,

~r.

Norman Kenny

2 5soren Kierkegaard, Stages of Life 1 s Way, tr. Walter Lowrie
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), passim.
26

Etienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Parisl Libraire ?hilosophique
J. Urin, 1952) pp. 464, 466, 469.
27
28

Plato, "Euthyphro, " Dialogues i, 38 3-398.

Fyodor Dostoevsky, ':'he Bro-chers Karamazov-, tr. Constar1ce
c;arnett (New York: Macmillan, 192J), passim.
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It follows from the previous considerations th4t artists, who are
after all men, and who have philosophies (which is simply another way of
saying that all men have some view of reality--and in mature men these
views are coherent and internally consistent)--it follows that their works
of art are embodiments of their philosophies, and that, therefore, there
can be no theory of aesthetics that does equal justice to the conceptualist

Dostoevsky,

the materialist Dreiser, the realist Pope, the rational-

ist Wolfe, the mystic Camus, the idealist Keats, the naturalist Whitman
and the pragmatist Rand.
erature

The beginning of wisdom in the criticism of lit-

is to discuss the writer's success or failure in following

the criteria of his own philosophy.

CHAP!'ER II
THE Al!STHETICS OF CONCEPTUALISM

Easily the most influential schools of aesthetic thought in the
history of the Western world are those descending from

~lato

and Aristo-

tle, which usually go by the names of romanticism and classicism respectively.

There is, therefore, a tendency of critics to reduce most works

of art to being examples of one or the other of these schools.

Unfor-

tunately, a term like romanticism may be misapplied ubiquitously to Wordsworth's naturalism, Shelley's rationalism, Keats's idealism, Blake's mysticism and even (under the theory of guilt by association) Byron's realism,
which is poetry with an Aristotelian structure.

Byron's famous comment

that he preferred a beginning, a middle, and an end rather than to plunge
into his work in medias res (the typical gambit of the romantics) is on~
.

1

one of the many Aristotelian hallmarks of his works.

Perhaps the most

obvious realistic device in his writing--which should be cited to lay a
groundwork for dstinguishing realism from conceptualism--is his insistence
on maintaining the regularity of his form, and to keep it simple and
traditional.
Hopkins.

Not for him are the sprung rhythms of a Coleridge or a

On the other hand, a distinction must be drawn between Coleridge's

rationalism and Hopkins's conceptualism.
1

For Coleridge, a poem

George Gordon Noel Byron, Lord Byron, "Don
Poetical Works (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1905), pp.
this passage deliberately distinguishes his intentions
contemporaries by alluiing directly to the Poetics in
sentence of Don Juan.

16

Juan," in Complete
Byron in
from those of his
the opening

747-748.
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progressively reveals what he takes to be a higher truth, and that antagonism between the worlds of farm and content can only be asserted by
the poet, who destroys by synergy the rhyme and the meter.

2

In HopkinJs work, however, the violation of the standard rules

of rhythm is not a product of the antithesis between the prison of the
body and the eye of the mind.

Rather, sprung rhythm is the necessary con-

sequence of three levels of meaning in his work, and in these three levels
are contained the result consequent of holding a conceptualist aesthetics.
It has already been established that the conceptualist accepts both the
Aristotelian distinction between will and intellect as well as the
Platonic dichotomy between mind and body.

To express both these distinc-

tions in poetry, it is necessary to begin with a statement of the will,
that is, with a statement about good and evil •. This non-artistic, or
extra-literary statement comes from the artist himself (note Kant's idea
that men make each act representative of all mankind).3

Such a proposi-

tion being a general principle must be stateable in a sensuous milieu.
But a sensuous milieu cannot be reduced to an intellectual principle or
to the logical form of the work as it would be for an Aristotelian.

Many

realist poets shy away from specific detail, seeking their poetic truth
in

universal statements.

To argue the truth of this statement in the

case of Byron would require a long digression; Pope is a more obvious
example of_such universality.

On the other hand, the conceptualist de-

lights in the sheer joy not only of the sensuous detail, but also in the

~or a complete discussion£!· Richard Harter Fogle 1 The Idea
of Coleridge's Criticism (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1962), pp. 49-69.
3such a tendency seems implicit in nearly every applicable
page of his writing.
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sensuous suggestiveness of the language in which that detail is described.
fretted.

Hopkins delights in words like dappled, minion, vermilion and
Because both the detail and the statements of moral belief are

first-premises for him, he simply offers both; they need not be proved.
It follows, therefore, that far the conceptualist in general, and
Hopkins in particular, the logical form of a work will be unique.

No two

works of a conceptualist will be exactly the same in structure, far the
function of the structure is to unite a very specific moral principle with
a very specific net of sensuous details.
tremely concrete:

A Hopkins line is usually ex-

"As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame. "

4

Also he erects variation of meter into a principle; as other writers may
vary their rhythms only to avoid monotony, so Hopkins varies his meter as
the result both of the external truth he states and of the internal necessity of suiting form to function.

But for all the richness of the detail,

and for all the complexity of the form, the entire kingfisher sonnet is
dominated by the line:

"Crying What I do is me:

for that I came."

4

It

is the only line that is subjective to the artist, whereas every other
line is either sensuously objective to him or categorically objective,
such as the statements about Christ.
One may gain aesthetic distance from conceptualist literature by
referring to the equivalent aesthetics in the other art farms.

For exam-

ple, in the history of painting, the early medieval mystics care nothing
for sensuous exactitude.
4

In a given painting may be found a tiny donkey,

Gerard Y.ianley Hopkins, "As Kingfishers Catch Fire Dragonflies
Draw Flame," in Poems, 2nd ed. ed. by Charles Williams (London: Oxford
University Press, 1931), p. 53.
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a medium-sized St. John,and a towering Christ.
exists only to express meaning.

In short, sensuous detail

By the time of Giotto, and the concomi-

tant naturalistic revolution, many paintings exhibit the tortured features
of a tortured Christ and a distinctly suffering Mary, both of whom are
unique, and the viewer can know them solely from the analogy of the models
who posed for the projects.

The struggle to bring some formal order into

the naturalistic revolution was the work of the Monumentalists--Uccelo,
Castagno, Piero della Francesca, Peruginq and Mantegna:
While they were all students of the new "realism," (read naturalism) they were even more s~gnificant in being bold and original
thinkers in the sphere of pictorial design. Their aim was the
life-giving disposition of mass, line and color.5
This means that they attempted to synthesize naturalistic detail with the
underlying idea--which, by definition, is Platonic rationalism.
This romantic "realism" then gave way to the true realism of
Leonardo.

In the famous Last Supper, the classical form,

balanc~

and

structure of the work come close to forcing the observer into calculating

so that he can determine which one is Christ.

The volitional

meaning, the extra-artistic, and the religious dimension are nearly lost
in

k~s

thesis.

determination to view his subjects in a

perfectly harmonious syn-

Despite his many artistic virtues, in a Leonardo the viewer search-

es in vain for the power of the simple, early medieval cartoon of the huge
Christ dominating the medium-sized St. John and the tiny donkey.
Michelangelo led the artist of his epoch out of the near banality of form and content without meaning.

In one of the most important

5navid Robb and J.J. Garriso, Art and the Western World.
ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 644.

Jrd
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works, the eighteen foot tall statue of David, with the exception of the
right hand, the entire work is carried off in a relatively true-to-life
manner.

The proportions do not violate what might be reasonably expected

in a well-proportioned athlete.

Unlike the ancient Greeks, Michaelangelo

does not shrink the size of the head to make the muscles appear powerful,
but that hand, that right hand, that right hand that held the sling that
slew Goliath, that right hand that saved the children of Israel and kept
the flame of Judah alive for Christ and Christianity--that right hand is
five times the size of the left hand.
resides in the proportion of the hands.

The moral significance of the work
Many people see this statue and

understand the importance of it, but only on reflection do they notice the
disproportionate size of the one hand, because, if the audience were immediately to spot a gross difference, that very grossness would so offend
as to render ineffective the statue as a work of art.

By a subtle appli-

cation of what plastic artists have come to call harmonious distortion,
Michaelangelo blends that hand into the whole figure in such a way as to
preserve the unity of the total conception.
Michaelangelogs process of harmonic distortion next finds life
in the paintings of El Greco.

To understand El Greco's work, one may take

as an analogy the columnar supports of the Gothic cathedrals.

The medie-

val architects tended to break up the facade of a ten-foot thick column
into minute rivulets which appeared as enormous chords aspiring after God.
Similarly, El Greco elongates his figures in recognition of the tension
in any human being between the downward gravity into the City of Man and
the upward pull into the City of God.

(A tangential remark is necessary

at this point; some critics who evidently practice medicine vicariously
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have alleged that they have discovered an astigmatic condition evident in
El Greco's work.

Anyone who has an experimental bent may view a human

figure and a painter's canvas through a lens that distorts a model to make
it look taller.

Using the same lens to see what he is painting--on the

hypothesis that an artist sees his canvas with the same eyes that see his

.

model--the painter will see both his model and his representation as tall
and thin, but both would then be shorter and fatter than he sees them.
Hence the astigmatic explanation of El Greco's painting is absurd.)

His

harmonic distortion suffers from only one possible aesthetic objection-that the elongation is too obvious.
The need to distort with sublety receives its final culmination in
Rembrandt.

That Dutch master painted in his studio by candlelight, not

with one large candle, but with innumerable small candles, each of which
was movable to permit its use to distort the expression of the model, or
to distort the significance of some part of the model's body.

The viewer

readily discerns the sensuous detail the artist sees, but he is not the
passive receptor of his model.

Rather he both receives sensations from

the mass which is his model, and he creates in part those sensations by
determining where and how the light will fall.
into a saint, a fooJ,or a devil.

Subtly he can make a man

The dominating spiritual quality of

Rembrandt's vision necessitated the invention of such techniques.
Subsequent impressionists and their successors reveal obsessive
concern with various experiments with light,

~ut

because they lack his

vision, they do not fully comprehend the use of lighting.
produce a series of interesting intellectual exercises:

Hence they
Seurat's

pointillism, Cezanne's cubism, or Monet's out-of-focus tecbnique.
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In Michaelangelo, El Greco 11 and Rembrandt, there is the grand
sweep of conceptualist aesthetics in plastic arts.

Alternatively one can

turn to architecture to see the naturalistic buildings of Mies van der
Rohe, the idealistic structures of Le Corbusier,and the conceptualist
houses of Frank Lloyd Wright.

6 ~~apartment building by Mies, with its

massive glass walls, oppressively brings in the entire world to the apartment dweller,who becomes nothing but a naturalistic product of his experiences.

Only his tiny bathroom shuts out the world where he stands naked

in front of large mirrors which give him to himself as object rather than
as subject.

Such contemplation correlates precisely with Zen Buddhism.

Zen of course takes the attitude of the object treated objectively
and ... the subject, i.e., the Poet himself as theme, treated objectively ... ordinary people being in the state of ... the subject treated objectively ... still wandering about in ignoFance of the laws of
their being, which govern them even while they wander in ignorance. 7
If Mies's man is a product of his experience, and his art is an
intensification of his experience, then Le Corbusier 1 s man is outside his
experience and his art is a revelation of new experiences.

He seems to

care nothing for the man who lives in his buildings; they confront the inhabitant.

If an inmate finds a lavatory perfectly proportioned to its

adjoining sink, but neither of them in proportion to his own body, so much
the worse for this poor misshapened and misproportioned soul; should he
decide to read a book, he might find a beautiful blinding light (like the

6
CL ~eter Blake, The Master Builders (New York:

Norton Library,

1976), passim.

Tokyo:

7Roger Blyth, Zen in English Literature and Oriental Classics.
Hokuseido Press, 1942, p. 71.
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one flooding into Plato's cave) assaulting his eyes through a narrow
clerestory.

It may even remind him of what Edna St. Vincent Millay says

somewhere, that burning a candle at both ends makes for a glorious light.
Under the conceptualist maxim "form follows function," a typical
Frank Lloyd Wright

house does not merely provide a home far the one who

purchases the building, but it indicates who he could and should become.
It may contain a dramatic kitchen two stories high, reaching through the
roof of the house, stage-lit to illuminate it, and it may be surrounded
by half-walls, turning the whole work-space, normally a. prison, into a
stage where the housewife is the star.

The half-walls may permit the

housewife to be seen from every part of the house.

{No woman living in

such a Wright house ever rolled into the kitchen in curlers.)

One can

then enter the massive walk-in fireplace, having no equal since the Table
Round.

Beside it stands one of Wright's five-foot thrones.

Huge four-to-

eight-foot deep eves even project beyond the glass doors, forming a symbolic extension of the occupants' control of the space beyond him.

It is

the passer-by who feels the domination of the owner, rather than the
owner feeling the criticism of his environment.

The purpose of Wright's

designs is to turn the Willie Lomans who buy them into Siegfrieds.

In

New York he constructed the Guggenheim Museum for abstract art as a spiral
staircase leading up to a skylight whose ribs form an inverted star of
David.

On the ground floor, a tree grows out of the water reaching up

to Guggenheim's Jewish God through the abstract skylight.

Far the

Unitarians of Madison, Wisconsin, Wright built a long church, open only
at the apse behind the minister.

The apse is only a large picture

window, for the Unitarian sanctuary is nature outside the church building.
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The vision through that window.is a forest, a beach, a lake,and a sky.
Again, in Milwaukee, Wright's Greek Orthodox church is an acoustically
perfect inverted saucer of stressed concrete over a smaller saucer
facing upward, holding the congregation.

At the time of construction,

the Orthodox Church permitted no musical instruments since only the human
voice was allowed to praise God.

Thus his acoustically perfect auditorium

is an apt expression of Eastern Orthodox theology.

The decision far the

a cappella choir reflects the ethereal spirituality of the Orthodox
Church with its enormous passion far the Holy Ghost.
This mystical aesthetic of music finds counterpart in the rationalism of Brahms, when, true to the principles of German Platonism, he
wrote the North German Quartets.

In this work, sensuous melodies are

dialectically extended into logical harmonies which squeeze these tonepoems into abstruse musical ideas.

Finally, a synthesis of mind and body

brings back some, but not all, of the original music, and some, but not
all, of the logical form--neither being allowed to destroy the other.

In

the resolution, both sense and reason must limit themselves to provide a
compatible vehicle.

The beautiful melodies swell just to the point, but

not beyond the point, where the form would be lost.

Brahms is supposed

to have said to the young Mahler, when both of them were watching a rock
drop into a pond creating great ripples, "after me, the deluge. ,B

He

clearly foresaw that a composer like Wagner would go beyond the point where
the swelling lyricism could conform to the logic.

When the logical form

broke down, he knew that the romantic rationalism that he and Wagner
8
This is an oft-repeated story; whether or not it is true
historically does not affect the truth of the statement.
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shared must dissolve as it did in the abstract intellectualism of
Schoenberg.
Against the rationalism of Brahms and Wagner, the clear, lucid
Aristotelianism of Mozart's perfect symphonies imposes sanity in a world
of passion.

Like Aristotle, Mozart believed in moderation.

Each note

is clear and distinct, joining together to form a perfectly constructed
unity.

This is the essence of classicism, it is not that this clear,

lucid melody lacks meaning; it is only that the meaning has restraint.
Against this dichotomy, or rather to unify both the classical and romantic.
Beethoven in the Ninth Symphony creates a new form for the·symphony
(adding choral poem) in order to bring forth the extra-aesthetic premise.
He takes for his text Schiller's "O:le to Joy," the premise of which is
"Oh, how happy I am that my God exists."

The form which he creates is one

that unifies that premise with the sensuous elements that began the
symphony.

In the previous symphonies of Haydn and Mozart, the fourth

movement invariably intends to resolve rather than to transcend the previous movements.

Beethoven in transcending his instrumental movements

with a chorale to God is followirrg Bach's lead.

Bach redesigned many of

the musical instruments of his time, and altered many of the musical
forms in order to make the music carry his spiritual beliefs.

Thus the

harmonic distortion necessary to weld the spiritual to the material in a
new logical form reveals itself in all the arts.
Conceptualist art is often attacked on the grounds of being programmatic, and clearly it is antithetical to theories advocating "art for
art's sake," or that the "medium is the message."

Nowhere is this criti-

.

'
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cism so strong as in the attacks on conceptualist writers as polemicists,
and the attempts to rule them out of court.

Dostoevsky would have freely

confessed that his works were religious polemics; Dickens is nothing i f
he is not a social polemicist.

For Hopkins, the meaning of his poetry is

an expression of Dun Scotus's philosophy.9

What must be understood here

is Aristotle's discussion of the uses of la.ngua.ge.

10

Ia.ngua.ge may be used

to describe empirical detail; this is the subject of grammar or semantics.
Language may be used to describe logical processes as 1n logic or syntacical considerations.

Or language may be used to convince other persons

to change their values.

This is the function of rhetoric.

The concep-

tua.list might easily accuse his opponents of lack of rhetoric, which is
to turn their antagonists' charges against them, for rarely is the power
of writing 1n its formal elements.

One may generally state that the rbe-

torical premises of nearly all conceptualist art are statement·s about religion,

se~

or politics.

The works of Euripides are the perfect examples

of all three--the gods, women, war.

He does not shrink from having his

deus ex machina literally deliver the

~

on stage.

11

If the deity must

be invoked to solve the problem in front of the artist, the artist must

call for the workman capable of performing the task.
This brings us to another defining characteristic of conceptual1st writing: its extreme concreteness.

The God of the conceptualist is

9w. H. Gardner, "Introduction to the Fourth Edition," The Poems
of Gerard Manley Hopkins (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. xxi.
10
£!.McKeon, Thoughts, Actions and 1assions (Chicago:
of Chicago lress, 1954), pp. 158-169.
11

University

s1r Richard Claverhouse Jebb, "Euripides", Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 11th ed. (New York: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1910), ix. 902.

27
not a being-qua-being, a first principle uncaused, a symbolic meaning of
life, the greater conception than which nothing can be conceived--rather
his God is the patriarchal Father, not too different from the first
bearded patriarch.

The conceptualist poet does not demur from real evil.

Dostoyevsky's devil, Dante's hell, and Dicken's slums are not mere negations, privations or absences of perfection--they are hovels of hell, as
much as in the words of another conceptualist, Francis Thompson, God is
"The Hound of Heaven. "

Dante's prostitute in hell is submerged in a

layer of excrement; the stench of the feces is not a privation, not an
absence of perfection, nor does it have any connection with the ennui of
the modern existentialist.

12

The conceptualist writer differs from both the Platonists and the
Aristotelians by his insistence on using his art as a form propaganda;
but it is still necessary to distinguish between the propagandistic art
of the conceptualist and the propagandistic art of the materialist.

Most

readers are familiar with the long and somewhat tortuous novels of Hardy,
Melville, James T. Farrell,

~·

al.

The hallmark of these works is their

total and absolute determinism, in which the pathetic heroes can only
curse a world they never made.

As the materialist philosopher shares with

the conceptualist both the rich, sensuous detail and the intuitive, extraartistic premise, the difference between them must be found in the former's
acceptance and the latter's rejection of a logical form created to unify
the sensuous with the moral.

Observe how the sense detail in a Melville,

a Dreiser, or for that matter a Norman Mailer, rises up like a rich,

~ante Aligheri, Hell, tr. Dorothy L. Sayers (Harmondsworth,
Penguin, 1949), p. 185.
1

England:
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pounding, heavy ocean, eternally, dialectically smashing whatever it
creates.

Such writers are often accused of using grand passion in the

place of farm.

Their very formlessness gives them drama--which is the

epitome of their greatness, when they have it.

The doctoral candidate,

seeking to show his mastery of form, might be excused from even dealing
with the materialist school of literature, were it not for the two major
exponents of the schools
Shakespeare.

Tolstoy's War and 1eace and the tragedies of

In War and Peace we are told that we must reject the view

that a man named Napoleon conceived, implemented, and willed to conquer
an area named Russia.

Rather, we are told that for no fathomable reason

a mass of humanity, from urges it did not understand, was impelled to
march across half of Eurasia; and then for equally incomprehensible
1
reasons, turned around, and in a disastrous rout, fled. 3 Further we
are told that the battles were not won by generals, but were lost by
virtue of unforeseen events.

The author's allusion seems to be to the

old saw that for want of a nail, the shoe was lost ••.

It is to Tolstoy's

humanity that we owe the abandonment of this determinism to the maturity
of his later works such as Anna Karenina.
-.: .. :j:'OCf
~

In the tragedies of· Shakespeare - including Richard III or Romeo
and Juliet, Hamlet, Macbeth, King Lear, Othello--we find that the central
characters are personages who look or sound much as one might picture
Shakespeare himself at the age when each of the plays was written.

From

the Hunchbacked Richard III through the star-crossed lovers Romeo and
Juliet, to Macbeth destroyed by the prophecy of the witches (the Fates of
1
(New York:

3Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, tr. Louise and Aylmer Maude
Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp. 1253-126).

29
the Old Greek tragedy), can be seen a series of heroes whose destruction
is an inevitable consequence of forces against which they have no control.
In Othello, the character, Iago--who is clearly an embodiment of
Fate--possesses a one-dimensional evil, which is a preliminary study far
the less incarnated fate preached by the witches in Macbeth.

If in Lear

it is learned that people must do as they do, in Macbeth it is learned
14
that people cannot do other than as they do.
And once again, a female
Iago, Lady Macbeth, plays the role of Fate, guiding Macbeth to his
destruction.

This digression into materialism was made necessary by the

need to distinguish the propagandistic art of the conceptualist, which
is grounded in free will, from the deterministic art of the materialist
which, even when it has the image of the god of a Calvin or a Spinoza,
is intlistinguishable from the laws of physics.
The hallmark of a conceptualist fiction is, then, the story of a
hero, who by conscious choice of the good (defined by the author) enters
into a struggle with evil.

It will be seen later that just as a material-

ist writer often uses an impersonal antagonist, such as society in the
hands of a Marxist writer, so at least one conceptualist writer, the one
with whom this work deals, uses the impersonal force of the good through
whom many characters in the same piece may rise for moments like a parade
of Christian saints in their martyrdom, making their small sacrifice in
imitation of the great Sacrifice by Him who redeemed us all.

The separa-

tion of the momentary embodiments of the good from the good itself as an
impersonal hero is a necessary device for a pious Christian author who
can neither excel the gospel, nor add a jot or title to it.
14

La~os Egri, The Art of Dramatic Writing (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1960), p. 109.
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As the conceptualist views morals from intention rather than from
objective act, his heroes will blunder, for they hung the last perfect
Man on a Cross.

His heroes will at times 9e temporarily bested by evil

men whose intention he does not divine, but always it will be with his and
their intentions that the reader will be concerned, and as a consequence
the conceptualist novel will always be a struggle between good and evil.
Yet in spite of this generic struggle, the conceptualist's heroes, as well
as his villains, will remain concrete human beings; in other words, people the audience can know.

In an analysis of conceptualist art and also

of a novel of the author whose work forms the inspiration far this thesis,
these areas must be brought to light:

1) the sensuous milieu and the

concrete detail that form the area and the character of the gladiators
in the particular works, 2) the moral premise, the extra-artistic statement that is being made and far which the author wrote his wark,and 3)
the formal structure of the work, for only after an analysis of the sensuous and moral elements can the audience discover the rule of proportion
or logic which he has created in order to unite the natural with the
supernatural.

The criticism of his effectiveness must wait until is dis-

covered from the physical and moral elements the body for which they must
form a skeleton.

Something more needs to be said of this requirement,

for criticism most often proceeds from an analysis of form first, and
thence to such physical or moral details as may appear within the work.
In the conceptualist novel, not to mention conceptualist criticism, the
reversal of this process is true; for the individual conceptualist, the
discovery of the form is the last and the crowning artistic achievement
rather than the beginning.

It may be said that the conceptualist discovers
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his form in medias res; for that very reason, it is the most difficult
part of his artistic creation, and the place where he is most likely to
fail.

At such times he is quite likely to envy the materialist who can

simply allow the grand passion of his milieu to lead whither it will,
without needing any unity of these two elements {sense and moral), whereas the materialist is free to occupy the bulk of his work with the sensuous and then to abandon it in a monologue of morality after the fact.
The conceptualist, on the other hand, needs to keep, at all times,
both his morality and his milieu onstage and, as a result, his form must
always be present to hold the work together.

Because his physical de-

tails and his conscious moral intent (as expressed in his characters)
must constantly interact and affect each other, his artistic form must always be present and yet be unobtrusive, for a common failure of bad conceptualist art is the work whose skeleton is so obvious that it obliterates
the body and the soul it was meant to unify.

One might readily think of

John Wayne's film The Green Berets, which has all the good and evil elements
of Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, yes, and even all the rich detail of the Brothers, but whose skeletal form stands out like the bones
on a man whose body has been emaciated by starvation.

Where the con-

ceptualist artist has made this scientifically correct but artistically
unappealing mistake, his propaganda reduces his performance to little
more than a diatribe, pedantic and often unintentionally comic in its
banality.

It is against this danger of triteness that one should first

measure the success of the conceptualist author in the criticism that
comes after a consideration of his three foundation elements--sense,
meaning,and form.
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But there is an opposite danger that will also have to be considered; the opposite of too much bone and too little skin is too much
fat on too little farm, for a conceptualist work can also be destroyed
where the form is not sufficient to give structure to a then too rich
detail and too pompous phraseology.

William Saroyan has often been

accused of static premises like "life is wonderful" which seem a bit
1
weak to carry the artifice of his rich characterizations. 5 In the conceptualist writing which fails in this way, the reader is lost in an
over-lush jungle of sensuous delight which drowns the awkwardly placed
sermon like a minister ranting against the joys of Tahiti.

To examine an author who avoids both the Scylla of formlessness
and the Charybdis of sermonizing, it is refreshing at long last to be
able to turn tQ the work of Charles Williams.

In his writing, the sensu-

ous details of his narrative and his moral premise will be traced, lead1ng to discovery of the critical form which he creates to unify the first

two elements; and finally we shall consider the fine line, or rather,
the taut wire he walks between banality and decadence, and his success
in avoiding

the Scylla and Charybdis which wait either to engulf him

in the decadence of purple prose or to reduce him to the didacticism of

a newspaper column.

CHAPI'ER III
THE CONCEPTUALISM OF CHARLES WILLIAMS
The only comprehensive account of Charles Williams's thought to
date is The Theology of Romantic Love,by Mary McDermott Shideler.

1

Be-

cause so much of Williams's needs elucidation for those who do not feel
he speaks directly to their condition, she culls his central doctrines as
they are spread out in over forty of his volumes.

To discuss the underly-

ing assumptions of Williams, however, it must be assumed that the reader
has first garnered a mastery of his explicit ideas.

It is beyond the scope

and space limitations of this dissertation to explain the massive technical vocabulary in Shideler's explication Qf Williams's thought.

Neverthe-

less, it is necessary to alert the reader that this thesis presupposes
the validity of all of what she has had to say about the meaning of such
concepts as the Co-Inherence, 2 Substituted Love,3 the Way of the Affirmation of the Images,
Vision,

4

the Way of the Negation of Images,5 the Beatrician

6 the Flying Moment,? and the Way of Perversion. 8

1
Mary McDermott Shideler, The Theola
of Romantic Love:
in the Writings of Charles Williams (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966 .
2
Ibid., pp. 61-63, 65-66, 68-69, 79-80, 108-109, 190-191.
3Ibid., pp. 64-65.
4

Ibid., pp. 33, 84, 114, 170-171,

5Ibid.
6

Ibid. , pp. 29-42.

?Ibid., pp. 115-120
8

Ibid., pp. 121-138.
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Quite often a writer who thinks philosophically, whether he is a
formal philosopher or a literary man, will compose one short work that
sheds light on his whole output.

As St. Thomas Aquinas gave us

On

Being

and Essence, as Kant wrote Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, or even
as Keats's letters or Thomas Wolfe's The Story of a Novel gives the "basic
thrust of those authors' thoughts, so the complete shape of Williams's
philosophy and

theology~-even

to the possibility of deducing his ethics,

epistemology and aesthetics--can be seen in He Came Down From Heaven,
his Christology and his discussion of the nature, of heaven and its revelation on earth.9

Early in his argument he reverses the usual insistence

on the pure spirituality of the Eternal state:

"It is not, of course,

possible to deny that heaven--in the sense of salvation, bliss or the
presence of
tion."10
thodox.

GodT~C~~

exist in space; that would be to deny the Incarna-

This statement, as with everything Williams wrote, is fully orBut it is another "arrangement of doctrine," to use his own

charming phrase.

11

Rather than rehearse the contents of this remarkable book (anyone
could do that for himself), it is of more profit to analyze directly the
premises that stand behind selected passages, particularly those that
~-"

directly bear on matters of body, intellect,and will in order to be able
to understand his "arrangement of doctrine."

Such passages most readily

9Charles Williams, He Came Down From Heaven and The Forgiveness
of Sin (London: Faber and Faber, 1950).
10
11

Ibid., p. 10.

Ibid., cf. p. 119.
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yield meaning to anyone searching for systematic meaning, because often
they instantly reveal what an author will admit into his system.

For ex-

ample, because James Joyce in his imaginative literature will admit sense
impressions only, he is a naturalist (see Appendix).

To show conceptual-

ism it is necessary in an author to demonstrate that he admits each of the
three elements.

Sense knowledge is real knowledge for the conceptualist;

it is not for the realist.

Similarly, intellectual knowledge is

admissible to the conceptualist in a manner scarcely imaginable to the
materialist, whereas the goodness of the will in action transcends all
knowledge, a statement unintelligible to the naturalist.
Why then would Williams wish to use another ordering of the
Church's dogma?

When he refers to using a different "arrangement of doctine,"

he seems to mean that the pre-eminence of St. Thomas Aquinas as Universal
Doctor of the Church has relegated to obscurity those Catholics who view
reality from other perspectives.

In the lines quoted, he is insisting

on the reality of things physical as part of the full scheme.

Indeed,

corporeality plays so much a part in Williams that, taken out of context
from the rest of his work, some of his essays (were it not for overtly
Christian passages) could be mistaken for the thought of D. H. Lawrence.
This demand for the reality of incarnation on the part of the optimist
Williams would in the hands of a pessimistic Fatalist become Manicheanism,
12
a charge which has been brought against him on occasion.

1

Dax (London:

~ancis

King, Ritual Ma~ic in England.;
Neville Spearman, 1970 , p. 112.

1887 to the Present

Yet no Manichean could write:
The events far which we sincerely implore the fulfillment upon
earth are already perfectly concluded in heaven ••• Heaven then is
beatitude and the eternal fulfillment of Will, the contemporaneousness of perfection.13
Nothing could be farther from Lawrence or Manicheanism than that statement; in the eternal state, the will reaches its fullness.

One cannot

tell whether "fulfillment of the Will'' in this context (1. e., its object,
the Good) means God or his creation.

The capitalization would make one

tend to think he was speaking of the Omnipotence, but how can omnipotence
The statement appears nonsensical unless one applies what
14
Scotus calls the formal distinction.
Either God and his creation are
be

fulfi~led?

really one (a nominal distinction), or else there is something greater
than God, namely God and his creation (a real distinction).

But i f there

were a distinction mare than nominal, but less than real, then God and
his creation could be separate but one-in-God, paradoxically.

By defini-

tion, this is.what the term conceptualism means, a way of solving the problem of universals without falling into the extremes of realism (Polytheism) or nominalism (Unitarianism), by maintaining that the universal
is an ontological concept, having ontological status, a third possibility
altogether.
If we examine Williams's sentence quoted in isolation, it is
irrelevant whether he is talking about God or his creation when he discusses Will, because whatever is true of God is true of those made in His
lJWilliams, He Came Down From Heaven, p. 11.
14

Etienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris; ·Libraire Philosophique
J. Urin, 19S2), P1J. 244-246.
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image, at least analogously.

His Will is metaphorically fulfilled in

eternity--because of his own existence--but men can become fulfilled
literally, and thus share in the Will.

This is classical conceptualism.

And Williams next announces that religion is the definition of the rela1
tionship between Will and creation, 5 1n other words, Will mediates (an
intellectual process) between itself and creation (Body).

He has avoided

the problem of conflict between will and creati·on which led to many
aberrations of theologians.

He makes mystery his first principle, as did

Scotus, and proceeds.
The supremacy of the will, not only to the body but also to the
intellect as well, has serious ramifications in the ordering of the
branches of thought.

From man's point of view, if the will and its con-

sequent choices and resultant actions are more important than what a man
knows, then ethics (or moral theology) will be prior to metaphysics (or
sacred theology); beliefs and understanding will always be less important
than the setting of the heart to the Good.
Good will always precede the True.

In terms of the virtues, the

This does not mean Williams or any

conceptualist disparages the intellect; far from it.

He is usually, how-

ever, concerned with its possible abuse (what may be called a form of
intellectual hedonism); it is far more important, nay (and here is the
difference from a Thomist) urgent for him to show the superiority of a
good man to one who merely discourses on goodness.

A legend states that

St. Thomas Aquinas once visited St. Bonaventure; the great Dominican said
to the Franciscan, "Where is your library?"
1

The Seraphic Doctor pointed

5Williams, He Came Down From Heaven, p. 11,

to a crucifix saying, "There is my library. "

16

That statement could

have been made seriously only by a conceptualist or a mystic.
It £ollows that this extreme voluntarism attempts to reveal that
the will is £ree, radically so.

Williams takes great pains

~o

show that

we are responsible £ar our intentions (always mare important than actions
to the conceptualist).
The devil, even if he is a £act, has been an indulgence; he has, on
occasion, been encouraged to reintroduce into Christian emotions the
dualism which the Christian intellect has denied, and we have relieved
our own sense o£ moral submission by contemplating, even disapprovingly, something which was neither moral nor submissive.!?
Any shift or motivation £or evil from the responsible party draws Williams's
ire.

Each man is responsible £or his own intention.
In a magnificently composed argument, Williams proceeds to discover

the relationship among the books o£ the Bible, its worth as a collection
o£ writings, and the intentions o£ the men who wrote the individual books:
"Setting aside supernatural beings, the central figure of the Old Testamentis Israel; the central £igure of the New is the Church." 18 This
stark dichotomy lets us see that "individuals and companies, and mankind
itself, are all £inally set in relation to that non-human cause and centre
which is called God." 19

Williams tells us that the introduction o£ evil,

16
Ampli£ication of this famous story can be found in Etienne
Gilson, The Philoso h of Saint Bonaventure, tr. Dom I. Trehowan and
Frank J. Sheed London: Sheed and Ward, 1938), pp. 470-495.
1
7Williams, He Came Down From Heaven, p. 19.
18
Ibid. , p. 14.
19 Ibid •.
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the severing of will from intellect by the introduction of a contradiction, with the resultant loss in preternatural power, is the given of
the Old Bible, and that the rest of it consists of building-blocks to
restore mankind's health.

This attempt to understand the human race and

to find the way to its healing is the sole reason far the scriptures:
By a deprivation of the central idea, and of the personification of
that idea, the Bible does not cease to be metaphysics and become literature; it ceases to be anything at all but little bits of
literature rather oddly collated.20
This is a direct attack on the once rather popular notion of treating the Bible as literature without regard to its religious teaching, a
belief that could be held only by one who reads anything merely for its
artistic value--a typically idealist tendency.

This statement in itself

excludes Williams from the camp of.those who hold that aesthetics is the
primary philosophy.
Certainly there are some books whose words, once we have studied them,
seem to demand from us a moral, even a metaphysical assent or dissent.
Literary criticism, however, may lead to or even be transmuted into
something more intense even than itse1f.21
He goes on to give The Pilgrim's Progress, the Commedia, De Rerum
Natura, as well as the Bible, as examples.

Williams is in no way dimin-

ishing the value of the aesthetic response to these works; but he is
placing them in a hierarchy of values, with the moral (or ethical)placed
above the aesthetic.

The distinction in this passage between "moral" and

"metaphysical" requires a comment, however.
At the risk of sounding repetitious, it cannot be too strongly

20
21

Ibid.
Ibid. , p. 15.
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stressed that for the conceptualist, metaphysics may be prior in the sense
or first, or fundamental, knowledge; but it is ultimately inferior to
ethics, which is prior in the sense of being first known, or the resident
of will.

The only reason a man lives the truth is that he is good.

men avoid it.

Evil

Typically, for someone who is not a formal philosopher

(especially one who lives in a culture dominated by another philosophy-in this case English Aristotelian realism), a conceptualist will yield
hesitantly to received opinion when he does not wish to argue a side issue.
In the passage under consideration, Williams is arguing for the superiority
of religious responses to solely aesthetic ones.

To have further compli-

cated his thought with a digression on ethics and metaphysics would have
needlessly compounded the discussion.

That he was aware that he was so

doing seems likely from his phraseology:

tl

a moral, even a metaphysi-

cal, assent ••. " introduces the idea of metaphysics tentatively, almost
reluctantly, perhaps as an assuagement to skeptical readers who are already being attacked on one front.
Williams offers in the next paragraph, as an aside, a very revealing statement about his own assumptions.
"The famous saying 'God is love', it is generally assumed,
means that God is like our immediate emotional indulgence, and not that
our meaning of love ought to have something of the 'otherness' and
terror of God."

22

Love and goodness are almost interchangeable words to

the conceptualist; the mystic would concur.

(It should be noted that

many of these statements could have been made just as easily by a mystic;
22

Ibid.
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no mystic, however, could have as high a respect for intellection for its
own sake, or show as much pure rejoicing in the body for its own sake as
does Williams.)

He is complaining that our intellectual concepts of the

Good (love) should mare often be checked against the way we experience
Goodness.

He employs the phrase "a terrible good" e.g., "The Hound of

Heaven" in Descent Into Hell. 23 Let it suffice here to say that Williams
says that love (goodness, will) is something other and greater than our
assumption (intellect) or our emotional indulgence ( sense).
By this point, a scant seven pages into the text of He Came Down
From Heaven, he has already made his point presuppositior>.a.lly; the rest
of the examples from the book are offered not to belabor the thesis needlessly, but rather to show exhaustively how passages in a book reveal an
author's presuppositions when the overt subject matter is another topic.
Admittedly, when an author's subject is his ultimate beliefs, his presuppositions are far easier to see; indeed, that is why this book is germane,
so that when faced with a novel of Williams, it will be unnecessary to
prove anything, but rather to discover how his beliefs affect the plots
and characters.
There remains one danger, one that may well require a willing
suspension of disbelief.

We have argued that each philosophy demands its

own aesthetic, that the canons of idealism should determine whether or not,
for example, Keats succeeds in Endymion.

Whether or no he was politically

motivated, Croker (a realist) had no business judging the work on

2
p. 16.

3williams, Descent Into Hell (Grand Rapids:

Eerdmans, 1966),
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eudaemonian aesthetic grounds.

24

On the other hand, Frederick Crews's

Freudianism makes him an admirable judge of the merits of Nathaniel
2
Hawthorne's materialist stories. 5 Even a cursory glance at Crews's
prose demonstrates that he, like his subject, is a thorough-going determinist.26

In a like manner, the critic competent to judge Williams must

properly proceed £.rom conceptualist grounds.

Shideler certainly shows all

the hallmarks, even down to her somewhat highly wrought style (crabbed,
i f one does not like it), much like Williams himself.

The tendency to

discursiveness is almost as inevitable in discussing a conceptualist
author as is the pull of the critic to be drawn into a Platonic dichotomy
when discussion a rationalist author like Shelley.

His critics have

been compelled to submit to the idea of the divided line even to begin
discussing the content of a poem like "Oie to the West Wind." 27
Perhaps the reason far the tendency of conceptualist writing to
become kaleidoscopic, or better, cubistic, is that in order to reason
both syllogistically (will-intellect distinction) and dialectically (mind24

John Wilson Croker, Unsigned review, Quarterly Review
(April 1818), xiv, 204-208.
25e.g.Frederick Crews, The Sins of the Fathers: Hawthorne's
Psychological Themes. (New York: Oxford University Iress, 1966).
26His constant reiteration of Freudian concepts as a means of
understanding Hawthorne's inherent Calvinism is only possible because both
systems are materialistic.
27For a detailed discussion of Shelley's Platonism cf. J. A.
Notopoulos, The Platonism of Shelley (Durham: Duke University Press,
1949).
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bodY -distinction), the author is often required by the grammatical constraints of language to retrace a point in order to treat it a second time
from another angle.

As Chesterton said in another context, "An author

must be orthodox in most things, or else he will not even have time
28
enough to explain his own heresy."
The grammatical structure of English
early became dominated by Aristotelian realism, and until recently it
came naturally to an Englishman. 29 Logical relationships in clearly related categories, set in three-point logic--these are the mainstays of
English prose.

A real Platonic rationalist in English prose, like Carlyle

and the Cambridge Platonists, appears barbaric because he has been forced
to reshape the language somewhat for his own purposes.

Hence, such a

writer does not read as clearly as a Dr. Johnson, or in our own age, a

c.

S. Lewis.

Lucidity in English, or better, pellucid English prose is

the domain of the realist.

No purple crowns his prose.

Add to these lucid

tendencies a desire to bathe in detail, and the pure writing of a conceptualist often repels those out of sympathy with its adherents, and
his style may be called either over-wrought, needlessly obscure, or even
incompetent.

Williams has been called all three.3°

Yet it should con-

stantly be borne in mind that an author who composes in Williams's fashion
is not merely entertaining an indulgence; for him to have taken the advice
28
G. K. Chesterton, George Bernard Shaw (London:
1910), p. 8.

John Lane,

29Will Durant, The Story of :Philosophy (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1965), p. 91. For several hundred years, every student who
attended Oxford and Cambridge Universities was required to master
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in Greek.
3°At a special session of the convention of the Modern Language
Association held in Chicago (December, 1977), nearly every speaker--all
of whom were sympathetic to Williams's content--found something disparaging to say about his style.
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of his critics by writing another way would have under-cut the very
heart of his thought.

It is a testimony to Williams's integrity that he

never wavered from his vision nor sought to modify his style.
The discursiveness of the conceptualist may seem almost like
free association to someone who does not enjoy his methods of ratiocination.

The tendency of the ?latonic argument to move from topic to topic

is easy to tolerate because the rationalist will usually move from thesis
to anti-thesis to synthesis.

So may a conceptualist; but he may seize any

part of the dialectical movement of an argument, and analyze a portion of
it before returning to the main thrust of the dialectic; or he may reverse
the process altogether by offering an analysis but, realizing its
necessity to the gist of his thought, he might suddenly enter into dialectical debate.

To many people this will seem as if he is shifting the

grounds for discussion too suddenly.

Yet in a successful conceptualist

argument, one can break down the argument into its parts and show that
each step is necessary, or at least that it is an amplification of the whole.
An

example of the use of contraries in a conceptualist argument

appears in the second chapter of He Came Down From Heaven, a discussion
of the Fall of Man.

Williams states, "Will is rather a thing we may choose

to become than a thing we already possess--except so far as we can a
little choose to choose, a little will to will.Ji

The antithesis of the

surface statement is obvious= we have already seen man as the image of
God, who is pure Will.

How then can will (the heart of our nature) be

other than what we already are, but "a thing we may choose to become?"
JiWilliams, He Came Down From Heaven, p. 21.
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The Fall of Man is the answer, and the synthesis would be that the Fall
altered man's ability to know his will.
~'The

The title of the chapter is

Myth of the Alteration of Knowledge".

The ensuing paragraph should

be quoted in full because only a conceptualist, fully conscious of his own
position, could have made it.

In this sense it is supposition as opposed

to presuppositions
The change in knowledge /J,he Fal]] is indicated by one detail. The
tale presents the Adam as naked, and in a state of enjoyment of being
naked. It was part of their good; they had delight in their physical
natures. There is no suggestion that they had not a delight in their
sexual natures and relationship. They had about them a free candour,
and that candour of joy was a part of their good. They were not
ashamed. They then insisted on knowing good as evil, and they did.
They knew that candour as undesirable; they experienced shame. The
Omnipotence might intelligently know what the deprivation of that
candour would be like, and yet not approve it into existence. The
divine prerogative could not enter other beings after that manner;
they had to know after their own nature. The thing they had involved
confused them, because its nature was confusion. Sex had been good;
it became evil. They had made themselves aprons. It was exactly
what they had determined. Since then it has often been thought that
we might recover the single and simple knowledge of good in that
respect by tearing up the aprons. It has never, so far, been found
that the return is quite so easy. To revoke the knawledge of unlovely
shame can only be done by discovering a loveliness of shame ~o much
for naturali~(not necessarily that shame, but something more profound) in the good. The Lord, it may be remarked, did not make
aprons for the Adam; he made them coats. He was not so sex-conscious
as some of the commentators, pious and others.32
What is important to notice is that Williams, unlike the l'latonist,
can imagine an unfallen sexuality totally physical, and good, but he
does not stop with the common presentation of the flesh becoming
corrupted by the Fall.

He makes it exceedingly clear that no guilt was

attached to flesh, but that sin was an insistence, an ungratefully chosen
act of the will.

It was not the intellect that caused the primal curse,

46
because

11 merely

saw the possibilities; actually the intellect's in-

ability to cope with the choice is almost gleefully put before the reader,
something an Aristotelian would never do.

Further, the inability of man

simply to deny the effect of the will on the body is a refutation of
naturalism; that he is concerned about body and intellect immediately
puts him 1n a camp other than the mystical; that he does mare than simply
analyze events denies the possibility of pragmatism.

His insistence on

free will in the paragraph means that he is not a materialist.

Six of

the seven alternate positions are refuted in some way by this paragraph;
only idealism is left unchallenged, and, as we saw earlier, he had taken
great pains in the first chapter to refute idealism.
It has previously been observed that Williams, as an Englishman,
primarily faced an audience of Aristotelian realists; thus far he has
taken no direct action in discussing the distinction between the will and
the intellect, and this understanding is crucial far

underst~~ding

any

conceptualist discussion of human responsibility: a knowledge of good and
evil does not make a man moral; that knowledge was the Fall.

Morality

is not just a compiling of action by habit based on intellectual knowledge and development, Aristotle's and St. Thomas's position; it is a
setting of the will on the Way to the Good.

Williams calls Babel

that symbolic legend of the effort man makes to approach heaven
ob.iectivel:y _onlr, as by the vain effort of the removal of aprons.
(Italics mine.)J.J
He sees the account of the Tower of Babel in the book of Genesis as a
paradigm far the relationship of the intellect to the will:

33Ibid., pp. 24-25.

~

unless something is ~, nothing happens. Unless devotion is given
to a thing that proves false in end, the thing that is true in the
end cannot enter (Italics mine.)34
He almost immediately quotes that paradox so beloved of him, "This also
is Thou; neither is this Thou", a statement he attributed to St.
Augustine but which no one has to my knowledge tracked down.

Again I

must refer the reader to Shideler for explication of the Way of the
Images i f Williams's meaning is not readily apparent: he is assuming the
reader's knowledge of his superstructure.

One can see without further

aid, however, that Williams saw intellectual pride (hubris) as the sin
of Babel, and offers action submitted in devotion to an Image of something
good as proper behavior.

Even though an image fails us finally, it is a

precursor to the good, as St. John the Baptist was of Christ.
In the peroration of his chapter on the Fall, Williams's prose
becomes exceedingly lyrical in his paean to the Goodness of the Lord:
The heavens go before the host, the habitation of the proceeding
Power, and of the single voice in and beyond creation that is able
to proclaim its own identity, the voice of the original good •.. It
is the law of exchange that advances, of the keeping of one life by
another, of the oath that cannot be controlled by man, it is the
knowleqge of good as good breaking out of the knowledge of good as
evil.35
Among other things, this is a prose hymn to the Goodness of God's Will,
and our participation in that Will.
Once Williams has unequivocally established the superiority of
the will to the intellect, he can then proceed to discuss the absolute
validity of the mind.

Because the will is of greater importance than

34 .
Ib1d. , p. 25.
35Ibid. , p. 28.
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reasoning does not mean that there is any inherent wrong with the intellect.

On the contrary, it is a gift of the Creator, and it should be

used to the full:
••• it has been ••• too often Lbelieveg? by the pious to encourage •••
[the fai thfuY ••• to say, in love or in laziness, 'our little minds
were never meant ••• ' Fortunately, there is the book of Job to make
it clear that our little minds were meant. A great curiosity ought
to e~st concerning divine things. Man was intended to argue with
God.3
The third chapter, then, on the presuppositional level, is, in
part, a discussion of the goodness of the intellect, its powers and its
sphere of influence, the previous chapter already having placed it in a
secondary role to will.
for

~own

Man should pursue knowledge where it leads him

sake but with charity.

"Humility has never consisted in not

asking questions; it does not make men less themselves or less intelligent,
but mare themselves".3?

The only danger, he seems to be implying is

that haughtiness can lead to belief in intellect as the primary good, as
was the case with Job's comforters.
Williams relates the mental anguish of Job to his question's
fulfillment at Sinai:
Moses went up into the Mount as myth; he descended as moral teacher.
He was a leader in both periods, but there was a difference--as
there is a differegce in the God to whom he went and the people to
whom he returned.3
These are unexpected sentences for a twentieth century literary figure to
have written.

The structure of the first antinomies is a pattern that

36Ibid. , p. 30.
3?Ibid., p. )2.
3Bibid.
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almost invariably means that the :former is in:ferior to the latter, e. g.,
"he went away a boy, but returned a man."

As a novelist, Williams'stock

1n trade was mythical materials such as the Graal and the Stone o:f

Suleiman; it was his li:fe's blood in one sense.

He could have hardly

underestimated the value o:f myth; but the moral teacher transcends any
embodiment o:f myth.

He says that the reason this highest plane o:f Moses's

being is in his role as moral teacher is that " ••• I AM has sworn that he
and it Lman's naturi/ shall be known as good, and only good, to whoever
chooses."39
The prophets are the inheritors o:f the Mosaic triumph, keeping
alive the spirit o:f the law and the glory o:f the Will who gave it.

This

leads Williams to another o:f his key asidesJ
The word glory, to English ears, usually means no more than a kind
o:f mazy bright blur. But the maze should be that o:f a geometrical
pattern.40
The framing of the Old Covenant into factual law should be a reason for
rejoicing, not an occasion for the characteristic modern objection that
morality is a set of cold rules.

The glory o:f God and his Commandments,

in Williams's writing, becomes a kind of baroque game, a playing with
the immense, much like the juggler in The Greater Trumps. 41 Once again,
however, Williams must re-iterate his trichotomy:
..• certain patterns in the web of Glory are already discernible:
the recognition of the good, everywhere and always, as good, the

39Ibid. , p. 33.
40

Ibid.

Williams, The Greater Trumps (New York~ Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1950) In the preface to this edition, William Lindsay Gresham
provides a preliminary explication of Williams's Tarot symbolism.
41
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reflection of power, the exercise of intellect, the importance of
interchange, and a deliberate relation to the Centre. 42

A rough translation of this passage into the terms of this discussion
might reads

we can already tell parts of the pattern of God's inten-

tions even before the Inca.rna.tion; they are the ability of

~ople

to know

the good when they sin while relating its origin to God, to use the mind,

and to participate actively with others for the sake of their Creator.
Slowly Williams is preparing us for his understanding of the coming
of Christ, and for the neglected doctrines he believes flow from His
appearance.

But first he must show the anchoring of this revelation in

the moral goodness of the Father. "'lhe glory is the goodness, but even
4
the goodness is not he." 3 Rather, the goodness is His Will.
That will must be taught by instructors to his chosen people. The
prophets are sent out from the visible mathematics of the glory.
Morality is either the mathematics of power o~ it is nothing. Their
business is to recover mankind--but first t~ inclusive--exclusive
Israel--to an effort to know only the good.
Thus the need to instill in the Israelites the fear of the Lord; to make
a people whole, to be active witnesses before the whole world by the
coming of Messiah.

The inculcation of a sense of sin, of the unworthi-

ness coeval with the Fall, was absolutely mandatory because those folk
were to bear His witness; but to Williams, sin is only known in operation,
and that operation consists of a dreary sameness.
in act.

The will is only known

This Ding an Sich is never known (Kantian conceptualism, of

course).

42williams, He Came Down From Heaven and the Forgiveness of
JJ .
.. ·~··~-...!.f;Jibid.. ,_ p. )4.

·--. ·-- 44Ibid. ' p. J6;
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Sin has many forms but the work is all the same--the preference of an
immediately satisfying experience of things to the believed pattern
of the universe; one may even say, the pattern of the glory. It has,
in the prophets as everywhere, two chief modes of existences impiety
against man and impiety against God--the refusal of others and the
insistence on sel£.44
It is in the

st~gle

for perfection by precept that the Israelites lived.

Only the nature of repentance, of forgiveness, remains.

"The prophets

are too much concerned with their demand for penitence and their message
of pardon to have time for metaphysics." 45 Once more ethics reigns
supreme, and ontological truth and natural theology are of relative unimportance.
be

Indeed Williams seems almost impatient with analysis that would

only a striving for that knowledge which does not have the perfection

of the human will as its aim.

"But Ezekiel and his companions are no

more concerned with a metaphysical analysis of the absolute than they are
with a defence of the myths of a co~descended ~pposition fthe anthropomorphic representations of the deityJ They are hammering at the heart. "

46

The effect of his "hammering at the heart" was to be the reward
of Israel.

Realism teaches the reduction of virtue to the formation of

good habits and the avoidance of evil practices, but for Williams the
primary point of the old covenant
is the making an inward thing of the law. It is no longer a thing
known and obeyed by a difficult decision; it is to become an instinct, a natural desire of body and spirit.47
The inclusion of the body is significant; visceral reactions against evil,
and a movement of the flesh toward the good without agony was the reward
44 Ibid. , p.
36.
4

5Ibid.' p. 36.

46

~.,

p. 39.

47Ib"d
__L·, p. 40.
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of those that followed the way.

This calmness

identical with the intellectual application

~

o~

body and spirit is not

good practices associated

with the Aristotelians; 1n that philosophy, 1f one knows the good, he
48
Williams denies
must will the good, ~or no man can will his own evil.

-

that position by his understanding

~

the covenant as something

~reely

chosen or rejected.

One can will his own evil 1n Williams's schemata,

as 1n the philosophy

o~

Duns Scotus.

o~

each choice is how one

o~ a given situation. 4 9

reacts to the haeccitas (thisness)
After similar discussions

The crux

o~

Ecclesiastes,

St. John the Baptist, Williams gives us his picture
does he anywhere simply speak

o~

Jesus or Christ.

and a portrait
~

o~

the Christ.

In speaking

o~

Seldom
God, the

Father, he usually uses words like the Omnipotence, the Mercy, the Protaction.

Of the Incarnate God he

and the Hero.

pre~ers

locutions like the Divine Thing .

In a parenthetical statement, he tells us why he so

designates the deity:
••• it will be remembered that Saint Matthew uses the neuter--that
holy thiAS; students o~ the Gospel may be excused for sometimes
following the example, i f only to remind ourselves of what the
Evangelists actually said.50
In others words, Williams desires to seek an accuracy that is sometimes
obscured by well-worn custom.

Nor is it too fanciful to assume that his

enthusiasm made him seek out terms (like "the Hero") that make Jesus
sound like the archetype of an epic

~igure,

because 1f He was mare than

hero, he was at least hero as well. Actually most o~ Williams's account
48Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Basic Works ed. Richard
McKeon (New York: Random House,1941), pp. 935-936.
4 9williams, He Came Down From Heaven and the Forgiveness o~
Sin 1 pp. 29-45.
50ibid. ' p. 49.
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of Christ simply re-states the Synoptics in highly colored, joyous prose,
and g1ves something of a mythical cast to the events s little in the
account helps elucidate his conceptualism, however.
Several passages, nevertheless,

~revealing.

Messiah le:ft us

only few of His words, but some of them put the nature of morality on a
plane higher than that known to Israel.

Half a hundred brief comments, flung out to the mob of men's hearts,
make it impossible far a child of the kingdom, for a Christian, to
talk of justice or injustice so fa:r as he personally is concerned;
they make it impossible for him to comElain of the unfairness of
anything. They do not, presumably, stop him noticing what has
happened, but it can never be a matter of protest. Judgment and
measurement a:re always discouraged. You may have them if you will,
but there is a sinister note in the promise that they shall be
measured l:ack to you in the same manner. 51
Higher than the moral precepts of the old Law is the fulfillment of that
law in the Christ; what is revealing, and perhaps almost

shoc~ng

to some,

is that Williams seems able to break into lyrical rapture over that stern
statements

"For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judgeds and •••

with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again."5 2

'!his

sentence would hardly seem a quick candidate for waxing ecstatic; but
Williams delights in the law whenever he discusses it.

At times he goes

out of his way to posit moral paradoxes and problems where only someone
obsessed with the idea of a moral universe could see even the possibility
of a trouble.

''It is not surprising that Messias saw the possibility of

an infinitely greater knowledge of evil existing through him than had
been befare ...53

The verse he is referring to is "blessed is he whosoever

51~., p. 53.

52 Ma+tkviw,

7:2.

53Williams, He Came 'Down From Heaven and The Forgiveness of
~. p.

54.
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shall not be offended by me."

The denial of what the Christ has done must

exceed, ar at least intensify, other evil.

'lbe Scotist doctrine (which

Williams held)54 is that man was made for the Incarnation rather than the
converse, the purpose of all that makes a man human through Christ, because humanity was designed for his coming whether or not there had been
a fall.

Once a man recognizes Christ as the Chosen, he is fully obligated

to pursue the goodness and truth to where his perceptions lead him.
do otherwise does violence to the very arder of creation itself.

To

In that

way Christ's coming can be a cause far greater evil than if he had not.
Williams's statement, then, is specifically Scotist.
The meaning of the Crucifixion is especially a maral one far
Williams.

Christ attained the knowledge of good and evil as man, but as

God he could possess that knowledge without experiencing it; therefore,
his act of vicarious suffering far all humanity became all mankind reunited .to its maker by the One who was at once God and his Creation •
• • • the Thing that was man rather than a man, though certainly incarnated into the physical appearance of a man; the Thing that was Christ
Jesus knew all things in the deprivation of all goodness •••• Man had
determined to know good as evil; there could be but one perfect remedy
for that--to know the evil of the past itself as a good, and to be
free from the necessity of the knowledge of evil in the future; to
find right knowledge and perfect freedom together; to know all things
as occasions of love.55
This is a position conceptualists share with mystics; in this passage
williams may possibly have had in mind the meditation of the Lady Julian
of Norwich when she said, "all shall be well and all shall be well, and
all manner of things shall be made well • .. 56 It was one of Williams is
4
5 Schideler, The Theology of Romantic Love, p. 67.
55williams, He Came Down From Heaven and the Forgiveness of
Sin 1 p. 58.
6
5 Lady Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love ed. Dom
Roger Huddleston, 0. S. B. (Westminster, Md: Newman 1ress, 1952), p. 48.
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favorite quotations and he makes frequent reference to Lady Julian
throughout his work.

In fact, one of his characters in War In Heaven may

possibly be named for her.57

Of course, this view of Christ's even-

tually reconciling of all evil into good, in what the theologians call
aeviternity, is the final result of the felix culpa.:

"pardon is no longer

an oblivion but an increased knowledge, a knowledge of all things in a
perfection of joy. 58

Not only will all things be made well, but even in

the matter of the pardoning of actual sin, the pardoner must recognize
that a desire of the sinner to do the right is all that is necessary in
order to forgive.
be

The constant failing, the not doing of sin, can never

a condition of forgiveness because "it would be a slur on intelli-

gence"59 as well as not a genuine reconciliation.
Here we see the conceptualist differing in moral theology from
the realist perhaps more than anywhere else. To a realist, a man is
judged by his actions; 60 to a conceptualist like ~eter Abelard, evil
61
always lies in the intention.
In this way, a man can commit all manner
of atrocities and not be guilty if his intentions are not evil; for
example, the actions of Torquemada's tortures may have been genuinely
meant to help save souls.

That he should have been stopped, or that the

57Williams, War In Heaven (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966),
Julian Davenant, Archdeacon of Fardles, accepts his martyrdom through the
course of the novel in an effort to make "all manner of thing well."

§lg, p, 59.

5Bwilliams, He Came Down From Heaven and The Forgiveness of

59Ibid. ,

p.

60.

60 st. Thomas Aquinas, Basic Writings ed. Anton
Random House, 1945), ii. 758-761.

~egis (New York:

~eter Abelard, Ethics tr. D. E. Luscombe (Oxford: Claredon
Press, 1971), pp. 40-47.
61
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actions were objectively evil ara not denied from this point of view.
But the state of Torquemada' s soul is known only in heaven.

This ar-

gument applies both ways; say a man attempts armed robbery and the consequences were that his victim found courage and defended himself from
assault.

The evil of the one occasioned the good of another.

This

attitude toward morality is vital to the understanding when we come to
Williams's fiction.
The remainder of He Came Down From Heaven consists of an exposition of the three basic tenets of Williams's beliefs which he understood
to follow from the very fact of the Incarnation: Romantic Theology (the
Beatrician vision), Substitution, and the Coinherence of the City.

62 have discussed these

Schideler and, to a lesser extent, Charles Moorman

so well that it would be useless to tread over this ground again.
should be noted in the context of

t~is

It

discussion that the sight of the

beloved as the God-bearing image is, from the beginning, a clear example
of genuine knowledge that is of body:

"It is a result of the Incarnation

that opened all potentialities of the knowledge of the kingdom of heaven
in and through matter.

'

6

'My covenant shall be in your flesh.'" 3

Williams does not enter into a needless digression in his argument
to talk in terms of academic philosophy in what is really a literary essay
on the coming of Christ and its consequences; he seems to recognize Dante
as a kindred spirit (conceptualist):

62 Charles Moorman, The Precincts of Felicit : The Au stian
City of the Oxford Christians

1966), pp. 30-64.

Gainsville: University of Florida Press,

63williams, He Came Down From Heaven and the Forgiveness of
~. p.

74.
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The first encounter with Beatrice had awakened physical, mental and
sni:r-Hual awareness; later encounters had communicated to Dante moments of humility and pure love, however far he might be staying
in them. (italics mine)64
Williams was not in the habit of applying trichotomies ("physical, mental
and spiritual awareness") where they would be gratuitous.

At the beginn-

ing of the chapter, he had introduced his explanation of theological romantic love by quoting the famous "spots of time" lines from The Prelude~5
He only attributes to Wordsworth the kind of naturalistic understanding
that what the body knows is a form of true knowledge.

Often the concept-

ualist Franscicans made much of their unique doctrine of the form of
matter, i.e., matter was truly an object of knowledge.

Many other instances

could be cited where Williams repeats what he perceives to be the partial
knowledge of other

philosop~ical

positions.

does not seem ons of thinking his position

His attitude at such times
correc~

and the

othe~s

wrong;

but rather that, as in the familiar fable of the blind men and the elephant, each man understands part of the truth.

Where Williams might

claim a pre-eminence for his own philosophy is that it readily recognizes
the partiality of any truths that can be reached; we never have the whole
truth.
Yet it is only in terms of conceptualism that the thought of another

conceptualist can truly be known.

In explaining Dante's meaning

of the term love (as made of the Good), Williams introduces the parallel

6
5_rbid.' p. 62.

.58
thought of another of the medieval Franciscans, St. Bonaventure.

(Dante

was a third order Franciscan.)
About the same time Bonaventure was writing that God was a circle
whose centre was everywhere and its circumference nowhere. The diagram of process is clear. Dante is on the circumference, and the
things that happen there make a difference to him; he has with them
no fixed and equal relation: only he sees the centre. The Love of
the New Life is in the centre; to it all parts of the circumference,
all times, all experiences, have this equal relation. In humility
and goodwill Dante answered Love when things went well, but Love
answers Love however things ~ But beyond that is the state where
there is in effect, no circumference; or rather, every point of the
circumference is at the centre, for the circumference itself is
caritas, and relation i9 only between the centre and the centre.
This is love-in-heaven.b 6
It has seemed advisable to quote this paragraph in full, because we can
now see that without an understanding of the conceptualist position (at
least in the flesh, as Williams himself might have said), these words are
utter gibberish.
igible.

So understood, they become perfectly and easily intell-

It seems like a celebration of physical love--but then the end

result is love-in-heaven; it could be Plato's divided line, but what is
below the line is good in itself.

He seems to reach for universal truth,

but with full knowledge of particularities.

No wonder Williams per-

plexes and defeats so much of his audience.

It is like the readers of

Dante who try to allegorize Beatrice into a representation of Theology.
She is a representation of Theology; the reason she is a representation
oi Theology is because she was Beatrice first, a girl who lived and died
i~

Florence, a girl whom Dante Aligheri loved and celebrated.
To understand fully the theology of romantic love as Williams and

Da:Ite expounded it, the student must learn to participate in acts of
Christian charity:

66 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
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But it is hardly possible to follow it without proposing and involving as an end a state of caritas of the utmost possible height
and breadth, nor without allowing to matter a significance and power
which (of all the religions and philosophies) only Christianity has
affirmed. 67
Such acts of the will take the natural state of

inter-person~l

human rela-

tionships and elevate them to the status of divine deeds.
Williams, however, was fully aware of the possible dangers of the
Affirmative Way:
A theology of this kind ... will give rise (within itself) to heresies.
Extremists of one kind will claim for the beloved a purit5 as nonexistent as the purity of the Church militant upon earth. 8
All heresy, from this view, is the result of keeping a morbid imbalance
among the elements of human experience whether physical,

intellectual~or

moral.
The rigor with which the lover pursues the way of love can lead to
several possible pitfalls.

Important in the context of this qiscussion is

"the assumption that the Beatrician state is everlasting ... " 69

The drive

to physicality alone, which easily leads to perversion and despair, besets the human condition.

The body may be good in and by itself; the min-

ute it becomes isolated from the rest of experience, it asserts a dominance in excess of what it is able to deliver.

The devotion of the· lover

must be undertaken with humility, so that he or she may understand what
it learns from the beloved and be prepared to return to life refreshed
and with new life (vita-nuova Y.
67rbid., p. 77.
68Ibid., pp. 77-78.
69Ibid., p. 79.
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Another problem can arise from intellectual snobbery; the lover
thinks the sight of the beloved private property; but, "love does not
belong to lovers, but they to it.•· 70

To defeat jealousy--the intellec-

tual pride of romantic love--the mind must be brought into a right relation to the limitations of the beloved.

Jealousy "is, always and every-

where, idolatry; it is a desire to retain the glory for oneself, which
means that one is not adoring the glory but only one's own relation to
the glory,"7 1 The kingdom of heaven perceived in the beloved becomes,
then, a perverted parody when not directed to its proper end.

"A sin

which is, by its essence, destructive of goodwill is worse than a sin
which need not be, in its essence, more than disordered goodwill." 72 The
flame of love comes only to those who choose to see it; the will must
guide.

A discussion of the doctrine of substituted love, that is, vicarious suffering freely entered into by willing participants in the imitation of Christ's suffering--the doctrine is easily the most controversial of any Williams held, and conceptualism has direct bearing on the
essence of that doctrine.

His readers, even his Christian readers, who

seem reluctant to give credence to the doctrine that one person can assent
to taking on the sufferings of another should try to learn the meaning
of the word empathy; in its origins, the word has all the strength of the
literal bearing of another's burdens.

?~bid., p. 80.
7~bM.
7;bM.

This is the moral heroism of Kant

-61
and the commandment of Donne, to seek not whom the bell tolls; it tolls
Several~

for thee.

statements Williams makes along

He- Came Down From Heaven, bear: emphasis.
who attempts the converted way

"w~s

He mentions that tbe ~elf

to be removed and renovated, to be a

branch of the vine, a point of the pattern.
of love."73

the way, i.e., in

It was to become an article

Thus, as soon ashe addresses the subject, love is defined as the

otherness of God.

In other words, the convert must be remade into the de-

sire and will of his Creator, which is the spilling over of love into joy,
the Commandment to people to love one

~~other.

Men are to enter into a

pattern of God's love in the same way that they were made in His image,
and as Christ has taught our minds and bodies:
We are to love
did, that this
is, by acts of
substitution.
the kingdom of

each other as he loved us, laying down our lives as he
love may be-perfected. We are to love each other, that
substitution. We are to be substituted and to bear
All life is to be vicario~ -at least, all life in
heaven is to be vicarious.'(4

This is the true righteousness the Pharisees never understood, and their
failure is the reason Christ condemned them.
The Church has recognized a form of substituted will in the rites
of infant baptism in which the will and intuition of the sponsors enter
the eternal state to co-mingle with the will and intention of the child's
soul.

Williams uses this example to show how substitution forms part of

the very pattern of sacramentalism, and that the effect on the soul is the
result of will and intention.

7Jrbid., p. 86.
74rbid.
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Part of the fact which such an exhibition ritually and sacramentally
presents is the making a commitment of oneself from another's heart
and by another's intention. It is simpler sometimes and easier, and
no less fatal and blessed to do it so; to surrender and be offered

to destiny by another rather than by oneself; it is already a little
denial of the se1f.75
From this point of view, even to lend a book is a step
the kingdom of heaven.

to~

entering

Here Williams lifts to a principle the typically

conceptualist love of the Divine viewed in what would never appear momentous {like Hopkins rejoicing in rose-moles).7 6
When Williams enters into a discussion of techniques for putting
into practice the doctrine of substituted love, he immediately draws a
tripartite distinction among the contractors' obligations.

Conceptualism

can be doubly seen here because the three parts have a body, intellect•
and will equivalency; and he speaks in terms of what is morally obligatory.
'!he persons entering into an agreement to sharins; burdens must know what
the burden is.

This constitutes a knwwledge of the physical sensations.

Next, the second party must give up the burden; to the person taking on
the burden, the result would be an intellectual awareness of the desire
of the other to have his burden undertaken.

Finally, the one who takes

the burden must indeed accept its this acceptance is an act of pure will.
The one who takes has to set himself~-mind and emotion and sen:_
sations--to the burden, to know it, imagine it, receive it--and
sometimes not to be taken aback by the swiftness of the divine grace
and the lightness of the burden.??

75

~·' p. 87.

7 6Gera.rd Manley Hopkins, "l'ied Beauty", in Poems 4th ed. , ed.
by W. H. Gardner and W. H. MacKenzie (Londons Oxford University :Press,

1967), p. 69.

77Williams, He Came Down From Heaven and The Forgiveness of
Sin.1 p. 89.
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What we have here is the doctrine of the scapegoat, combined with the
doctrine of the imitation of Christ.

The reader is exhorted, albeit by

literary devices, to take up the suffering of all his fellow human beings,
just as Christ took up the sufferings of all mankind; in other words, he
is asked to participate in the

pe~ect

imitation of Christ.

Williams's expression of this doctrine could have been made only
by someone in the Franciscan tradition, Franciscan because an inordinate
number of conceptualists have been attached to Francis of Assisi and the
order he founded: Duns Scotus, St. Bonaventure,and Dante are the prime
examples.

Williams employs the early Franciscans as exemplifications of

the idea of good will in acts of substituted love:
All goodness is from that source Lihe MessiaE7, charged and exchanged
in the process. It was said of the Friars that one went patched for
another's rending, and in the kingdom men go glorious for others'
labours, and all is grown glorious from the labor of all.78
Williams asserts that a person must deny the self, but to him the
Fall means we must work to co-inhere in nature once more, not simply to
overcome it; this process invites all decent men to enter the communion
of the saints, because we are unable to save ourselves:
the only thing that can be ours is the fiery blush of the laughter
of humility ~hen the shame of the Adam has become the shyness of
the saints.79
To enter such a communion, men form societies, the City as
Williams invariably calls it.
78 Ibid., p. 93.
79Ibid., p. 94.

Recognizing that ordinary moral effort is
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not enough because such effort is usually fraught with pain, he makes
clear that the moral effort he prescribes is not that of the materialist
stoicss "It is not enough to be full of an effort towards good will unless
it is a joyous goodwill. ,BO
The final chapter is an attempt to demonstrate the idea of the
City of Man in conceptualist terms; the great bishop of Hippo, a Platonic
rationalist it will be remembered, thought the body was something to be
overcome, that the City of Man was to be superseded by the City of God.
Williams, contrariwise, envisions the Cities as they interpenetrate each
other.

Suffice it to say that i f individual men can exchange parts of

their being in acts of substitution, societies--which are collections
of men--may enter into acts of exchange as well,

Further, the communion

of the saints, pictured from this perspective, is then the co-mingling of
the City of Man with the City of God--the Churches militant, suffering,
and triumphant.
Inevitably, Williams must address himself to the problem of
suffering; even though theologians avoid blaming God for evil, Williams's
conceptualism places the responsibility on the Creator of all.

Even if

evil were a privation (which a conceptualist is not willing to concede),
then that privation paradoxically was integrated into the nature of His
creation:

He understood suffering, pain, fear, death, sin, evil.

created:

80

Ibid., p. 95.

He
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Without him it could not have been; and calling it his permission
instead of his will may be intellectually accurate, but does not
seem to get over the fact that if the First Cause has power, intelligence and wil~ to cause a universe to exist, then he is the
First Cause of it. 1
·
Such an outburst could easily turn into a prelude to despair.
What saves the Christian conceptualist from this invidious sin is his
orthodox position that the Incarnation became God's sharing of this condition with his creation; He was willing to enter
death, and.by His Resurrection redeem us.
is at best an evasion:

i~to

suffering and

But to deny God's part in evil

"The pious have been--as they always are--too

anxious to excuse Him; the prophet was wiser: 'I form the light and create
darkness: I make peace and create evil: I the Lord do all these things. '"

82

Evil is real to a conceptualist.
Thus human duty is to pursue the
conforming to His Will.

wa~

of his Creator, our wills

"There is orily one reason why anything should be

8
loved on this earth--because God loves it. 3 To accomplish this end,
it is imperative for a man to change his actions to con£orm to God's
commandment: "To think of the pattern is not to be part of the pattern;
to talk of exchange is not to exchange".

84

Here, in the conclusion of

his discussion, Williams drops any pretense that he is primarily analyzing,
and concludes,as a conceptualist will, with uncompromising exhortation,
8

~bid.'

8

~bid.

81b.d

~··

8

~-b"d
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p. 99.

p. 100.
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66
proclaiming that men should have a change of heart, and he tells his
reader that our separation from God is attributable more to our evil
intentions (which can only be rectified by adhering to Christ's will)
than to anything else.

The problem can be overcome by the honest person

allowing his will to fade away from him through repentance and prayer.
Thus,

••• the schism of intention is deeper than any other; where is certainty7 who can be sure of any motive in any act? Lit is axiomatic
to the conceptualist that one man never knows the intention of another.
It is to be remembered that Socrates refused to serve on a jury for
this reason~ Yet the choice, the wish that may become the will, may
be there, whatever our ignorance; to desire to follow the good is
important, to desire to follow the good from the good is more
important.85
What then is the moral duty, the highest good to this Christian concepualist?

It is to believe (body), to define (intellect) and to accept

God by not being offended by Him (will); with these considerations in
mind, it is possible both to realize why Williams has been misunderstood
by his critics, and to demonstrate the internal coherency of his
imaginative art.

CHAPrER IV
THE CRITICAL RESPONSE TO CHARLES WILLIAMS
The monumental task of discovering the presuppositional thought
of Charles Williams--a task which has generally intimidated his critics-has been heroically undertaken by R. J. Reilly.

Ironically, Reilly is un-

able to pin down Williams to any of the standard pigeon-holes that typically categorize philosophical thought:
It is perhaps worth remarking here on the eclectic ~uality of
Williams's thought. So far as he is a transcendentalist, he is within the great stream of nee-Platonism; so far as he is an occultist,
he is part of a minor eddy of the same stream. But his evaluation
of the body and of matter, his insistence on the goodness of mrtter,
place him closer to the tradition of medieval Aristotelianism.
(italics mine)
Reilly might have avoided the imprecision of the term "eclectic" by pushing
his analysis a step further.

Nor is Reilly's

~uandary

an isolated case;

as perspicacious a writer as Thomas Howard has implied as much in describing Williams's ideas. 2 In fairness to these men, who are literary scholars, it should be noted that philosophers and theologians seldom recognize the separateness of conceptualism from other systems;J in a like
1R. J. Reilly, Romantic Reli ion: A Stud of Barfield, Lewis,
Williams and Tolkien (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971 , p. 166.
Zrhomas Howard, "Charles Williams's Experiment in the Novel",
Dissertation, New York University, 1970, pp. 11-12.
3William Turner, History of Philosophy (Boston:
1929), pp. 287, 391.
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manner (no matter what his reputation in other areas) as insightful a
historian of German philosophy as was Dr. Rudolf Steiner discusses Kant
as if he were a failed idealist, not fully recognizing the tripartite
nature of Kant's thought.

4

It comes as no surprise to find

that a conceptualist who is also a man of letters will tend to confound
his critics.
Therefore, it is desirable to examine Reilly's analysis of
Williams's thought in some detail.

Reilly observes that Williams was a man

"to whom the unity of things had been revealed--but revealed by natural
means, exciting moments of imaginative insight." 5 By itself, this could
mean something like Wordworth's "spots of time," and so it does.

But

Williams, in distinction from the early Wordsworth, was an orthodox
Christian,,. "a religio-li terary phenomenon. "

6

Without a deeper understand-

ing, Williams might be classified as an orthodox naturalist, a twentiethc~ntury

William of Ockram or Roger Bacon who also conposed literary crea-

tions.

But according to Reilly:

phasis on

th~

"What we find in Williams's work is em-

union of the intellect and the imagination as the highest

means of reaching religious truth."?

This further plunges Reilly into

the trouble of classification, and forces him to

sei~e

somewhat arbitrarily

on the term transcendental to describe Williams.

4Rudolph Steiner, '='he Philosophy of Freedom:
a Modern World Conception (Spring Valley, New _ork:
1964), pp. 49-53.
5Reilly, Romantic Religion, pp, 150-151.

6

Ibid., p. 151.

'7
'~b"d

~··

p. 152.

The Basis For
Anthroposophic Press,
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Central to transcendentalism, as Reilly defines it, is the typically Franciscan doctrine, expounded most fully by Duns Scotus, that the
world exists for the Incarnation rather than the more usually held converse; in no way does holding such doctrine offend orthodoxy, but it does
offend both Thomistic realism and Augustinian rationalism, and has been
shunted aside by the adherents of both schools.

What follows logically

from holding that the Creator desired Incarnation from all eternity is
admirably put by Reilly himself when describing what Williams believed:
The universe, including the unity Man, is to be seen as a vast inter~ocking web of glory; all things manifest God in their degree; the
hills skip for joy and the sons of God shout his praises. All things,
man included, are glints of God; He is not in all things, but, as it
were, bShind all things; the creation is an array of masks or images
of God.
Each part of creation images its_Creator as the images of a poem echo the
author's

mi~d;

but the great Author gave'his images life in existence as

well as in essence.
glory".

The duty of man is to participate in that "web of

Thus the very nature of existence, for Williams, may be nearly

paraprxased by the Scholastic definition of accident as that to whose
nature it belongs to exist by virtue of another.

"All things, it may be

said, are accidents existing by virtue of each other and by virtue of the
substance (the only substance) of the co-inhering trinity of God".9
Etienne Gilson's analysis of the Subtle Doctor in The History of Christian
Philosophy in the Middle Ages, makes clear that Reilly's paraphrase of

8
Ibid. , pp. 153-154.
9Ibid. , p. 155.
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Williams is a Scotist statement and, therefore, is a conceptualist
'ti on. 10 But philosophers have as much trouble with Duns as they

pos~

have with Kant, or that literary critics have had with Williams.
Actually Reilly is the only critic that has recognized a similarity of approach between Williams and Kant, though he does not draw the
full implications of his observations.
Though Williams rarely mentions Kant, he seems to hold the Kantian
notion that time is a mode of perception; we reduce the timeless to
temporality and sequence because otherwise we could perceive nothing.
Strictly speaking, past, present and future are relative and provisional terms. Existence operates in timelessness: the past and the
future are happening. The practices of substitution~mpathy in Kan!7
and interchange can and do operate in the past as wel~ as in the
present and future.11
This paragraph reads as a gloss on a central aspect of the thoughts of
both Kant and Williams.

Reilly's.purposes do not impel him to pursue the

Kantian parallels further.

Had he more tightly defined a conceptualist

tradition, he would have detected consistency.
Another author has listed a number of Williams's reading interests
and dubs the list with the increasingly ubiquitous appellation "eclectic". 12
10

Etienne Gilson, Histor) of Christian Philosophy in the Middle
Ages (New York: Random House, 1955 , pp. 454-464.
11
1

Reilly, Romantic Religion, _pn. 155-156.

~iann Barbara Russell, "The Idea of the City of God" Dissertation, Columbia University, 1965, p. 12. Here is the relevant passage:
"Charles Williams's approach to most of his central ideas was ... an eclectic
one. In developing his central ideas, Williams selected from religious
and philosophical systems, from history, and from literary works of all
ages. Thus, Williams can be said to lack an acute historical sense because
he is not seeking to place an idea in the context of its age so much as
to relate the particular idea to what he considers a basic pattern of
reality".
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Her list, as with the list of projects Williams's initiated in his publishing career; shows he had nearly single-minded interest in conceptualist and mystical writers.

He was the first professional editor of the

poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins, the first editor of a major house of an
English-speaking firm to promote the writings of Kierkegaard;and he edited
1
Evelyn Underhill's letters. 3 His devotion to the Lady Julian of Norw~ch,
his Dantean scholarship, his persistence in adhering to the Scotist doctrine of the Incarnation, his nearly single-handed resurrection of Thomas
Traherne and Coventry Patmore, and indeed his enthusiasm for any author
who saw images of the divine in concrete nature--all these form an unmistakable. pattern and a unity of vision no critic has previously noticed.
When Pauline Anstruther enters the timeless state of her ancestor in
Descent into Hell, and her aveternity accepts the burden of his fear so that
he can be martyred without fear "four centuries earlier--when this happens,
Williams is not merely indulging in fantasy or mere pious speculation.
He is portraying in action a doctrine held by religious conceptualists.

14

Only the Fall, so the argument runs, prevents these perceptions from being
common knowledge: "The nature of the transcendental, interlocking universe
is good, as it is a divine facade".

1

5 In the discussion of Shadows of

Ecstasy, more will be said 'about perception of time and space.

It should

i3Alice ~7 Hadfield, Introduction to Charles Williams (London:
Robert Hale, 1959), pp. 125-126, 181.

14
charles Williams, Descent Into Hell (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1965), pp. 168-171.
1

~eilly, Romantic Religion, p. 156.
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be pointed out here that nearly every Williams character achieves salvation or damnation by choosing how and why he enters time and space in a
particular novel's action.

Two more examples:

in The Place of the Lion,

Adam Durrant rectifies the cleavage of nature by choosing to allow himself to become a vehicle for the Platonic intelligences to return among
the Forms.

16

In Many Dimensions, Clohoe Burnett gives herself to the Stone

to bring the separated elements of the divided stone to unity--thereby
accomplishing her own salvation, whereas Sir Giles Tulmulty tries to divide the stone for himself and is both physically and morally undone.

17

Of course, such occurrences in novels partake of romance, and

Williams is nothing i f not a confirmed romantic, in whatever sense one may
wish to use that much maligned term--whether he is to be considered a
writer of romances, or whether he exhibits the hallmarks of a nineteenth~ntury

romantic.

But Reilly observes that "Williams's romanticism is

what might be called a 'corrected' romanticism,"

18

i.e., he brought his

orthodox Christianity to bear on the romantic tradition.

Uncorrected ro-

manticism in this context would consist of that myopic view that dwells on
this world without regard for theological truth of any kind:

"If Words-

worth had been content to revel in the experience of nature which haunted
him like a passion instead of looking for its meaning, he would have been
16

charles Williams, The Place of the Lion (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1965), pp. 192-206.
1
7Charles Williams, Many Dimensions (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1965), pp. 235-246.
18
Reilly, Romantic Religion, p. 1_59.
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an uncorrected romantic." 19 Thus, Williams often borrowed the phrase
"the feeling intellect" from Wordsworth; in other words, feeling (body)
must fuse with intellect, and the whole be ordered to the teleological
purpose (will); once again we have backed into the primary definition of
the conceptualist position as it has been described above.

Williams has

thus achieved the goals and refuted a famous argument of his friend
T. S. Eliot, and Reilly recognizes the fact:
If we may borrow Eliot's phrase, we may say that Williams's true romantic is one in whom there can be no 'dissociation of sensibility',
one whose thoughts are experiences which modify his sensibility. In
Eliot, however, the unified sensibility serves largely as a faculty
for the writing of poetry. In Williams, the union of thought and
feeling serves ... as a means of arriving at religious truth.20
The central passage that clearly demonstrates that the thrust of
Williams's thought can only be understood through conceptualistic
analysis is the one in which--as if so often the case, from

~eter

Abelard

forward--the critic seems to view his subject as a muddled Platonist,
as if he misperceived the Platonic Tradition; Reilly does not see the
Scotism in his description of Williams's position.

This "arrangement of

doctrine"
... makes one point very clear: it is not possible to regard matter
as in any sense evil. If the Fall necessitated the Incarnation, then
one may be Platonist enough to hold that Christ's love for man enabled
Him to take on 'even' matter to save him; it is possible to retain the
Platonic view of matter as evil and the body as punishment ... But if
the Incarnation would have occurred even without the Fall, then this
possibility no longer exists. We can no longer be pained that God had
to assume matter; and therefore, any indignity we see either in His
19Ibid., p. 160.
20-rb•d

.::_2_. '

pp. 1'50-161.
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assumption of matter or in matter itself must derive not from the object, matter itself, but from our misconception of it. In fact, it
seems to follow that the usual view of matter as somehow less than
spirit is simply a result of the Fall, part of our postlapsarian
blindness.21
Because he does not perceive the fundamental difference between the conceptualist view and Platonism, this admirable summary of what Williams did
genuinely hold as truth, a recapitulation of the Scotist and Bonaventuran
doctrine (indeed, the Franciscan doctrine) of the Incarnation, is called
"tenuous". 22

If a critic as sensitive to theological literary creation

as Reilly can only feel tenuousness and unclarity from this theological
perspective, is it then surprising that almost all Williams's less philosophically

attuned critics feel that they need apologize for his obscurity

and "fuzzy sentences" as Charles Huttar said at the 1977 M. L. A. conference special session on Williams?

In Williams's case, non-philosophi-

cal or non-theological approaches fail to come to grips with his context,
and like a true conceptualist philosopher,

~illiams

is unable or unwill-

ing to compromise; the critic must meet him on his own grounds.

Reilly

objects to this but calls his objection minor. 23 Were such contradiction
in the nature of the created universe to run rampant through Williams's
corpus,

it would do violence to the validity of his work; at any rate,

the objection is far from being "minor".

And Reilly sees it himself when

he observes that, for Williams's "virtues exist in the body as truly as
21
22

Ibid., p. 165.
Ibid.

ZJibid. , p. 166.

in the soul, though

4

differently.•~
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If virtue resides in the body as well

as in the soul, then that body is good, and our physical natures have goodness in their own right, and are a genuine mode of knowing.

Or as Williams

said in his poetry, "Flesh knows what spirit knows, but spirit knows it
knows--categories of identity." 2 5
Such unity of flesh and mind leading to vision is precisely what
led Williams to Dante, in whom he found a kindred spirit.

From the pre-

vious discussion of Williams's conceptualism, it need not be stressed very
hard what Reilly unwittingly reveals about Williams in this passage:
It is in Dante, Williams thinks, that we find the first and greatest
'true' rorr~nticism: the union of thought and feeling leading to
beatitude {Wili7, the theologizing of the romantic experience ~s it
came to Dru1te from the troubadors' treatment of courtly love.2 6
From this FOint of view, the art of Charles Williams is an attempt to achisve
the same unity of vision as Dante's in a contemporary context and to engage the reader in a spirit of caritas.

This Christian love he always

sees as moral duty, " ... duties to be performed, Christian duties to be
2
done in and through love." 7 It is the rare man who rejoices in individual moral obligations; they are the stock-in-trade of the conceptualist.
"After the visions come the duties; but the duties are only made possible
by that vision."

28

A character in a Williams novel almost invariably

24Ibid., p. 167.
2

5Charles Williams, The Region of the Summer Stars (London:
Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 26.
26

Reilly, RoKantic Religion, p. 169.

27 Ibid., p. 176.
28

Ibid.
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confronts or shies away from his moral responsibility.

Laurence Went-

worth's increasingly sinister refusal to participate in the world culminates in his acceptance of a succubus and total idiocy in the "ever-narrowing circles of the void," 29

The Archdeacon

of Fardles gives himself to

the Truth and Goodness of the Holy Grail though it means his physical
death.JO

In each case, a character accepts or rejects God in his confron-

tation with physical truth.

The immanence of God taken together with His transcendence was emphasized over and over again by Williams; in countless passages he stresses
that when confronted by an image, it is the duty of a man to remember
"This also is Thou; neither is this Thou. ,Jl

He was neither engaging in

speculation, nor in an effort to retain a merely intellectual balance.
Williams means that immanence and transcendence must be seen in all creation to achieve a proper love of God.

If this is true, it clears up what

Reilly implies is a potential scandal in the heart of Williams's thought:
If Williams is right, then Dante loved, not Beatrice, or not only
Beatrice, but God-in-Beatrice; more accurately perhaps, in view of
Williams's insistence on the Athanasian creed, Dante loved Beatricein-God. Bluntly, he loved both woman and God at the same time in
seemingly the same way. Eros and agape merge: a single human
affection may encompass both God and man.32
2

9Williams, Descent Into Hell, p. 222.

JOWilliams, War In Heaven, (New York:
1949), pp. 281-290.

Pellegrini & Cudahy,

31williams, The Descent of the Dove, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1966), p. viii.
2
3 Reilly, Romantic Religion, pp. 183·-184.
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Yet Reilly fails to see that it is the love of Beatrice in Dante that upholds balance, and he further claims that the Williams-Dante view tips
the scales toward immanence:
Even if we distinguish as carefully as the Athanasian creed does
between substance and person, the identification of Beatrice and God
seems hardly avoidable.33 (Italics mine)
This statement simply is not true; that which transcends an immanent
manifestation is the eternity of that person, what there is of the Creator
in the creature.

In one way, after the conceptualist hierarchy of first

principles is established can anyone ever really confuse creature with
Creator?

It is scarcely possible.

Etienne Gilson has repeatedly pointed out the differences between
the Western theology of being (I am who am) and the Eastern theology of
images (man is made in the image and likeness of God);3 4 this greatest
of modern Thomists has stressed that the commingling of sentences from one
of these theologies into the corpus of the other has almost invariably led
to heresy, but that no such heresy need occur where each of these theologies is restricted to its own area.

Most Western critics, that is to say,

most writers available to us, are product of the theology of being;

Reilly,

from the philosophy of being,finds potential heresy in Williams's work,
but it is Reilly himself, by his importation of the philosophy of being
into Williams's theology of images, that has created the mischief.

33Ibid., p. 184.

4

3 Gilson, History of Philosophy, p. 70.
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Further, Reilly does not recognize the conceptualist creation of
a new form, what

might be called the in-Gadded novel-romance:

'~he

'occultism' of the novels prevents their being taken seriously as examples of romantic theology or of theologized true love."35 This does not
seem to follow.

Why do the devices of myth discount the presentation of

a theological attitude with characters that manifest those attitudes in
an extension of the novel form?

That such a procedure produces a new form

(a bastardization if it is not liked, a synthesis of novel and romance
if it is) is only another way of saying that Williams's conceptualism forces him to create form, as
ter on aesthetics.

w~s

anticipated by the discussion in the chap-

The straight-forward novel does not permit a steady

depiction of the supernature that appertains simultaneously in mundane
physical action; the romance does not allow for the psychological effects
of the supernatural on three-dimensional characters.

To engage the ad-

vantages of both genres, Williams must create his own sub-genre.

To

those unaccustomed to the body-intellect-will trichotomy, Williams's novelform requires a slight restructuring of aesthetic acceptability.
Re~lly's

By

criterion, if we eliminate Simon the Magician from All Hallows:_

Eve because of his occultism, Simon Magus should be removed from the Acts
of the Apostles; the skulls of children that still occasionally turn up
at the site of Giles de Rais' estate testify to the genuine use of the
occult by those with perverted senses of power.

Williams

iF~gines

such

power unleashed in the twentieth century; the geometrice.2. increase in the

35Reilly, Romantic Religion, p. 184.
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amount of satanism rampant in the world in recent decades has proportionately increased the relevancy of Williams's fiction to the modern condition and aecreased any chance of accusing him of inventing plots
implausible or bizarre.
Reilly further attempts to shake the foundations of Williams's
thought by accusing him of a possible misinterpretation of Dante:
But it is a commonplace that the medieval habit of thought was incurably analogical: it saw most earthly things as analogues of heavenly things, and what it saw in thi§ was as a matter of course
without, as it were, premeditation,J6
He cites Guido Cavalcanti as an example of another poet who says much the
same as Dante, which is somewhat true; but Cavalcanti focuses our attention not on the blessedness of the lady in her physicality, but rather he
feels that she is blessed because of her body, which is a difference preeluding theologizing.
of Cavalcanti.

Nor has anyone tried to theologize the mistresses

To the degree his imagery approximates Dante's, Cavalcanti

is to that extent a lesser Dante.

Yet Reilly claims that

... what Williams seems to ignore in his continual citation of Dante
as a teacher of the Way of Romantic 1ove is that Dante, in treating
love philosophically and even theologically, was doing no more than
the other writers of his schoo1.J?
True, but he did it best, and through the ages recognizably so, becoming
the Model for men of the Romantic way.
love in a conscious manner.

Dante fused theology and physical

The lovers follow the Way without reflection:

flesh knows what spirit knows/ but spirit knows it knows ...

36Ibid., p. 185.
J?Ibid.
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As Dante's career presents the paradigm for the conceptualist
literary man, Williams is the man who recognizes that pattern across seven centuries.

Yet Reilly--who

aga~
J

it must be

re-iterate~

has come

closer than any other critic to understanding Williams's philosophical
approach --Re~!Iy:il:iOws an innocence of the nuances of conceptualism by
claiming that i f Beatrice is more than Beatrice she was not personal, and
thus undermines Williams's romantic theology.

If Dante merely articulated

what was implicit in his fellows, the pseudo-problem collapses; and i f
Williams explained that vision to his own generation, recognizing Dante
as a man on the same path, then all is consistent and coherent.

And, in-

deed, Reilly, in his succeeding paragraph, sees that Beatrice and the
characters of Williams must follow-the path to moral duty and he is disappointed. (Hefails to see the internal consistency also.)
... the only real objection~.to Williams's--and Dante's--syste~ •••
is not theological but purely natural and human: it seems disappointing as its analogue, the Christian religion, so often seems disappointing. It seemed at the outset to promise so much for daily living-for the time being--beeause it deal::fu with one of the truly ·unfor- ....
gettable experiences in human life.
He is referring to love between the sexes; it leads to loving one's neighbor, marriage,.the rearing of children, all that is "unexciting" to those
people seeking novelty.
truth is mundane.

Lies, a conceptualist would say,

Its very mundanity creates its beauty.

~

novel; the

And though

Reilly may be disappointed, he also can see the other side of what the
subjection to moral duty means:
... all nature, including human nature, is an image of divinity, areflection of God ... all things are reminders of God, like Whitman's
grass, a handkerchief of the Lord divinely dropped.J9

38Ibid., p. 186.
J9Ibid., pp. 187-188.
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Only a person who sees the Christian religion as analogue may not be able
to see the consistency of really believing that God created and saw that
it was good.
The testimony of T. S. Eliot confirms that Williams as a man was
of a piece with his literary productions; but again, the realist Eliot,
in his introduction to All Hallows' Eve, indicates that he believed that

Williams partially failed as an artist because he did not or could not
conform himself to accepted norms of composition.
degree in philosophy at Harvard

i~

Eliot, who received his

may be recalled, does catch a glimmer

of the necessity of form-manipulation •
•.. Williams invented his own forms (sic)--or to say that no form,
if he had obeyed all its conventional ~ws, could have been less
satisfactory for what he wanted to say. 0
Eliot fumbles badly searching for a manner of classifying Williams's
thought; he is forced to fall back continually on his

understandL~g

of the

man 's character:
For him there was no frontier between the material and the spiritual
world. Had I ever had to spend a night in a ntunted house, I should
have felt secure with Williams in my company.
Notice that Eliot sees that God's creation is all one for Willi.ams, and
that our persistence in separating nature from supernature is a nominal
distinction to him, or perhaps a formal distinction; it is certainly not
real.

Even to a theologically minded man like Eliot, such perception is

to be considered "peculiar'' :
40
T. S. Eliot, "Introduction", in Charles Williams, All
Hallows' Eve (Boston: Noonday Press, 1971), p. xiii.
41

Ibid.
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To him the supernatural was perfectly natural, and the natural was
also supernatural. And this peculiarity gave him that profound insight into Good and Evil, into the heights of Heaven and the depths
of Hell, which providea both the immediate thrill, and the permanent
message of his novels. 2
Probably the most instantly recognizable aspect of conceptualist
metaphysics is the idea that there is no break between nature and supernature; they overlap and interpenetrate at every level of being and experience.

Even more vital to him is his insistence on the centrality of

moral theology, or better, moral action.
Eliot somewhat perplexed.

This emphasis in Williams leaves

He has just praised Williams for his "profound

insight" into the nature of morality, and then just as abruptly praises
him for not projecting this insight into the novels.
The conflict which is the theme of every one of Williams's novels is
not merely the conflict between good and bad-men, in the usual sense.
No one was less confined to conventional morality, in judging good
and bad behavior, than Williams: his morality is that of the Gospels.
He sees the struggle between Good and Evil as carried on, more or less
blindly, by men and women who are often only the instruments of
higher or lower powers, but who also have the freedom to choose to
which powers they will submit themselves. 4 3
If Eliot is only saying in a verbose manner that Williams is not judgmental
toward people or the characters of his creation, then there is no argument;
but Williams is never afraid to judge a character when we are permitted
to share the omniscient author's peek into the intentions of his character.
Wentworth's and Tulmulty's damnations come readily to mind, not to mention
the otherwise incomprehensible conversion of Gregory Persimmons.
42

Ibid., p. xiv.

4 3Ibid., p. xvi.
44
Williams, War in Heaven, pp. 265-280.

44
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What Eliot probably means is that Williams is playing for much
higher stakes than the individual fates of his individual characters; he
is also showing the cosmic dimensions of Good and Evil that exist anterior to the machinations of the particular actors.

The simple refusal to

perform an act of kindness can reverberate throughout eternity, as Evelyn
learns in All Hallow's

Eve~5

A submission to "the co-inherence" may lead

to acts of glory passing human understanding, as Lester learns in the same
tale.

46

In this way only, Williams's morality is not conventional.

The

content of good human behavior is unaltered by such a vision; in other
words, the doctrine of the Sermon on the Mount is binding on all Christians.
Williams's profundity comes from making clear the supernatural implication
in Christ's words.

As Eliot states the case, Williams could be open to

the interpretation of holding "higher doctrines." This is an important
consideration to raise in an author concerned as much with occultism as
is Williams.

One matter that is a constant in the esoteric societies is

that they teach a "higher" doctrine, which is usually a contradiction of
Christian morality; a number of them are satanic. 47

Later it will be

shown that Williams will portray the occult only to reject it ultimately
as either evil or at least unhealthy; the

~~tithesis

between Williams and

occultists will be apparent to anyone who reads Williams's rejection of
the idea of matter as an evil,and his equally categorical rejection of
4

5williams, All Hallows' Eve, pp. 172-201.

46

Daz

rbid., pp. 240-273.

47Francis King, Ritual Magic in England:
(London: Neville Spearman, 1970), passim.
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gnosticism, i. e., neither his divinely inspired heroes, nor his demonically possessed villains have privileged information.
Eliot, though, may only mean that Williams never openly preaches,
which is true, and the statement is probably more a comment on Eliot's
taste, Williams's and the twentieth C3ntury's,than objections based on
literary criteria.

The sermons of Cardinal Newman would be banished as

literature by such canons, and that the great Tractarian works are less
read than formerly could easily be explained by the distaste for exhortation among our contemporaries.
Further, as Eliot recognizes,

what~

unusually keen in Williams's

perceptions was his awareness of the loathesomeness of evil, which was
tied firmly to his literary ability to make his audience share in his
disgust and horror of that which offends God.
Williams's understanding of Evil was profound. Had he himself not
always seen Evil, unerringly, as the contrast to Good--had he understood Evil, so far as it can be understood, without ·knowing the
Good--there are passages which could only be outrageous and foul.
He is co.,cerned, not wlth the Evil of conventio~al morality and the
ordinary manifestations by which we recognize it, but with the very
essence of Evil; it is, therefore, Evil which has no power to attract
us, for we see it as the repulsive thing it is, and as the despair
of the damned from which we recoil.48
Here Eliot may have touched on the real reason for much of the puzzlement
and distaste for Williams among the reading public.

Without the shared

background of Christian morality, his stories are ridiculous, and they are
meaningless (and melodramatic) to anyone who disbelieves in the objectivity
of evil.

A reader feels with deep emotions the abyss and emptiness of
48Eliot, ''Introduction", p. xvi.

that which separates itself from its Creator.

Such writing requires a

web of assumptions on the part of the reader.
Thomas Howard has noticed that besides the context, the images in
the novels force a consideration of the occult elements in them.

Lf0und7

Williams ...
special images that would suggest in
the centers of human aspiration( ... knowledge, ecstasy,
is what makes his novels seem occult. Williams was not
an escape from the actual. It is simply that, with his
agination, he saw these images as a frightful source of

themselves
power). This
interested in
vicarious imconflict.49

No doubt, but assuredly his close association, no matter how briefly, with
men like A. E. Waite as a member (like Yeats before him) ~f The Order of
the Golden Dawn must have affected his sensibilities.5°

Yeats continued

to search for images from occult symbolism for the rest of his life.
Williams used them more probably because he was both attracted and

r~pelled,

much like his own character, Roger Ingram, who shall be discussed later.
It is Thomas Howard who has called the work of Williams's editorial career disparate, noting that he wrote about writers with "as little
in common" as Dickens, Hopkins and Kierkegaard.(sic)5

1

What they have in

common is the ability to portray a conceptualist view of life.

Somewhat

like Eliot, Howard feels that he must justify discussing literary works in
terms of their ideas, primarily because Williams leaves him little choice.
It is absurd, however, for a literary man to feel the need for apologizing
4

9Howard, Charles Williams• Experiment, p. 7.

50King, Ritual Magic, pp. 9, 112.
1
5 Howard, Charles Williams' Experiment, pp, 11-12.
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for talking about the manifest content of a piece of writing.

What forces

Howard to make the novel leap of discussing what a work is about happens
because
Williams's work •.. is peculiar. It does not proceed by focussing on
a central figure; it is not mundane; it fails perhaps in magnitude;
it lacks the structural subtlety that we look for in our novels: and
it draws upon subj~ct matter and treats it in a way that is alien to
the mode~- novel.)~
In other words, he sees that Williams has shattered the novel form, and
has remade it to suit his own purposes, and that to make the statement
that was

him, he was forced to do so by his content.

i~

As we have seen,

this new direction of form is inherent in conceptualist aesthetics.
After Mariann Ru.ssell makes the tell-tale error of calling
Williams eclectic, she notes that he will use anything handy as part of
his arsenal:
In developing his central ideas, Williams selected from religious and
philosophical systems, from history and from literary works of all
ages. ~hus, Williams can be said to lack an acute historical sense
because he is not seeking to place an idea in the context of its age
so much as to relate the ~~ticular idea to what he considers a
basic pattern of reality. j
At best, this statement is a half-truth.

Because Williams acts from with-

in a framework of thought, accepting across time those people he recognizes
as kindred thinkers, Russell chides him for not being a systematic historian, which is also untrue as a short acquaintance with Descent of the
Dove, Queen Elizabeth or James I will quickly prove.

5Zibid., p. 44.
53Russell, Iiea of the City of God, p. 12.
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see unity in Williams's thought, impairs the usefulness of her otherwise
painstaking work.

Christopher Fullman's interesting study echoes the

foresaid critics because he believes that "Williams will not easily fit
into a school."54 Russell's study especially would have improved trcmendously from a knowledge of conceptualism, because a number of her isolated
observations have the ring of authenticity about them.

For example:

Williams's images of the city are for the most part attempts to
present the unusual significance glimpsed in a personal religious
experience. 55
... Williams tends to seek archetypal meanings in personal experience
and to_+elate such meaning to a system he derived from Christian
dogma.Jb (From an eclectic yet!)
To Williams, the supernatural appears as the prototype of the natural
so that in ~he original creation, there existed in nature nothing that
had not pre-existed in the super~tural. Creation is a kind of image
of the Creator as the supernatural is the meaning of the natur;al.57
Relationship is for Williams a natural image of a supernatural fact.
The principle of the individual spiritual life is the perpetuation
of Christ's historic substitution; substitution is the 'inscape' (sic)
of the city.58

54Christopher Edward Fullman, "The Mind and Art of Charles
Williams: A Study of His Poetry, Plays, the Novel~" Dissertation,
University of Wisconsin, 1955, p. 415.
5

~ussell,

Idea of the City of God, p. 43.

56 Ibid., p. 46.
57 Ibid., p.

50.

5Sibid., p. 60.
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Even more than the bishop of Hippo, who had a professional concern
with voluntary evil, Williams empha~izes that voluntary evil lies
in relation rather than substance.5b (The reference here is probably
to The For~iveness of Sins, p. 132.)59
These are little gems that float through Russell's book like leaves in
water: beautiful but without continuity.

Her refusal to come to grips

with the unity of Williams's meaning leaves her work a collection of useful aphorisms.

The present study was begun in the hope of rectifying such

misunderstandings of the man's accomplishments.
One recent study puts forth some reasons for Williams's lack of
popularity, and at the same time teaches (probably without conscious
understanding) the reasons why he wrote as he did=
A main reason why his work, for all its intrinsic excellence and extrinsic historical usefulness.remains so little known is its unusual
difficulty. At first sight his style at times is crabbed, mannered
and wholly impenetrable. Many passages require repeated close readings even for the necessary preliminary sympathl between reader and
writer, let alone for a thorough understanding.vO
To a scholar like Shideler, whose own writing suggests conceptualist
presuppositions, or to the present writer, there are no such problems read.
h'l.In, 61
lng

Generally, however, (for many readers) the problem exists.

Davidson proceeds to light on an obvious choice for making a comparison
with Williams.
8
5 Ibid., p. 60.

59Ibid., p. 61.
60

Alice Elizabeth Davidson, "The Fictional Techniques of
Charles Williams", Dissertation, Indiana University, 1977, p. 1.
61 Mary McDermott Shide l er, The
of Romantic Love: A
----~--~~------------------~
Study in the Writings of Charles Williams
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966),
p,

J.
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Like Gerard Manley Hopkins, who also struck even the most penetrating of his earliest readers as crabbed and affected, Williams needs
time to build, to train his audience. Then he can be seen, like
Hopkins, to give his complex materials powerful direct expr~sion.62
?eckham and C. S. Lewis before him have observed that the only real traces
of genuine obscurity in

Willi~~s

as a fault are the careless ways he some-

times uses antecedents. 6J The new farm of in-Godded romance-novel may ereate one problem, however.

Because of the Stevensonian or even Chesterton-

ian material Williams uses as a springboard for his own constructions, an
uninformed reader will doubtless expect a story that moves rapidly from
incident. to incident like The Man Who Was Thursday or "The Strange Case
of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde."
one

~t

Indeed, the plots of a Williams novel make

to move with an adventuresome gallop through the stories.

Such

a reader will almost immediately become impaled on the reflective passages,
and be forced to back-track because embedded phrases which seemed trivial
are quickly shown to have a cosmic significance.
Williams for

~ight

Such attempts to read

entertainment will most likely lead to frustration

rather than to fruition.

The novels are best read orally with the

nuances savored by all the senses.

It should be remembered that one of

the tenets of conceptualist art was that it plunges the audience into a
world of sensuous detail. (See pp. 17-18.)

Like a play that only takes

6
Zoavidson, Fictional Technique, p. 1.
6
3Robert Peckham, "The Novels of Charles Williams," Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 196.5; C. S. Lewis, "A Commentary on
the Arthurian :Poems of Charles Williams", in Arthurian Torso (London:
Oxford University :Press, 1948), pp. 187-188.
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on life in performance, those passages that so disturb Davidson make
good prose sense on the first reading (allowing for the acknowledged
antecedent problem) when articulated.
Although it is offered tentatively, another problem may exist for
the reader of a conceptualist work.

That Williams shifts from sensation,

to perception, and thence to intuition as modes of knowing, could possibly
confound

readers of other philosophical persuasions.

truth forever seems to be shifting on them.

The ground of

Thus, a naturalist will be

enjoying a passage of rapture, when suddenly Williams will show what the
rapture means.

The mystic will share a character's contact with super-

nature, only to be shown either the pattern in the truth or its physical
effects.

A reader must be prepared to proceed where Williams wishes to

take him

by not resisting his logic, or else he can easily become

befuddled.
His attitude toward artistic creation tells a potential reader
how to interpret his ideas:
I once very daringly asked him whether the line in one of the Taliesin
poems, 'the feet of creation walk backward through the waters' was
meant as a description of the effects of sin and the Fall. With
characteristic humility he replied after a moment's thought, 'I have
never thought of that before, but that is certainly one of the things
it means'. Paradoxical and frivolous as this answer might seem to
some, there could hardly be a clearer or more spontaneous avowal
that the poet's function is not to give expression to the dredged-up
precipitates of his own sub-conscious but to witness to his imperfect
but nevertheless agthentic perception of the manifold aspects of
objective reality. 4
~L ew~s,
.

.

Arthur~an

Torso, p.

A

~J.
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This approach does not imply
of little or no meaning.

that what the poet expressly intended is

Rather that meaning has ramifications and im-

plications far beyond what the artist consciously put in the work.

Those

interpretations arising from the work itself and which are in harmony with
the conscious intentions of the author add
torting its meaning.

to the original without dis-

This attitude at first glance, seems related to

6

ideas expressed in Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism, 5 but a closer look
at that monumental work shows that Frye constantly breaks down categories
whereas Williams multiplies them.

Frye may well be eclectic in the sense

of having devised (to use his own terms) an encyclopedic approach, which
seems to be a pragmatic manner of scholarship because true system is rejected

~

priori.

Williams, on the contrary, delights in tidying-up and

sorting-out in what seems a

sh~er

delight in using·his brain.

This is a

typical sentence from Williams's own criticism: "Eros need not for ever
be on his knees to Agape; he has a right to his delights; they are part
of the Way."

66 Literal fact is less important for him than creating

paradigms for the channels of knowing (i.e., body, intellect,and will).
For instance, in Religion and Love in Dante, Williams tells us in a footnote that whether or not Beatrice cut Dante dead in the streets of Florence
is historically unimportant, because, "a literary convention is, at its
best, a means of passion." 67

Such passion is a means of conveying truth

65Northrop Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism:
(Princeton:

Four Essays

Princeton University Press), passim.

66wnliams, Religion and Love in Dante (London:
1941) 1 p. 40.

c7
; Ibid.

I

p. 9.

Dacre Press,
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and goodness; therefore, any method of exciting passion to the ends of
the transcendentals constitutes a valid literary approach (he would call
it a "Way").
Patterns are the dare, as they are the necessity, of criticism as of
life; they can be connected only by destruction, and no doubt this
pattern will soon enough be des6~oyed. But their creation and
destruction is our only method.
So says Williams, the system-builder in criticism; his own critics
have not recognized the pattern that pervades his own work.

Since so

many statements in this chapter have been brought up only to show their
shortcomings, I should like to end these comments on the critics with a
disclaimer.

A tradition of conceptualism as here defined is not univer-

sally recognized in theology or philosophy, much less in literature.

Be-

cause of this, no critic to date (except Shideler--and she only implicitly)
recognizes the internal consistency, nay, the system in Williams's thought.
The principal reason for these pages is to confront any future attempt to
call Charles Williams by that pejorative term

68

eclectic.

williams, Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1933), p. v.

CHAl"l'ER

v

SHADOWS OF ECSTASY AS A CONCEP'l.UALIST NOVEL

Throughout his entire ouvre, Charles Williams retains the conceptualist position with remarkable consistency, rightly having ignored
the injunctions of his close friends to simplify his style (which we have
argued would have destroyed his meaning).

Though six of his seven novels

have a small though devoted readership, one stands apart for provoking
dispute even by Williams's following; that book is Shadows of Ecstasy.

1

In the shorter of her two studies, Shideler sets it apart from the others,
implying it to be singular in its obscurity.

2

In his popular study of

the Oxford Christians, Humphrey Carpenter likens the book itself to the
confusion of mind of one of·its characters, who says that it is
all such a mad mixture, purple rhetoric and precise realism,
doctrines of transmutation and babble about African witch-doctors
and airships and submarines.3
Furthermore, he calls it "one of the oddest books ever to go under the
1

Charles Williams, Shadows of Ecstasy (London: Victor GolJ~n~z,
1933). Subsequent pages will be to the more readily accessible edition ..
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965).

~Y McDermott Shideler, Charles Williams: A Critical Essay
Eerdmans, 1969), p. 46.

(Grand Rapidss

3Charles Williams, Shadows, as quoted in Humphrey Carpenter,
The Inklin s: C. S. Lewis J. R. R. Tolkien Charles Williams and Their
Friends Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1979 , p. 93.
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•·
name of a novel ••. "

4

and claims that "Its lack of interest in ordinary

chaXacter portrayal was striking • .,S CleaJ:ly Carpenter considers the
work a total failure.
Easily the most consistent and coherent reading of the novels is
that of Robert l'eckham; even i f one occasionally cavils at individual
judgments, all Peckham usually lacks is an understanding of the threads
holding Williams's thought together.

But when discussing Shadows of

Ecstasy, even Peckham follows suit:
The book is indeed inferior to the other novels: it deals with
difficult and odd situations clumsily; the characters tend to
operate on their symbolic level; the theme is strange and is
both philosophicalll difficult to sympathize with and psychologically unimaginable.
What a reader can "easily sympathize with" is largely a matter of taste
and not a criterion for literary discussion; but to maintain that no one
can envision the underlying psychological validity of the novel is cleaJ:ly
a wrong-headed statement as will soon be demonstrated.

Peckham not only

has no sympathy with the book, he totally misunderstands one of the central characters, one of whom an understanding is vital for a proper reading:
For the priest, however, the ecstasy has been intellectualized
nearly out of existence. 'He defined men by morality; it was perhaps inevitable that he should define God in the same wagr'.7
4<ant has also been accused of defining God by moralitY. )

4Ibid.
5Ibid.

6

Robert Peckham, "The Novels of Charles Williams," Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1965, p. ?.
?Ibid., pp. 13-14.
8
William Turner, History of Philosophy (Boston:
p,

391.

Ginn, 1929),
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First, Peckham calls this an example of the via negativa, which it is
not.

Morals are imperative no matter which Way one pursues God; the ele-

vation of morals to define man is not primarily an intellectual approach,
as we have seen.

Caithness carries the position Williams wishes to pre-

sent; if the novel fails at all, it is because central truths are not
placed mare centrally before the reader's imagination.
~eckham's

perception of the principal character, Nigel Considine,

is a bit closer to the mark' he sees him as a D. H. lawrence figure, and
he is probably partially correct in calling " •.. the book ••• sort of a commentary on the ideas of D. H. La.wrence." 9 Here Peckham elucidates the
character of Considine and talks about him as a man held up to our admiration.

No wonder Peckham and others who take this approach have

difficulty understanding the novel.
The book is a twentieth-century English recasting of an AntiChrist myth; the Anti-Christ character (Considine) denies his infernal
nature at the only time the subject is broached in the text.

But the

.~ti

Christ would lie.

Upright men like Roger Ingram and Inkamasi, the Zulu

king, follow him.

But Christ warns, does he not, that the Anti-Christ

would fool, i f it were possible, the very Elect?

Here is the question a

reader must ask himself i f he wishes to know whether or not Williams
succeeds in this work; has he demanded too much from his reader by presenting him with Anti-Christ and allowing that reader to risk misinterpretation?

9Peckham, Novels, p. 23.
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As Thomas Howard was aware in his study of the novels:
Since Williams's seven novels represent seven different ima~in
ative approaches to one single idea, an exhaustive rendering of each
one would end up being intolerably boring,10
But to give such a reading to but one of the books would be profitable
and reveal how conceptualism can inform the working of a piece of fiction;
and since even Williams's admirers seem baffled by Shadows of Ecstasy, if
coherent conceptualism can be shown in that work, it should be readily
transferable to the remainder of his imaginative literature.
Unfortunately, what makes this novel in some ways easier to study
is that Williams asserts the meaning explicitly.

times this is perceived as a defect.

Too often in contemporary

A novelist is expected to show, not

to tell, and the reader is then expected to interpret and analyze the raw
data of the book for himself.

This method is perfectly acceptable--if

the writer or the reader is a pragmatist or a materialist.
the right aesthetics is needed to fit the right author.

Once again

The following

analysis is offered to help clear up the confusion generated by Carpenter
and some of his fellow critics:
1hese novels were all concerned with the rightful and wrongful use
of power. And here somebody reading them may find himself in some
confusion, for Williams's ideas of right and wrong often seem extremely odd. In Shadows of Ecstasy, it is disturbing to find the 11
'hero' Roger Ingram becoming a disciple of the 'villain' Considine.
10
Thomas Howard, "Charles Williams's Experiment in the Novel,"
Dissertation, New York University, 1970, p. 6.
11

Carpenter, Inklings, p. 96.

But do not the exalted of the earth follow Soloviev's Anti-Christ?

12
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Turning to the text of the novel itself, the story begins In medias

-

res during the peroration of an address by Roger Ingram, a professor of
poetry, which he is presenting after a dinner for the explorer Nigel

Considine and the assembled geographical faculty of the University of
London.

Ingram's chair was that of "applied literature", i.e., its en-

1
dower wished for literature to be applied to life as the sciences are. 3
The author, in omniscient voice, comments on Ingram's book, which attacks
those who believe in "the purification of literature from everything
else".

14 Already the reader realizes that action is superior to know-

ledge, or better, that knowledge exists for action.

After some light

banter (banter is the most noticeable characteristic of Williams's dialogue) the author says that Ingram, "would, in short, have been a bore,
had he not been himself".

1

5 That truth to his own intentions supports

his integrity and allows him to be integrated as a man, i.e., not a bore.

In rapid order, the author introduces Isabel (Roger's wife) and
Sir Bernard Travers (a retired, distinguished surgeon), who discuss Considine before the reader meets him.

To an outside observer, Considine is

simply an eminent explorer and something of a mystic; his public life has

12

cf. Vladimir Soloviev, War and Christianitl (London'
Constable, 1915), passim.

1

Ywilliams, Shadows,

14Th"d
--1;_·

' p.

8•

p. 7.

revealed nothing about what he intends.

Throughout the discussion, and

throughout the book, Sir Bernard speaks with a detached sense of ironic
humor, as a sort of Oscar Wilde with retired scalpels; and he always upholds the intellect; at the moment, though, he is perplexed because he
cannot remember where he saw Considine before.

16

Williams is capable of dropping a piece of light, casual (but
serious) moralizing (though oblique) into any part of his plot.

As the

evening closes, here is how Williams announces the playing of "God Save
the King":

"The National Anthem implored Deity on behalf of royalty, and

dismissed many incredulous of both,"l?

Such gratuitous moralizing per-

meates Williams's works, and-- as has been argued

.~-is

a conceptualist trait.

Then Considine is introducedt. Roger had quoted Rimbaud's ominous

.

.

lines, "I will encounter darkness as a bride/ and hug it in mine arms."
Considine challenges him instantly by asking whether he means the lines
as truth, or " •.. do you use apposite quotation merely as a social convenience?"18

With exact detail, we are told that Considine's eyes "smoulder." 19

Already it is possible to classify some of the characters as they align
themselves along the chart of philosophical possibility.

Roger erects

poetry and the exquisite passions as the standard by which he makes his
decisions for life; he is an idealist.

Sir Bernard wishes to retire from

action to contemplate and comment on life; he is a realist.
16 Ibid.,

p. 11.

17Ibid.

p. 12.

I

18
Ibid., p. 13.
19Ibid.

Considine
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burns passionately to put beliefs into action; he is a mystic.

That such

categorization is not a commentary on worth. will be seen; the categories
do consistently describe the limits of what each character comprehends of
what is happening at any given time.

For instance, the aloofness of the

idealist makes Roger have a "sardonic consciousness that the subservient
listeners probably thought ... a little mad. 20

He relishes such super-

iority, but Considine in conversation is like "a hand of energy at rest." 21
The passivity of conversation appears foreign to his nature, as it generally
will to a mystic.

Sir Bernard constantly reflects,as in passages like:

"The intellect hardly ever failed one eventually, i f one fulfilled the
•
• t ~mpose
•
d . 22
cond ~• t ~on
~
II

Aristotle or St. Thomas Aquinas would have

been pleased by such a statement; his intellect has allowed him to understand that poetry is Ingram's religion.
In the first ten pages then, Williams plunges the reader into a
milieu of poetry professors, after-dinner speeches, African explorers with
sinister implications, a retired surgeon who flashes wit, and his businesssman son Philip.

The detail of the action and character is already ex-

tremely dense, just as an understanding of conceptualism has already predieted.

But on the next page, Williams introduces to the reader and the

members of the party, the character on whom the action will eventually
turn:

Ian Caithness, an Anglo-Catholic priest and friend of the Archbishop
20

Ibid.

21

Ibid. , p. 15.

22

Ibid.

100

of York.

He is described as looking ascetic, but we are informed that he
2"

practiced no austerities. ~

Intensity of devotion rooted in the active

life is a conceptualist hallmark.
At the moment, a masacre of Christian missionaries in the interior
of Africa has disconcerted Caithness.

24

The Church has asked for no re-

prisals by the secular arm because the missionaries had anticipated the
possibility of martrydom.

Sir Bernard suddenly remembers an old photo-

graph and recalls that as a boy he took a picture of his grandfather in
company with a man who resembles Considine remarkably, and they discuss
the impossibility of Considine's being over a hundred years old.

This is

the only element in the plot that can be construed as "fantastic" (read
impossible to the incredulous) that appears in the book.

To date, no cri-

tic has noticed that the great age of Considine is not unlike that of the
Grand Llama in Lost Horizon, or like Ayeeha in Haggard's She.

What

Williams is doing then, is employing a sub-genre of popular fiction and
attempting to elevate it to the status of an enduring work of art.

There

is a difference, however; whereas Rider Haggard or James Hilton sacrifices
character for the sake of plot, Williams tries to keep both in balance:
One cannot imagine Shadows of Ecstasy without the precise contributions
of the highly individualized characters.

On the other hand, any explorer

could be substituted for Alan Quatermain, or any adventurer may have been
thrust into the action of Lost Horizon without loss to the work as a whole.
2

Jibid. ' p. 17.

24
Ibid., p. 18.
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This bending of the form--this synthesis of, let us say, Robert Louis
Stevenson and John Galsworthy--gives us a conceptualist form allowing
an author to show the goodness of supernatural truth through natural action mediated by intellectual understanding; and even if he neglects
detail of background, the events continually transpire with great rapidity.
In the second chapter, it is revealed that Philip works for a syndicate developing parts of North Africa; conceptualist immersion in specific detail is never more in the forefront than when young Travers tries
to read his morning newspaper only to discover that his employer, Simon ·
Rosenberg, has committed suicide, and that African hordes have taken over
much of the area where his companies' holdings lie.

"Philip goggled at

the thick type, and instinctively tried to read both accounts at once." 25
All communication with the African interior has ceased; Rosenberg was
despondent over his wife's death, and the
ment lay at his home meaninglessly.

~wels

he bought for her adorn-

In conversation, Rosenberg's love of

natural beauty is held up as a pale reflection of Caithness's love of
Church and God.

26

On the philosophical level, this means that a denial of

physical goodness with its supernatural equivalency leads to despair and
suicide.

Philip, (the representative of the typical modern man) is left

in confusion.

Rosenberg had developed a mania for making "for his wife"

the most wonderful collection of jewels in the world; Sir Bernard's immediate reaction is to desire to discover what happened (to possess knowledge) as a result of the Rosenberg tragedy. 27
25 Ibid., p. 22.
26

Ibid., pp. 26-27.

27 Ibid., p. 27.
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The next few pages consist of plot exposition: Considine is at
the inquest into Rosenberg's death, he reveals that he was the deceased's
last visitor {we are never told but we later assume Considine manipulated
the death), and he says he was concerned about the dead man's state of mind.
When the will is read, it is discovered that his fortune is left to two
cousins, Ezechiel and Nehemiah, two fanatics who hate Gentiles, and that
Considine and the Grand Rabbi have been named executors.
tion takes a scant two-and-a half pages.

28

This much ac-

From this point on, the abundance

of detail need not be mentioned again so as not to be distracting.
When Sir Bernard and Considine engage in small talk shortly after
the inquest, the first hint appears that the explorer has some gnostic
motive: Sir Bernard says off-handedly that man has stomach and mirid
(rational animal), but Considine counters with these words:
0 so far f Considine answered, and normally! But it's the farther
and the abnormal to which we must look. When men are in love, when
they are in the midst of creating, when they are in a religious flame,
what do they need then either with the stomach or the mind?29
The implication is that men can overcome the limits of the body by sheer
force of will,
form.

Gnosticism usually takes either an idealist or a mystic

Considine's desire to enter a purity of action rather than of mind

identifies him as a mystic.
When Considine confronts Ingram, however, he applies arguments
that appeal to the professor's mental constructs, especially in regard to
28
Ibid., pp. 29-JO.
29Ibid. , p. 31.
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his understanding of the nature of poetry.

Considine constantly con-

fronts Ingram with a "pattern of imagery,'.' to use a phrase much beloved
by idealist critics.

Death is a form of poetry and the criticism of verse

is a form of embalming-;..and vice versa; Ingram claims that people like
"embalmed" (i.e., analyzed) poetry "better than the live thiilg. n30

Ingram,

then, realizes the limitations of the subjective use of poetry and wishes
to impose his categories in action, thereby recalling the perpendicularity
of idealist thought.

(See Appendix II.)

Since Williams was a conceptualist, his characters, from his viewpoint, will sometimes have insights beyond the limitation of their perspectives.

Philip. the modern pragmatist, experiences an occasion of

Beatrician love in Bonaventuran terms (Williams mistakenly attributes
the words to Augustine) c "she. herself had no circumference. ·~ 31
that he is constantly feeding on the truth of her being.

This means

Once again we

have a restatement of the Franciscan doctrine of divine incarnation as a
reflection of God, coupled with the Scotist haecceitas ... But this is
merely a toddler's first step for Philip:

"He was still a child of the

new birth; maturity of intellect as of morals was far distant ... 32 The
young pragmatist has become a naturalist; he has yet to learn the validity
of intellect and will.

30ibid., p. 33.
3iibid., p. 36.
3Zibid.
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Sir Bernard's reaction to his son's new-formed naturalism is
predictable; he is the type of realist who has not yet concerned himself
with final causes; therefore, "Dante was to him no more ridiculous than
Voltaire; disillusion was as much an illusion as illusion itself.
that seemed had at least the truth of its seeming . .,33

A thing

He permits only

what his intellect puts before him for his consideration, but he allows
everything that comes before him thus as possessing equal validity.
if his son is only infatuated.

then tfte girl 1s

~apable

Even

of making his

son infatuated.
The eyes of Rosamund might or might not hold the secret origin of
day and night, but if they apparently did then they apparently did,
and it would be silly to deny it and equally silly not to relish it.34
This means more than simply not poisoning the wells of philosophy; it means
that truth and goodness and beauty can reside in apparent falsity, and
that whatever verities come by whatever means, they are of the Good.

This

too follows from a conceptualist position.
The African leaders have issued a proclamation which first reaches
the reader filtered through Ingram's idealist understanding r

"It says

that the Socratic: method is done for." 35 He appears to have made the
statement with a twinkle in the eye.

The declaration itself turns out to

be an announcement that the ways of Africa will soon overcome the ways of

33Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. J?.
35Ibid., p. J8.

10.5

Europe whether by force or by co-operation.

The statement is a tissue

of purple prose expounding pure naturalism with calculated appeals to
others.

In this context, the Africans play on Ingram's prejudices:

to all who owe their devotion to music, to poetry, to painting
and sculpture, to the servants of every more than rational energy;
greater than those and more numerous, to all who at this present
moment exist in the exchanged or une~changed adoration of love, it
{the poweri7 calls more especially.36
After serious reflection on the impending African invasion, Ingram can
only comprehend what is happening in terms of Milton; thus is the ability
of idealism to act projected off on a tangent, one with "the truth of its
seemings" perhaps, but a tangent nevertheless.

The chapter on the pro-

clamation ends on the sinister note of Ingram unwittingly introducing more
than he can yet know, or more than he is subsequently to learn from his
experience--he posits the possibility of the African leader as Anti-christ·.
He suddenly quotes the familiar lines from Yeats' "The Second Coming,"
What rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born.37
He muses on what the "prodigies of the birth" will be; Considine will soon
_make clear exactly what those prodigies are.
The next chapter opens with another gratuitous moral discussion;
young Philip, the pragmatist-cum-naturalist, ponders the morality of fol1m-ring slavishly the desires of the beloved.

That he knows nothing of

romantic theology is beside the point; he is a man with the experience of
36Ibid. , p. 41.
3?Ibid., p. 45.
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adoration, and wants to know what he should do.

Morality is the natural

state o£ men, Williams is telling us, no matter what a man may think he
thinks.

This placing of an average young_man into the identical situation

which confronted Dante before Beatrice is another example o£ the extraordinary risk Williams takes with his creations.
Rosamund while he rides in the Tube.3

8

Philip muses over

To thrust the reader into a time-

less condition contained in an otherwise mundane setting, either increases
or decreases the verisimilitude of the action,depending upon the

ind~vidual

backgrounds and apperceptions of each reader; Williams is here attempting
a solution in fictional technique to the age-old problem of appearance and
reality.
Caithness, the Christian priest, is not concerned whether or not
the gospels o£ the Africans are true or not; the invidious quality of their
doctrine of blood far exceeds the importance of such comparative niceties
as to whether or not they are correct.

For Caithness, "One can't trust

one's own vision too far; that's where religion comes in."39

Such state-

ments lead Peckham to consider Caithness as a type "of those who wish to
use force to destroy the evils of the

world,'~ which makes him an equiva-

lent to Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor (even though Caithness overtly condemns such inquisitorial practices).

The problem with this point of view

is that the Grand Inquisitor seeks to preserve and protect Truth; Caithness wishes to promote the Good.

This is a difference in kind because

3Sibid. , p. 46.

39Ibid., p. 48.
40

Peckham, Novels, p. 14.
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immoral means cannot be used to uphold Good (by definition) without selfcontradiction.

The tendency to see Caithness as representing a position

to be embraced--though it flies in the face of most modern readers' prejudices against people who strictly adhere to dogmatic belief--is yet
another example of Williams's moral preaching to his audience.
Almost on the heels of Caithness's announcement of his fears, financial panic and an atmosphere of general lunacy begin to assert themselves
throughout England.

41

In a second proclamation, the Africans announce that

they plan to reinstitute the old forms of blood sacrifice and darkness:
Victim or priest at that altar, it matters not whether you inflict
or endure the pang. Come, for the cycles are accomplished and the
knowledge that was of old returns.42
The effect on the people of London is almost instantaneous; they begin
hunting blacks whereever they can find them.

Subtly Williams has intro-

duced a pet theme of his, namely that a perpetration of evil locks_the victim into a situation that has only morally intolerable consequences.

For

example, take the case of an innocent people who are attacked; they must
either fight back, thereby committing terrible acts of violence in their
own right, or else they must not resist, allowing a greater evil to hold
sway.

This sullying of the victim's moral predicament is to Williams one

of the worst features of the nature of evil.

It is only natural that when

faced with an alien doctrine manifestly evil directly threatening their
lives, a London crowd could easily become a lynch mob. "Evil begets evil"

41 w·11·
1
lams, Shadows,
42

Ibid.

I

p. 53.

p. 51.
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may be a trite phrase, but Williams often clothes this bromide with
believable situations.
During the rioting the Ingrams grant temporary asylum to a black
who had been threatened by the mob; 43 he is soon to identify himself as
Inkamasi, a king of the Zulu tribe. 44 In

tJ~ical fashion, Williams stops

the action to analyze his assembled characters by means of their conversation: talk about boiling milk and talk about differences in temperament
between the sexes.

Various other chatter reveals the attitudes of

Isabel, Sir Bernard and Philip. 45 Philip is still taken by Rosamund's
Beatrician perfection, or rather what he perceives as such: "the movement
46
of her arm was something frightfully important ..• "
The reader soon
learns what resides in the heart of this woman with the important arm:
she is spiteful and sneaky. 47 Notice that in no way does such a revelation
vitiate Philip 1 s vision: what seems real seems real, and his vision of
Rosamund as she could be in her beatitude will not be taken from him.
Actually, Rosamund persistently shows petulant annoyance at Philip's romantic vision of her--the implication being that she despises the disparity
between his vision and her actuality.
43Ibid., p.
55.

44Ibid., p.
59.
45Ibid.
46 Ibid., p.
56.
47Ibid., p.
63.
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All the characters in the company, and especially Roger Ingram,
are quite taken by the young king who loves to discourse on poetry; reluctantly Sir Bernard and Ingram begin to accompany the Zulu to his lodgings,
and in what Humphrey Carpenter might consider one of the book's wild eoincidences,48 Considine suddenly appears before them emerging from a cab.
Later we discover that under certain unspecified conditions, Considine (in
one of his many resemblances to Christ) is able to read minds, at least
imperfectly.

This. explains why he may know where to find two people to-

gether for whom he has concern.

Coincidence in Williams operates similar-

ly to the way it works in a Dickensian novel.

There reader wavers between

an admiration for character and action; Dickens and Williams do not shrink
from tailoring one to suit the other, because people affect events, and
conversely, events affect people.
Immediately thereafter Considine places the king in a hypnotic
trance, using more words identifying himself with Christ:
you free".

"I will make

Considine is saying here that he is the Truth (the Truth will

make you free), and of course Christ said that he was the Way, the Truth
4
and the Life. 9

Another Biblical text often comes to mind when Considine/

Christ imagery comes forth in this novel:
them".50

"By their fruits you shall know

Throughout the book, in a way diametrically opposed to the

formalists who would say, as Peckham does, that Considine indeed is a type
48

carpenter, Inklings,

49John 8:J2; 14:16,
5°Matthew 7:20.

p. 94.
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of Christ,5

1

the actions and intentions of the characters have meaning

only as they are filtered through an understanding of extra-literary premise, in this case orthodox Christian doctrine.

Considine claims he will

make Inkamasi free; what that means remains to be seen.

The Zulu leaves

with Considine, as the others agree to join them for dinner the following
evening. 52
At that dinner the reader learns that the Rosenberg brothers wish
to rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem with the proceeds from their inherited
jewels.

The Rosenbergs seem to represent the truth of other religions (in

my Father's house are many mansions), and their tenacious adherence to the
ways of their fathers is held up to the reader as an indication of moral
worth; that they are also dupes of financiers and Considine is quite beside the point.

Considine himself (as deceiver) often mouths true senti-

ments, as he does when he says of the brothers' desire, "It is a great act
of creation; they prepare for Messias."53

That, according to the author's

belief, Messias came two millenia ago is also beside the point; if
Williams is a conceptualist, this

passag~

is not ironic.

A man enters or

engages into time and space at his choosing, since time and space are modes
of perception, and a man can literally prepare for something that has
happened or infer something that will be.

This accords with orthodox

Christian doctrine; without some realization of the temporal condition as

1

5 Peckham, Novels, pp. 7-26.
52williams, Shadows, p. 6?.
5Jibid. , p. 69.

111

a mode of perception, neither atonement (redeeming the past) nor prophecy (anticipating the future) would be possible.

The Rosenbergs then

are minor characters who counterpoint the theme by representing salvation
in a foreign mode.
During the dinner conversation, Considine declares that he believes
that the African proclamations are authentic, and indicates the first clue
to his real identity when he maintains that "It is gospel, perhaps a crusade, which is approaching.".54

As Considine continues his pronouncements

by declaring that the conquest of death (resurrection) is like the intimations heard in the flow of great poetry, Inkamasi remains listless.
Throughout the discourse it is obvious that he is still entranced.55

Ingram

begins inclining toward Considine's position, since he believes that the
magnificence hinted at and echoed in the best verse must reflect
reality, and Considine seems to offer that reality.5

a greater

6 When later the

characters learn that death, destruction and nihilism accompany Considine's
gospel, they might possibly have looked back on the next words Considine
utters; it is a statement of mystical identification, but an inverted one.
A religious mystic wishes to flow into the object of his vision, to become one with God by submission to God's will.

To desire to take the na-

ture of things and draw them into the self is an admirable definition of a
perverted mysticism, a diabolism:

.54Ibid., p. 70.
55Ibid., p. 71.
56Ibid., p. 72.
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You can know your joy and direct it .•• When your manhood's aflame with
love you will burn down with it the barriers that separate us from
immortality. You waste yourselves, all of you, looking outwards; you
give yourselves to the world. But the business of man is to assume
the world into himself. He shall draw strength from everything that
he may govern everything. But can you do this by doubting and dividing ~~d contemplating? by intellect and official science? It is a
greater labour than you need.57 (Italics mine)
Such attempted assumptions of the world to the self were the way of the Fallen
Angels; the rejection of intellect and official science was the way of the
medieval witches in their covens and the Renaissance alchemists who attempted to conquer nature by transmutation of base metals into gold.
transmutation is a word dear to Considin& as we shall see.

Indeed

Any attempt to

continue identifying Considine as a Christ figure rather than as an AntiChrist figure, therefore, is absurd.

In Williams's own terms, Considine

8
co-heres, .but he does not co-inhere.5
Further, Considine claims that those two great ancient figures of
secular and religious power, Julius Caesar and Jesus Christ, were types that
anticipated the gospel to come.

Considine's speech reflects the almost uni-

versal tendency of the several occult gospellers whether ancient or modern
to include Christ as one of the prophets, or as a figure who somehow possessed part of the truth that a new faith proclaims; often they also identify truth with some ancient secular achievement,whether it be the
the temple of Solomon, the pyramids of the Pharoahs, or the grand empire

5?Ibid.

58Shideler, The Theolo

of Romantic Love: A Stud in the
Writings-of Charles Williams (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966 , p. 184.
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bequeathed by Caesar.59

For Considine, Caesar was murdered before he could

accomplish his goals of empire, and Christ was a failure:
Ah, i f Christ had known love, what a rich and bounteous Church he
could have founded! He almost conquered death in his own way, but
he was slain like Caesar before he quite achieved it. So Christianity
has looked for the resurrection in another world, not here.60
The meaning of Considine's character turns on what he means by the word
~·

He only understands that any kingdom that fulfills the desires of

men's hearts must be in this world "by the transmutation of your energies,
evoked by poetry or love or any manner of ecstasy, into the power of a
greater ecstasy."

61 Like Uncle Andrew's speech in C. S. Lewis's The Magi-

cian's Nephew, this grand-sounding speech when translated into simple prose
means that people of power can do what they like to whomever they like for
whatever reasons please

them.

62

Far from being lost in a never-never land,

Williams is depicting a character with strong political power who is attempting to harness occult forces so that he may unleash them upon the world.
The Nazi Party was well under way toward making such a plan actual as

6

Williams was writing this book. 3

59H. Spencer Lewis, F.R.C., Rosicrucian Questions and Answers:
The Com lete Histor of the Rosicrucian, 13th ed. (San Jose: Supreme Grand
Lodge of A.M.O.R.C., 1977 , pp. 188, 292.
60
61

williams, Shadows,

p. 73.

Ibid.

62 c. S. Lewis, The Magician's Nephew (New York:
1955), p. 18.

Macmillan,

3Louis Pauwell, Morning of the Magicians (New Yock: Stei~
and Day, 1964), This volume documents the Nazi affilation with numerous
occult groups, many of which sound as if they had aims remarkably similar
to that of Considine.
6
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Shadows of
as a novel.
already

Ecstas~,

it should be recalled, is a romance as well

At this stage of the action, Considine reveals that he has

~tially

succeeded; he is over two hundred years old.

He has

reached this great age retaining youth and vigor while increasing dramatically in power by refusing to participate in the ordinary intercourse
of society--refusing to participate in the co-inherence that is, living
64
on "by the power not of food and drink but of the imagination ••• "
A
passage such as this can easily fool a reader; it fools Ingram.

A number

of the audience is usually left startled at Considine; i f he is evil, why
does he understand so much about the important mysteries? Notice that
his understanding is almost always slightly askew from a Christian perspective.

Williams permits his reader to succumb to Considine's

seduc~

tion i f he is not wary; it is a risk the author took with the success of
his artifact, and this conceptualist device (no compromise) has probably
done more to limit an appreciation of the novel than any limitations of
invention on the author's part.
What intensifies the possibility of misreading the book is that
by the end of the dinner, Ingram is totally mesmerized by the new message

of power he has received.
His intellect had shown him the marvelous glories of the line of poetry, but as he passed into it and between its glories his intellect
revealed itself but as one of the elements. A moral duty swept him
on. This energy was to be possessed, to possess him, and then--then
he would have time to find yet greater powers even than that. 65
That Ingram now mingles "moral duty" with his previously merely aesthetic

64
williams, Shadows, . p. 75.

65Ibid., p. 79.
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responses to life indicates change, and as we shall see, it is change for
the better.

Yet only by listening to the occultism of Considine, and later

by coming under his direct influence, is the moral improvement possible for
him.

The artistic dilemma of the plot is once again solved if we apply

what is by now becoming a refrain of these pages:
intentions.

a man is judged by his

By being allowed to enter Ingram's mind, the reader sees that

the professor of Applied Literature genuinely wishes to apply the power of
poetry to his life.

He realizes that he needs a more fundamental ground-

ing than aesthetics can give him, but his intellect and moral vision speak
to his growing maturity as a man as well.

That he is only able to realize

the good by becoming the disciple of an evil man is irrelevant; Ingram is
never to realize clearly that Considine is evil.

Considine propounds

themes of music to his guests as a means of enticing them; only the impecable realist, Sir Bernard, keeps his head entirely, preferring to take his
music "like a gentleman".

66

The spiritual cannibalism of Considine and

his followers is made explicit when he tells the story of a composer:
He had overcome all things except music, but that lured him to spend
his powe~ and he died. We feed on what he did that we may do more
than he.b7
To the logical response that everything would die were he serious, Considine replies with imprecision and rnystag0gy that what awaits is a "passion
of ecstasy".

68

66

Ibid,, p. 80.

67 Ibid.

68Ibid.
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If the Rosenbergs have chosen how they enter time and space, so
has Considine:

"Time and space hung behind him, his background and his

possession, themselves no more separate but woven in a single vision ..... 69
In other words, he has chosen to stand aloof from time and space themselves
so that he may try to dominate them.
~

of evil.

This might even be a Kantian defini-

Not only does Williams attribute images redolent of Christ

to Considine, but he often speaks of him in sacerdotal imagery, thus making
him a type of the priest.

Since his function is already identified as

evil and even diabolical, Considine would then represent some kind of priest
of the black arts.

When he greets two associates,,he "stretches out his

hand, the other bows over it, genuflecting a little at the same time .•. .,70
He speaks as if he were participating in a ritual, 71 .and promulgates

.

authoritatively as if he held episcopal dignity:
self •.. I only hear · it, but that
.
72
child of the Mysteries"?

"The pemision is in your-

is right that I should do.

Are you a

Much later we learn that the man to whom he is speaking has offered
himself as a human sacrifice so that he may attempt to conquer death in
the most literal meaning of that phrase, i.e., physical resurrection.

What

Considine says at this time, however, is only that earthly desire if it
is transmuted into imagination preserves life.

69Ibid., p. 81.
70ibid., p. 82.
7libid., p. 8J.
7 2Ibid.

The words of the other man
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will later become horribly remembered by the reader, "I will go down and
come again living'',?3 ~ds which when spoken sound merely as if they were

part of a rite,

Considine, we discover, has been having a ritual supper

with associates by night in secret before a ritual death; that death is
not his own but Nielsen's, the associate.
does not take the burden on himself.
vious.

Unlike Christ the Anti-Christ

The parody of the Last Supper is ob-

The sound of gunfire interrupts them.

Considine asks, "Can it be

the African planes? ... Has the intellect failed to guard its capital?" 74
Some of the assembled seem to realize that Considine and the High Executive
of the African gospel are the same person.75 In response to Ingram's enquiry, Considine echoes Hamlet when he told Horatio that there are more things
in heaven and earth that are dreamt of in his philosophy: " ••. there is more
in verse than talk about smiles and metaphors, and ·you know it.
there is triumph speaking to man ... 7

6

Hark, hark

Power and passion lie behind the

dignity of verse and Considine is quickly making Ingram aware of the
consequences of such a belief.
Chapter Six, "The Mass at Lambeth," contains both the most potent
and the most realized power shown in the book; it is striking that those
critics who have discussed this volume seldom refer to the Mass, because
the actions of Ian Caithness are the only actions that the protagonists

?Jibid.

74 Ibid., p. 86.
?5Ibid., p. 8?.
76 Ibid.
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(so to call them) ever use to counter Considine (except for using the
traitor who will be mentioned in turn).

Without the Church and her repre-

sentative, the movement toward evil would stand completed.
not at the dinner, but Travers reports what had happened.

Caithness was
He is

shocked, but as a Christian and a priest, his first concern is for the soul
of the all-but-forgotten Zulu (who it appears is also a convert).

Through

all the purple prose, Caithness breathes some good sense; speaking of
Considine, he recognizes immediately that the power is infernal and that
he holds some kind of power over Inkamasi.
Many modern readers prone to be receptive to the flippant wit of
Sir Bernard may think somewhat less of Caithness because in the middle of
the priest's deliberations on the soul of a man, the skeptical peer muses
that he· "wouldn't remember that God had ever been known to disagree with
Ian."??

A close look will show that the reflection is more on the charac-

ter of Sir Bernard when Ian announces that he plans to see InkamGsi; and
he takes Sir Bernard along with him.

This courage, knowing Considine's

great power, goes far beyond Sir Bernard's off-handed epigram which is
likely to remain in the modernist's mind.

Again Williams takes a risk

of being misperceived in order to increase verisimilitude.

As to the gos-

pel of Considine, the priest simply says "That's all been done." 78

He

is stating what all Christians would say, and he is attempting to do the
will of Christ.

What more can a Christian author make a character do for

the sake of goodness?

??Ibid., p. 90.

78Ibid. , p. 91.
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~hey

discover Inkamasi sitting alone in the

dar~

priest understands that the king's will is dominated.

and rapidly the

For a conceptualist,

as for a mystic, the capital sin would be to rob another man of his will,
for it is by the will that man is most truly himself; thus Considine, by
having the Zulu under his power, has to that extent deprived him of his manhood.

Williams makes clear that in the center of man is the rock-hard

freedom of the will that no man can damage; another person can only tamper
with its ability to affect the world.

'When Caithness asks whether he

sleeps by his own will, Inkamasi replies•

"I watch by the will of him

that rules me ... Inkamasi is hidden within me.
sleep." 79

Caithness attempts an exorcism:

sidine has hidden,

80

It's I yet not I that

the name of God is what Con-

as he has also hidden the name of the Mother of God.

In turn, the Trinity, the faith.and the body of Christ are invoked, all to
no effect.

The failure of the exorcism does not show defeat, but rather

how strong an adversary Considine is for the Church.

Caithness and Sir

Bernard take the Zulu back to London. 81
Caithness's plan is to take Inkamasi on the following day to Lambeth,where his evil can be offered to God at the Eucharistic Prayer.

All

the poor, muddled waffler Bernard can understand is that Ian's conversation
seems to him much like Considine's, this knight of the realm having become
a pattern of the invincibly
himsel£.

82

ignorant, the converse of how he thinks of

This is an example of conceptualist irony.
79Ibid., p. 92.
80
81
82

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 94.

Ibid., p. 95.
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Not so much the facts, though they were grotesque enough, but the
manner of the facts, di§turbed him--the triumph, the fanaticism,
the shadows of ecstasy.e3
For all his contemplative desire, Sir Bernard simply has gotten himself
into something he is incapable (from his own philosophical position) of
understanding.

The "shadows of ecstasy" refers to the resurrected life

the occultists wish to obtain; presumably real ecstasy would be synonymous
with immortality.
Philip, meanwhile, as he drives the company to the cathedral, continues to muse on his Dantean vision; he is now realizing the eternal in
his exalted perception of Rosamund, and is beginning to be able to reflect
on his experience.

His naturalism has become a type of the rationalist

who looks for the ordered perfection arising from the welter of physical
data.

Philip is becoming mature:

The moment of vision in Isabel's kitchen, when Rosamund's arm had
lain like a bar. of fundamental power across the whole created universe,
dividing and reconciling at once, had stirred in him-something more
than masculine .•• Even if it passed--though of course it couldn't
pass--but even if it did.pass, still its passing had yet nothing
whatever to do with it.84
The perfection he had seen in its permanence remains no matter what ephemera
interfere with the understanding of truth.

Philip would now be at home

in Plato's Republic.
The reader observes through Philip (the new believer in Truth's
eyes) the Mass celebrated for the African's soul, mixing his comprehension
with elements of his romantic vision.
8
3Ibid.' p. 97.
84
Ibid., p. 99.

The act of the Mass the author
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calls "the restoring of a will."S5 This act, for a conceptualist, would
mean that sacramental imaging or incarnating of a truth reflects the spiritual.

The actions of the Mass bring the will of Inka.masi back to himself;

in a passage making a rare combination of mundane fact with expression-"! drive this time"

86

--and liturgical exactness--"the Archbishop as

swiftly went back to the altar, genuflected, and returned, bearing the
Sacred Gifts" 87 natural images merge with supernatural so that nature
appears quickened by spirit, and eternity is felt to contain nature as
well.

Williams thus upholds sacramental intercession.
Later Inkamasi is able to reflect on Considine's power over the

African chieftains, saying that "many of them had become conjurers, debased things" and that "those who had sold their magic to Considine were
very greatly afraid."

88

This statement clearly supports the notion that

Considine had consciously worked with the occult arts so that he might
attain power over others.

It is probably worth reflecting at this point

that some ten years after this book was originally written, and five years
after it was published, Williams wrote an essay in which he discussed the
nature of creating an Anti-Christ character for narrative art.

We have

seen enough of Williams's own creation and have participated in enough of
his thoughts, so that only a few statements are necessary about a conceptualist evaluation of his artistic intentions.
85Ibid.,

p. 101,

86 rbid.,

p. 104.

87rb·,

pp. 10J-104.

_1::£.'

88Ib.d
__1._.' pp. 10?-108,

The Anti-Ghrist is to be
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a pure embodiment of evil.
cruelties or perversions?

Why then does he not engage in obvious
In order for an author to devise a subtle plot

for a tale, Williams says that "Anti-Christ must not be mad, to begin
8
with. He must not, even, be too romantic." 9 He must be plausible
enough so that ordinary and extraordinary people can follow him.

He will

stir people, but not really to the depths.
Anti-Ghrist is bound to be a kind of sterile romantic; there is hardly anything else far him to be--classic he cannot be and realist he
will not be, and therefore, he must be the one kind of romantic who
can become neither--the sterile or pseudo-romantic.90
This means that he must pass, like Considine, beyond caring for such evils
as killing or the like; all conduct far him is pride, the pride that draws
everything to itself, the despair of Dante's Satan.
be funny.

"Anti-Ghrist cannot

But neither can he have a serious purpose except to himself. " 91

It will be noted that Considine cares little for the revolution he has
begun, nor far its consequences.

His sole real interest is in himself.

Yet Considine is constantly presented in Christ-like imagery, as we already observed; that is because "nothing but Anti-Christ cari be Christlike,
in the consciousness of a kind of otherness from men ... 9 2 Thus the imagery
one can attribute to him reverses the usual pattern of Christ imagery; to
some extent a figure of Judas or perhaps Caiphas would be found in the
working out of the plot associated with Anti-Christ.

Inkamasi's knowledge

8
9Williams, The Ima e of the Cit and Other Essa s, ed. Anne
Ridler (London; Oxford University Press, 1958 , p. 119.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
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has removed whatever lingering doubts the reader may have had about Considine when he declares about him:
He desired a greater mastery, and that I think he found. Most men
waste their energies, even at their best they waste them, on fantastic dreams and worthless actions. Lffe ~ sought to restore its
strength ...
hail_learnt to arouse and restrain and direct.:.to
such purposes as
chooses. -

LE9

ZEe/

These characteristics are those Williams has ascribed to the Anti-Christ.
Destruction is also part of the co-inherence, but Considine rejects it as he does all life.

He had bound the king's will as a child,

as he had the wills of all the African kings. 94 What he desires more than
anything else is a continent where his gospel may flourish, where he will
be able to draw followers to himself so that he can feed from their wills.
Here Dante's Satan is the model again; notice the reality of evil and its
banality.

To divorce one's self from goodness and truth is to wed idiocy.

As Inkamasi observes:

"mankind cannot be saved without intellect and

without God." 95
That Ingram announces himself squarely on Considine's side 96 after
so much knowledge clearly demonstrates that the young don's obsession with
poetry has overmastered his rational faculties.

An

old maxim derides

those who do the right things for the wrong reasons; Williams through his
character Ingram is telling the reader that it is meritorious to do even
9 3w illiams, Shadows of Ecstasy, p. 108.

94Ibid., p. 109.
95Ibid., p. 112.
96Ibid., p. 11).
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the wrong things for the right reasons.
of intentionality.

Again one must turn to the doctrine

Ingram wishes to know the pure power that is the sub-

stance of poetry, i.e., he wants to learn to know God.

With that invin-

cible ignorance already observed, Sir Bernard questions the universality
of Ingram's emotions toward poetry and Considine;97 to any conceptualist,
a genuine limitation of the

Aristoteli~n

is his inability to deal with the

private comprehension of particular men, precisely .because he is lost when
not participating in universality.

Though Ingram's reply is made to his

wife, for a moment the character echoes the sentiments of his creator's
attitude toward any approach to scholarship or to life that only speaks
objectively:
And in these centuries you've nearly killed poetry, with your appreciations and your fastidious judgments, and your livas of this man and
your stttdies in that. What do you know about 'huge and mighty forms
that do not live l~ke living men'? P~~er, power, it's dying in you,
and you don't hunger to feel it live.
Roger's religion is poetry; this outburst then is equivalent to
an orthodox Christian's revulsion at scholars who intimate that their discovery questioning the historical accuracy of some bit of Biblical datum
somehow undermines the tenets of the faith.

Only Considine of all the pea-

ple in his experiences has echoed what is in Ingram's own heart; that is
why he will follow the adept.
Philip has completed his transformation in the meanwhile; it will
be recalled that he has progressively moved from pragmatism to naturalism,
97 Ibid., p._ 114.

98 Ibid., p. 115.
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to rationalism.

He now decides for Rosamund and belief because he feels

the necessity of faith for completing his life.

He is acceding to a Kan-

tian categorical imperative; he fully takes responsibility for the intentions of his will.99
Within a page, Williams introduces a character antithetical in position to what Philip has become, identical to what he was when the novel
began.

The Prime Minister, Raymond Suydler, governs the nation by making

shrewd guesses; Williams hints that he drifts with whatever situation he
discovers, and finds what best works.

By definition, this is pragmatism.

Aside from furthering the plot, to juxtapose the shallowness of
with Philip's

Suy~ler

decision for the moral good only shows up the conceptualist

view of the emptiness of the pragmatic way.
To Sir Bernard, the realist, Suydler is equally absurd 1 he had
visited his office to report Considine as the High Executive of the
African invasion, but his thoughts were other:
And what was the good of trying to defend the intellect in this
place of the death of the intellect? Witch-doctors were invading
Europe, and he had gone running to an ape for help .. ,100
Thus two invincibly ignorant characters confront each other; both are decent gentlemen in their way, and Williams treats them with the respect
they deserve• Suydler never understanding the real point, and Sir Bernard
never being able to live in the mundane world.

Yet, Williams shows us

that they do communicate, because no matter under what delusions they act,
99Ibid., p. 115.
100

Ibid., p. 119.
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they are each fully human.

Although, as usual, he is incapable of coming

down to earth, Sir Bernard correctly observes:
If A is the same as B, and B is the same as C, then A is the same as
C. Other things may be true; for all I know, they may be different
at the same time; but this at least is true. And Considine will have
to hypnotize me myself before I deny it. Suydler is wro~g~-a guess
may be true once and twice and a thousand times, for man has known
abstraction, and no gorilla of a politician can take it away from him.101
Each man i f he chooses (for the conceptualist) sees truth to the extent
he wills.
The will affects not only individual souls, but society as well.
Materialists generally apply fiction socially more than others, because
they are confronted with phenomena and then interpret meaning, bypassing
the understanding.

Conceptualists must first filter the meaning of pheno-

mena through human intellect and psyche before any social meaning can result.

As a result, it is only after understanding the motives of men like

Considine, the Rosenbergs,and Suydler--men who manipulate public- events-that the reader can be prepared to understand the social implication of
their actions.

Only at this point does Williams indicate the social effect

Considine is having on England as a whole.

Financial panic is threatened,

the people are afraid, and money is pouring into the hands of financiers,
to the aquisitive advantage of the Rosenbergs among others. 102

Williams

clearly indicates the potential suffering Considine is weighing over England's head; this is one way that does not have the solidarity of the people, because they do not understand what they are fighting against.
101

Ibid., p. 121.
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Another aspect of Williams's technique is becoming apparent; just
as the reader is able to grasp the significance of one movement of the
action, he jumps to another by a novelistic equivalent of what in cinema
is called parallel cutting; thus he moves back and forth among the thoughts
and actions of the participants with a temporal simultaneity.

It may

be possible that this technique relates directly to conceptualism because
only complete awareness of what underlies an action will allow an audience
to know all the complexities of a character's intention.

Dickens and

Dostoevsky use such cris-crossing of action, albeit in longer "takes" than
Williams, no doubt because of the slower pace demanded from the writing
of their epoch.

The straightforward, linear.techniques of Trollope and

Tolstoy, or the modern D. H. Lawrence, are less involved than the pyrotechnics of, say, Dickens.

These thoughts are offered tentatively, however.

Williams does "cut" to Philip's meditations on the social implications of Considine's actions; Philip's insights into the nature of Love
are now intensified because he realizes fully the disparity between his
vision of the beloved and the real Rosamund,who spurns him.

10

3

Once again, Williams abruptly cuts, this time to Ingram,who by
this time would smash windows (and probably the universe if he could) to
get at the source of truth in poetry.

104

He does become the model of the

man who tries to attain his intuition of ineffable truth and cannot because such truth is unattainable; he wants he knows not what, but he desires
it with all his heart:
10

3Ibid., p. 124.

104-b"d
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I want--yes, I--the thing that's me wants to know, not like wanting ap.l:-'le-tart with or without custard, but like wanting breath.
There's air outside the windows, and I shall smash them to get it or
I shall die.105
In other words, he wants God; the church has not spoken to his condition,
and so he searches for his desire where he can, in this case in Considine.
Even more, his desire is to touch the source of Considine's power, that
which is like his life's approach to reality in masters like Beethoven and
106

Michaelangelo.

With Dickensian co-incidence, the maid announces the arrival of
Considine and his confederate Mottreaux.

(In a throw-away line, Williams

calls the young servant Muriel "Unnameable"; such anonymity and subordination of social classes conceptualists almost invariably find intolerable.
By so labeling her, Williams clearly intends to cast reflection on the
Ingrams, who are consumed with their own affairs, but who are quite able
to keep someone in an inferior position to themselves.) 107

The Ingrams'

self-concern makes clear why, with encouragement from his wife, Roger agrees to accompany Considine to Africa.

108

Roger is to become a disciple

in the most literal sense, like the fishermen who followed Christ. 10 9·
10 5Ibid.
106
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Considine tells him that he rejects anything that absorbs his energy.

110

Ingram,too,must learn to withdraw and take power from others.

Once again Considine echoes Jesus:

"I have meat to eat that ye know not

of," and in his own voice he declares, "I am in obedience to all laws I
have not yet mastered."

111

This means that someone may yet be able to kill

him by treachery, and he cannot take time to guard against such an occasion too zealously because that also is an a bso:r·ption of energy,

One feels

that anything that would be vanity to the author of Ecclesiastes would
absorb Considine's energy.

Roger chooses to go with them.

The reverse gospel imagery reaches one of its crescendos at this
time.

Rosamund (Judas) has betrayed Considine (Christ) to the government

(Sarhedrin).

They come for him by night.

presses his enemies by first

creat~ng

In this case, Anti-Christ sup-

an oppressive atmosphere and then

by using his will to brush aside the officers who attempt to take him.
"Who takes me?" he asks spreading his arms in mockery of the crucifixion
and +'1 ees. 112
.1.

Until this episode, the reader has never really entered Rosamund's
mind, except fleetingly to know that she finds some people repulsive.

The

reader has not had enough information to judge Rosamund's betrayal of
Considine except by inference from her usual petty and spiteful nature.
That information Williams now places before the reader.
110

Ibid.

111 Ibid., p. 1JO.
112
Ibid., pp. 1J2-1JJ.

She has sought
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ineffable desire in her own

wa~

and it has thwarted her approach.

She

seeks revenge for her life of pain: "her outraged flesh rebelled and clamoured from starvation for food."ilJ

She hates everything that would lead

her to happiness, especially from someone like PhiliB who loves her.

Her

life is a pattern of revenge, and she suffers acutely from the sin of envy.
That is why she also wishes to destroy Considine, not so much because of
his evil as because of her jealousy.

But the next day the realization

of magnitude --not of her action but of her intentions--strikes her;
II

like all men and women who are not masters of life, she swayed to and fro

in her intention and even in her desire."
she has a secret longing for Inkamasi.
cialist toward him.

115

114

In one part of her being,

That is why she has acted the ra-

Though alive, "she hated life ... "

116

Since she

has withdrawn from life, she has not chosen to enter time.and space,
the conceptualist equivalent to Platonic non-being:

" ... the strait-jacket

of time and place imprisoned her as it imprisons in the end all who suffer
from a like madness." 11 7
In the meanwhile, Philip has gotten on a bus to try to think
through the muddle he has made of his affairs, but as he passes Liverpool
Street Station, he hears shouts, the bus stops, and he suddenly discovers
11

3Ibid.' p. 1J4.
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Ibid., p. 1J5.
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himself pushed along by a mob who are intending to threaten the Rosenberg
brothers.

118 Williams obliquely pleads thit the Jews have become scape-

goats because of their reaction to international and financial speculation;
the complaint of' the rioters is that these "dirty Jews" have stolen the
people's money.

No one could be more bewildered by the turn of events than

the poor Rosenbergs; that their cousin may have had some culpability is
probable; the mob holds them responsible.
Rosenberg who is lynched.

It is the innocent l';ehemiah

Philip is able to usher away the surviving bro-

ther with the aid of' police. 119 The intensity of this scene becomes even
more poignant when it is realized that Williams wrote before Hitler's ascendancy; he predicted a potentiality he saw.
the distance is heard the sound of

As the crowd disperses, in

guns. 1 ~ 0 The disastrous

intertwining of war and finance is complete.
Over 800 airships have attacked England,

totall~

destroying five

villages; the voice of Considine comes over the radio warning that a third
attack on the country will be a thousand times stronger and will destroy
Londo~.

Part of what Williams seems to be saying co-incides with the by

now proverbial observation ofT. S. Eliot about "dissociation of sensibility."

Considine had cloven art from logic, and when he enters Sir Ber-

nard's home shortly after his radio speech, he revels in the potential

118
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destruction of intellect
really means.

122

~he

121

and that he will teach London what feeling

restored Inkamasi tries to attack Considine, but

Montreaux shoots him in the thigh.

12

3 For extremely various motives, Con-

sidine leads to his secret retreat not only Montreaux, but Inkamasi, Caithness, the surviving Rosenberg, and of course his new disciple Ingram.
Even with the attempt at completeness tried in this reading of the novel,
a complete detailing of the motives of each character would require a discussion of an interminable length.

Suffice it to say that the specific

detail has become almost too dense to recite each element of the action
without equaling or exceeding the number of words in the text itself.
Williams portrays a London in full disarray.

Refugees march, red

glares flash through the sky, and the night is full of "hysterical shrieks",
while looters fight over goods.

124

As the party moves along, African troops

greet Considine shouting "Glory to the Deathless One."

The nature of

this army shows why the English people are living in such terror; the soldiers often leap and scream.

Considine's car kills some of them under its

wheels, but yet they continue to dance in frenzy.

When some of the English

fire on them, the Africans increase the intensity of their entranced
121

Ibid., pp. 145-146.
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act~vity.
They even begin to stab each other.
Considine says to
his party that he is showing to England "things wild and possibly triumphant," and that the Africans will have the death they have asked for because they only wish to die for the Deathless One.
they are engaging in a mass suicide.

For this reason

(This seemingly most incredible of

the incidents in the novel unfortunately was also vindicated by time as
being plausible in 1978 when the followers of Rev. Jim Jones committed mass
suicide in Guyana.)

It should be becoming clearer that Williams's fantasy

always at least tangentially relates to religious and social possibilities,
and the wild improbabilities of a fifty year old Williams novel may become
tomorrow's headlines.
are not adepts. 127
C~istian

Considine has no pity for the Africans because they

He compares the slaughter to the martyrdoms of the

saints; and denounces non-magical warship:

... man ••• desired immortality, and deceived himself with begetting
children and with religion and with art. All these are not ecstasy,
but the shadow of ecstasy,128
Considine calls himself a true adept: one who wishes only to learn the esoteric secrets.

The result of such "wisdon" the reader has just seen.

What he desires is sheer power sucked from whatever source he can find,
whether it be sexual or vampire-like from the desires of others.

He had

been forced to act swiftly because the adepts believed that "the religion
of Europe" left to its own defense would overpower them.
125Ibid., pp.
150-151.
126

Ibid., p. 158.

127 Ibid., p.
152.
128Ibid.,
p. 153.
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place of ideas and the wills of people who have heard the Gospels, AntiChrist would have no power unless he also used (or manipulated others to
use) physical force to effect his ends. All the brother adepts, "the
12
united lodges" as they are called, 9 reminiscent of the organizational
structure of secret societies that actually exist--all of them are united
in this effort to overcome the Christian cultural domination of Europe.
Williams is referring apparently to the widespread use of non-European
influences that permeate such esoteric organizations whether the supposed
130
source of this wisdom be Moslem, A:frican, or "Easte.rn."
Ingram's disregard for others is so great that all that he can
desire is for the full ecstasy of power in poetry to master him and for
him to master it.
His very physical body was being carried in towards the energy which
created art. Art ••• the ancient word so often defiled and made stupid
stood for a greatness only partially explored.131
He had no hesitation to think thus a mere few moments after the bones of
human beings have been crushed under the vehicle in which he rides; such
juxtaposition shows Ingram's moral impenetrability and selfishness.
is an evil of omission.

It

Williams leaves the understanding of this serious

character defect to the reader's own comprehension without any comment on
right or wrong.

Right and wrong are for the author matters of intention,

and i f a man's own obtuseness prevents him from detecting his own evil, he
is thereby protected.

Further, it would be typical of a conceptualist to

129 Ibid. , p. 155.
1
3°Arthur Edward Waite, The Occult Sciences (Secaucus:
University Books, 1974), pp. 1, 8.
131 Williams, Shadows of Ecstasy, p. 156.
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plant a complex evil in a character and to let the reader make what he
will of him.

Many intellectuals have thought the intellectual Ivan, who

is the final cause of murder and destruction in The Brothers Karmazov,
the protagonist of the book.

Such ambiguities run rampant in the stories

of Dickens, dating as far back as the complex creation of Jingles in
The Pickwick Papers.

Ingram

is such an ambiguous character.

As Ingram dreams, London panics.

The presence of the destructive
1
and even self-destructive Africans has caused the city to lose control. 32
The City, it will be recalled, is for Williams the City of Man reflecting
the City of God; he is showing what happens when alien forces strike a
separation between the two.

After the raid, the London-of-Man, so to

speak, has temporarily cut itself off from London-in-God.
•

This imagery
1

is consistent with the Logres image~ from Williams's poetry. 33

In

Shadows of Ecstasy, he paints a Walpurgis Night in Cheapside and Ludgate
Hill.

On the High Altar of St. Paul's, a woman cracks a bottle over a
1

man's head. 3~ In philosophical terms, Williams is saying that without
the engagement of mind, beauty (which the adepts and Ingram desire) cannot
be manifested; any attempt creates only tyranny or anarchy.

Only Love,

like the Love in the Man that restored Inkamasi, can lead to the beginning
of goodness (will).

132Ib'd
__
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3Jwilliams, Taliessin through Logres (London: Oxford
University Press, 1938), passim.
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3 Ibid., p, 161.
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Sir Bernard can only understand that Considine has torn away
"stability". 13.5 Roger's wife, Isabel, who has remained in the background
far most of the novel and will hardly be seen again, emerges suddenly
as an image herself.

When pressed into action, she had sent Roger on his

way because it would move them both toward goodness.

In the following

passage, Williams presents two of his characters at the limits of his
artistic complexity=
Sir Bernard wished he could have heard Considine and Isabel arguing-not that Isabel would or could have argued. So far as he could see,
she was saying exactly the opposite of Considine, and yet they were
curiously agreed. They were both beyond the places of logic and
compromise, even amused compromise. They were both utterly, utterly-well, they were both utterly, and that was that.136
Even Sir Bernard can sense the mysticism in Isabel's, if not sacrifice,
then ability to attempt what she and her husband sought by sending him

.

way.

"He who would find himself, will lose himself; he who will lose

himself will find himself," in the words of Christ.

He is also able to

see that what she has accomplished is the mirror opposite of what Considine has done.
to do good.

He has drawn power into himself; she has sent out power

In this vignette, Williams has presented a type of the

conceptualist mystic heroine, a little epicenter of good transcending
itself.
As Sir Bernard

~uestions

whether or not Considine will keep his

word not to attack London (his realism prevents him from discerning that
such obvious deceptions have no place in Considine's character--they would
absorb his power), Isabel's only immediate concern is for the welfare of
1 3.5Ibid. , p. 162.
i3 6Ibid. , p. 163.
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the wandering refugees and for trying to make sure the children have
1
enough milk. 37 She has lost herself, and thereby has found herself.

And

by so doing she realizes what has always been potentially part of here
I'm no good at words ••• and I'm a fool at knowing things, but when
there's something in you that has its way, and when Roger's doing
what he must do, and I too--0 every fibre of me's aching for him
and I could sing for joy all through me. Isn't that all the ecstasy
that I could bear? gome and let's do something before it breaks my
heart to be alive. 13
This type of mystical woman will later take stage--center as Clohoe
Burnett in Many Dimensions.
When Considine's party arrives at his house by the sea, Caithness
demands to stay with Inkamasi and is taken to him.

As Ingram obeys Consi-

dine's eyes (evidently the residing place of much of his power), the adept
1

states that the Mass at Lambeth has made Inkamasi liable to pain. 39

Here

is one of those instances where the adepts realize that even on the level
of the magic they pursue, Christianity is its equal at the very least;
Considine seems unaware of the contradiction of his statement, as do all
the others.

Lest it be thought that it is an accidental artistic flaw in

this one work of Williams, he was to repeat the idea of occultists recognizing the equality of
140
War in Heaven.

orthodo~

much more explicitly in his next novel,

137Ibid., p. 164.
138Ibid. , p. 165.
1 9
3 Ibid., p. 167.

140-W'll'
1. 1.ams, War in Heaven (London: Victor Gollanez, 1930).
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The adept has arranged the rooms with a perfection of art; as
Ingram makes ready for sleep he allows a phantasmagoria of images to
141
overwhelm him.
He dreams of the youthful Wordsworth running after
him carrying a shell which he waves aloft as he shouts, "A god, yea,
142
many gods. " From the shell emerges a voice singing the word power.
Conceptualists do not necessarily deny the validity of dream interpretation.

Materialists like Freud can make

vi~l

use of this method in

their system, because dreams shut out the intellect, and are a blend of
physical sensation and meaning totally determined by a person's life.
For the voluntarist, however, dreams can examine the residue of body and
wil!; i.e., sum up a person's condition.

The shell Wordsworth waves re-

presents art and poetry, and the power Ingram desires seems to emanate
from its source; Wordsworth and Considine (as mental icons) have become
fused in his imagination.
One of the adepts is impervious to the cold.

They all call Con-

sidine by his first name, just as much contemporary calling of people by
given names is part of the initiatory rite of entering a profession.
Considine has absorbed so much power that he can literally feel the nation
14
shifting to his will. 3 Caithness has taken this all in; when he sees
the magicians gloating over their power, he imagines no elusive ecstasy.
He rightly connects these men with the massacres of the Christian missionaries and the ritual deaths of the Africans, atrocities performed solely
141W.ll"
1 1ams, Shadows of Ecstasy, pp. 167-168.
142
Ibid. , p. 169.
14
3Ibid., pp. 170-171.
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so that Considine and his party can increase in power, and he further
realizes that they had spared London from convenience, scam, and whim
144
rather than from humanitarian concern.
Yet Considine still justifies
his actions by claiming that poets like Shakespeare (in the songs of
Ariel) had predicted the Second Evolution of Man, as the African up14
rising is popularly known. .5 Considine and Ingram (and it is a belief
their creator evidently shared) believe power lies in certain lines of
poetry regardless of meanings thus the line "on the bat's back" reoccurs with incantatory frequency.

The claim is that somewhere in the

rhetoric resides the power.
Throughout the novel, Considine has only hinted at his full intention: that he wishes to absorb power and to overcome death.

He begins

to work on Ingram's soul by initiating him into the mystery of the adepts.
In a room with beautiful yellow hangings, the two men find Nielson lying
on a low divan.

Seven days earlier, he had died in ritual sacrifice.

The

company is waiting far the possibility of his resurrection by magical
means; they are experimenting with the possibility of genuinely being
able to conquer death.
Was the old symbolism of the mysteries true 1n its reversal? was the
supernatural itself a visionary exhalation of the natural, and
could it hold nothing but what the natural held?146
There is nothing either to a black magician or to a Christian conceptualist
prohibiting such thought.

The principal difference between the two lies

144Ibid., p.
172.
14.5Ibid.,
p. 174.
146Ibid., pp.
17.5-176.
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only in the moral integrity of the attempt.

Considine and his cohort

would kill to achieve their goal, and would try to circumvent natural
processes instead of submitting to them.
"Thy will be done."

A Christian would pray that

Therein lies the gulf between them.

resurrection seems to be working.

The attempted

A quiver seems to pass over Nielson's

face which has only a light pallor covering it after a week.
eyelids flicker, everyone waits with enormous expectation.

As his
In that

ghastly experience, Roger has learned that there is no personified Death,
only dead people. 147 The hideous finality of death without the possibility of eternity faces him squarely; only in life is meaning.

But

Williams will not sentimentalize; Ingram must understand with his own
being, with his own free will, the life God offers him.

Nielson's hands

move and jerk, and then he is truly dead; instantly, the adepts draw the
experience to their wills.

148

Later Considine haughtily proclaims his own superiority to Caith"You should have kept to your pupils, Mr. Caithness, to the morals
1
you understand and the dogmas that you don't. 49 Though Caithness offers

ness.

to stay, Considine and Inkamasi wish to speak alone.

Because of the

priest's interference, Considine says that the king must choose his
future, that is, whether to follow Nielson to death or to stay with the
Europeans.

His regality, the only part of his physicality that means
147 Ibid., pp. 177-178.
148
Ibid., p. 178.
149 Ibid., p. 179.
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anything to him, has been taken from him by the nature of the EuropeanAfrican conflict.

He also recognizes that the conquering of death would

retain for him some share of kingliness, and that Considine for all his
evil is genuinely committed to a passion for king-like strengths
I have always, so far as I could, done according to the gospel which
moves in me and my friends, the doctrine of transmutation of energy,
of the conscious turning of joy and anguish alike into strength and
will, and of that passionate strenrlh and will into all the exploration of all the capacities of man.!50
Considine has in no way destroyed Inkamasi.

The occultist admits the Mass

freed the chieftain (thereby acknowledging Christ again), and he offers
1 1
ritual sacrifice to him. 5
Inkamasi is facing the dark night of the soul,
the truth that comes through temptation to despair.
the Crown (kingship).

Europe has forgotten

Considine offers him majesty in death and potential

resurrection.

What allures the king is that only Considine, of those in
his experience, understands royalty. 152 He had studied the ways of Europe
for the sake of Africa

so that he could better govern; since he will not

be able to rule, he decides for lordly death.

His conflict between his

physical reality and his mental anguish has permitted him to attain a
Platonic

rati~nalism

in that he sees truth as a dialectical process be-

tween mind and body, because he has united within himself, not in such a
twilight but in a more wonderful vision of opposites, the day of his own
1
individual being and mysterious might of holy and awful office. 53
15°Ibid., p. 180.
151Ibid.,
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The sight o£ Nielsen's £lirtation with resurrection has e££ected
a pro£ound influence on Ingram.

The following morning he reflects on
1
what happened, and feels his intellect slipping from him. 54 Since this
has been the young don' s only previous mode of knowing, he is anguished
indeed; his idealism is beginning to slip away from him as well as his

full devotion to poetry.
up.

Like Philip earlier, Roger is starting to grow

"That dead hand moving had abolished the whole edifice of his

mind. " 155 He is at least aware that physical sensation is real knowledge;
such commonplaces as cups of tea or snow seem more important than even poetry,
and the image of the wave (eternity) has erected a sea-change in his
mind. 156 Williams is far too subtle an artist to allow instantaneous
change; Roger is now a little bit better able to will his will.

Even so,

that trained imagination can still take flight:
Who could tell what wonders waited then, when emotion was full and
strong and sufficient, no longer greedy and grasping, when the senses
could take in colour and essence and respond to all the delicate vibrations which now their clumsy dullness missed, when deprivation
itself should be an intense means of experiencing both the deprived
self and the thing of which it is deprived, when--when space and
time were no more hindrances, where (fg? all one could tell) the
body itself, might multiply itself ••.
Williams anticipates the possible personality shifts that can take place
in Ingram.

His new-found ability to engage in sensuous experience:-(" colour

and essence") and the dim awareness that something lingers in him superior even to his poetic understanding ("when space and time were no
i54Ibid., p. 186.
155Ibid.
156Ibid.,
p. 187.
157Ibid.,

p. 188.
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hindrances") combine in him to create an ecstatic view of his own potentialities; he is now able to pray, even though he does not know to whom
1
or to what he lifts his voice. .58
Further, he can see ·the chance of a similarity between Ian Caithness's love for human souls and old Rosenberg's love for jewelsl formerly,
he would have simply embraced a mental projection as a truth.

With his

new-found experience, he is able to discern that because a hypothesis
contains certain advantages does not necessarily make it true.

"".l'he fact

that man wanted a thing very much never did make it true--or the body that
lay within would now perhaps be walking in the house and even coming up
to speak to him." 1.59
Caithness is the only character to have a total grasp of the
cosmic significance that each of the characters participates in; he even
says that Considine is like the Anti-Christ, which Ingram rejects as
160
preposterous.
Considine is in the process of returning the jewels to
the surviving Rosenberg brother.
the jewels.

Caithness thinks Considine may take

What restraint would prevent him? He kills. 161 The adepts

let the power of color course through themselves, but Mottreaux is
attracted to the jewels for their own sake, not for power. 162 Even though
1.58Ibid.

I

p. 189.

Ibid.

I

p. 190.

Ibid.

I

p. 191.

Ibid.

I

p. 192.

l.59Ibid.
160
161
162
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greed is grievous sin, to fall back on such sin is a step in the right
direction when one has moved to the depths of spiritual pride which a man
like Mottreaux has experienced; need makes him capable of action, because
he has intention in the world once more.

He says that he will kill for
.
.
16
the jewels and die, and even asks, "let me hold them while you kill me." 3
Such seeming insanity is actually a kind of recognition of having cut
himself off from normal human feeling, feeling that can even yet save
Mottreaux; he refuses to transmute his desire for the jewels for their own
sake into a desire fur a power they could give him; in this, at least,
he therefore rejoins the human race.
Throughout history, Considine now informs his audience, many men
.
164
A message
have tried death and resurrection though they have fa~led.
arrives, and he places the jewels temporarily into the keeping of Mottreaux
16
who in turn eyes them greedily. 5 The effect of the action on the
characters issues from this point on in a mosaic of intentions that will
soon be completed by Considine's death.

Roger has at long last learnt

true Socratic humility, that he knows that he does not know, and thinks
166
Here is a real first step toward
of "his feeble little understanding."
wisdom for any conceptualist's understanding.
ness's own position is made explicit.
163Ibid., p.
193.
164Ibid., p.
194.
165Ibid., p.
195.
166

Ibid.

In the same terms, Caith-
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The nature of his intellect and the n~cessities of his office had
directed his attention always not towards things in themselves but
towards things in immediate action. He defined men by morality ••. 167
Williams describes his character in the terms of Kantian philosophy;
Caithness does not know the thing in itself, but only in action, and men
can best be known by morality.

This is nearly a definition of conceptua-

list metaphysics and philosophy of man.

Furthermore, he must fight with-

in himself to avoid religious dualism (evil being equal to good), which
is a temptation to a conceptualist.

For him

••• Omnipotence mi~ht permit what it did not and could not originate.
Yet other origin (outside Omnipotence) there be none. It is true he
always added that it was a mystery, but a safer line was to i~sist
that good and evil were facts, whatever the explanation was.168
Though the rest of the passage speaks of his limitations as a man, these
thoughts of Caithness would easily find a home in the writings of St.
Bonaventure or Duns Scotus.

As Ingram's intention has led him to humility

though he follows Anti-Ghrist, Caithness--though essentially a proud man-wills and prays to will the good that God commands.
A word to Caithness from Mottreaux triggers the final action of
the novel.

Mottreaux gives the priest an indication that he will try to

stop Considine and that he looks for help; Caithness agrees, but to what
extent he is not aware.

He only sees a breach in the unity of the enemy. 169

Mottreaux has deceived Ian into thinking they are on the same side spiritually, whereas the former adept only wishes to secure Rosenberg's jewels.
In Roman Catholic adult instruction classes, it is a truism that at con-

167Ibid., p. 196.
168Ibid.
169 Ibid. , p. 198.
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fession one can easily fool a confessor, but that the deception is not
on the priest, but rather compounds the sin.

Peckham somehow thinks

this situation reduces Caithness's viability as the novel's true protagonist, to the extent one person can bear that title in a Williams
1
novel. 7° If anything, Ian's position is streng!hened because Williams
continually puts before his reader the priest's unflagging intention to
perform God's will.

That he also succumbs to a temptation to kill (a

lesser evil) for a greater good (the defeat of Anti-Christ) only demonstrates

anoth~r

conceptualist point, that evil affects and even diminishes

the effect of good.
tainted it.

No act of moral good can be perfect i f evil has

In this way only are Caithness's actions tarnished.

171

That night, Roger for the first time perceives his room as naturally one with his learning, as one act in time and space.

He is now a

man of free will, and well on the way to true learning, despite Considine,
.
172
the central deception of his life.
Considine's eyes still seem archangelic to Roger, who remains as unable as some of Williams's critics to
1
tell a Christ figure from an Anti-Christ figure. 73 After Considine
relates his personal story, Roger's mind temporarily becomes clouded with
a barrage of confused sea-imagery. 174 Williams often includes the
1
7°Peckham, The Novels of Charles Williams, pp. 17~18.
171 Williams,

Shadows of Ecstasy, p. 199.

172Ibid., p. 201.
173Ibid.,

p. 202.

174Ibid., p. 204.
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fantasies of characters in such confused states; if to a conceptualist,
all experience is subjective, then the ramblings of a soul in confusion
are as central an experience as any objective event in his life.

Who

can say whether Roger Ingram's actions or his frightened daydreams are
more "really" his experiences than any other? Actually whatever experiences affect his relationship to his will and to God are the most truly
his own, because they are the most intense.

The reader soon discovers

that Ingram has taken his experience into himself in much the same manner
as Considine advocates; once again, the intentions of a character weigh
far more vitally with the state of his soul than whether the content of
an action is objectively good or evil. 175

Ingram is becoming able to

transmute his experience into the joy of heightened experience, but unlike his master, he understands such transmutation as part of his bounden
duty:
He knew delight and named it; unafraid, he summoned it, and it came.
He rejoiced in an ecstasy that controlled itself in great tidal
breaths ••. Ecstasy was no more a bewilderment.176
Yet even in the ecstasy of achievement, Williams, by the tone of this
passage, shows Ingram's further experience of temptation to spiritual
pride in its full allure: ",.,only those who had not known it were afraid
of it, for it was man's natural life." 177
He comes to himself discovering the spiritual presence of Considine.

Mottreaux becomes livid with rage when the adept gives Rosen-

berg his jewels; the orthodox Jew believes the Lord will reward Considine,
175Ib"d
__
J._,' p. 205.
176 Ibid.
l??Ibid.
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who in turn announces that Inkamasi will be offered to death and possible
1
resurrection. 78 Ingram is appalled at what is proposed to happen to
the king; Roger's conversion from an idealistic position to one of moral
duty is already bearing fruit.
"You dare not touch h1m." 179

Caithness goes much further, threatening,

The priest openly states at this point that Considine is AntiChrist; Considine's reply could easily mislead the unwary:
Neither Christ nor Anti-Christ ••• but I living a gospel of redemption,
and the ends of the world hear it: whom do men say that I, a son of
man, am?180
He denies his first statement by instantly ascribing the imagery and the
very language of the Christ to himself; in other words, he must be lying,
and of course, like the proverbial Prince of Liars, Anti-Christ simply
follows suit.

Considine continues to take on to himself gospel epithats,
181
but he tips his hand when he says, "'what we do we do quickly. '"
This
is not language ascribed to Christ's action in this case but to Judas's;
Considine's offering of Inkamasi is nothing more than simply betrayal, or

more honestly, murder, whether or not he accompanies the slaughter with
ritual religious trappings such as genuflections and the presentation of
182
Only Caithness realizes the full significance
the divan as an altar.
178Ibid., pp. 206-207.
i?9Ibid.
180
181

Ibid., p. 208.

Ibid.

182

Ibid.
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of what Considine is domg, and draws a cruc:ifix from near his heart and
prays.183
Inkamasi makes clear why he permits his own deaths

"' ••• though

I hold you jjhe adepti/ for my own enemies and for misguided .men, I think
you are the only servants of the kingship that is more than the king. n 184
In other words, hierarchy must obey the dictates of hierarchical structure,
and Considine's is the only power he can see announcing human power; it
is the king's limitation and his death.
That death is executed when the king drinks a chalice filled with
poisoned wine; because the motions ascribed to the participants are
charged with liturgical meaning, and the actions culminate in physical
sacrifice, these men are performing a variant of the Black Mass.

Roger's

disgust permits him to experience the superiority of the will to the
intellect.
Till now he had believed that sense of harmony to be all they-Isabel or Paradise Lost--had to offer, but he had begun to learn
that to pause there was to be too easily content. The harmony itself was but a prelude to some enrichment of his w~gle being, which
in its turn must be experienced in every detail •.• 5
Something,far deeper lies beyond the constructs of his mind.

Thereafter,

in rapid succession, Inkamasi drinks, the enraged Mottreaux stabs Considine and drags Caithness from the room; Ian goes to the car while Mottreaux
breaks into Rosenberg's room, seizes the jewels, and then lays hands on
183Ibid., p. 210.
184
Ibid.
lB5Ibid., p. 211.
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Rosenberg himself, whose martyrdom is complete far he dies wholly for
the God of Israel:
His face, as he lifted it, was full of a scorn deeper than time, the
scorn of his God far the spoilers of the holy places. He saw the
distorted face of a greedy Gentile above him, and before the bullet
searched his brain he spat at it once.186
The purity of such intention finds reward in death for a Williams
character.
Ingram misunderstands Caithness's intention totally, and compares
the priest to Caiphas, a piece of symbolism which is apropos indeed.

We

previously noted that the figures in a story of the Anti-Christ become
reversed; whoever is Caiphas to the Anti-Christ does the world and the spirit
good service, which is precisely what Caithness has rendered, even though
he is justly and understandably horrified when the true meaning of
Mottreaux's plot becomes manifest.

To all those critics who claim the

book a jumble, one paragraph above all explicitly states the unifying
theme that holds all the tangled aspects of this novel together:
'God help me! Caithness said. 'I didn't know.' He hadn't known;
he hadn't, if it were blameworthy, been to blame; if he were responsible for Considine's death, it was a noble responsibility,
and he would bear it. Out of evil, God brought forth good. He
added, 'Then there's the less reason to say. •187 (Italics mine.)
From all the actions of men nefarious and relatively good, the Good of
God will be brought to light.

This theme constitutes the underlying

structure of this book, of the complete Williams corpus, and of conceptualist writing of any kind.

And with the adepts fighting amongst them-

selves over the prostrate bodies of Considine and Inkamasi, it is Caithness
186
187

Ibid. , p. 213.
Ibid., p. 215.
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who has the fortitude to return to the house for his coat and Ingram's
188
before the two of them drive away.
While attending various refugees, Sir Bernard greets the Ingrams
the next day noon at his home. 189

Roger is able immediately to see the

purity of the change in Isabel, whose mysticism had previously been hidden
from him.

"He realized at the moment the vast experience of love which

she had tmdergone, and accepted it."i90 They are clearly set upon a way
that will lead them together to the experiencing of the Good.

Yet he is

left wondering whether Considine can possibly resurrect· himself, and what
1
would happen i f he could return. 91 Roger has clearly become a man
trying to pursue goodness; but as scripture predicted, the
can possibly deceive the elect.

Anti~Christ

The profundity of Considine's deception

still lives on; also, there will be successors.
For the moment, the movement is checked because it depended (as
such movements often do) on the leadership of one man.

Left to its own

devices, the African army is totally overwhelmed.
Considine's body, like Christ's, is missing.
body had been discovered along with the king's.
have not changed in the slightest.

Mottreaux's stabbed

Suydler and Sir Bernard

But the converted Philip Travers,

recognizing where the real determination came from, is setting to right
188Ibid. , p. 216.
189Ibid., p. 217..
190Ibid., p. 218.
191 Ibid. , pp. 223-224.

the tangle of events.
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At breakfast, Sir Bernard asks whether Suydler ar

Considine deserves the votes of the peoples

"Philip read it ithe news-

paper articli7 and far almost the first time in his life startled his
father into real admiration by saying that he should vote for Ian Caithness."192 Philip's vote of confidence for Caithness is the same one
Williams expects to evoke in the reader; this perception can only work i f
that reader, like the book's conceptualist author, views goodness as the
most important of the verities.

Ian Caithness, far from being "intellect-

ualized beyond all belief," becomes the vehicle for a novel which for
all its complications of farm contains an extremely simple point:

the

Good is good because God made it, and that statement is also a central
doctrine of John Duns Scotus.

192 Ibid., p. 221.

CHAPTER VI

CONCEPTUALISM IN THE REMAINING NOVELS
To exhibit the conceptualism of the remaining novels of Charles
Williams, it is necessary only to point out how the system is regulative
in each book.

Charles Moorman has observed that "Almost a..rJ.y sentence in

Emerson or St. Paul, almost any line in

Coleridge,co~tains

the germ of

all of Emerson or St. Paul or Coleridge or Charles Williams.

1

Thus, if

one were to seize on a single essential element of plot, character,or argument in such writers, one would possess the key to the whole.

Conse-

quently, if a critic treats one of the many controlling points of an artifact and thereby shows that conceptualism is operative, then conceptualism can be assumed to inform the full work.
-;:'ake, for instance, the handling of the three protagonists in War
in Heaven.

Robert W. Peckham has shown that the symbolical functioning

of these characters partakes of Arthurian

parallel~

the Archdeacon of

Fardles takes the role of Galahad, the Duke of the North Ridings represents Percival, and Kenneth Mornington images Bors.

Further, these charac-

ters also stand for the respective functions o£ the Church, the State and
1
Char les Moorman, _Th+.e_.;;.Pr.:;....:e-'c--:i-::n'-:c'-t-'s'--o-:'f':--:F--:e_l_i_c_i--:t-"y'-:__T--:h::o:e:--'A_u:-'g~u_s-:t=-l-·n_ia:::.r_"
City of the Oxford Christians (Cainsville: University of Florida Press,
1966), p. JO.
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the laity.

2

1.54
In addition, they may be seen as representative of "superior

wisdom," the protector of tradition, and "the excusable anger of the
faithful. ,.J

The equivalency of this symbolism to the will-intellect-body

conceptualism and to the manifold
readily apparent.

me~~ings

of Dantean interpretation is

The last of Peckham's trichotomies (which appears to

be anagogical) requires additional commentary.
The Archdeacon, The Duke,and Mornington (according to this reading) represent alternative ways men of good will can war for what is right
(the transcendental Good).
actions, desirous only of

Mornington is consistently impulsive in his
destroyL~g

the enemy.

Contrary to the over-

whelming majority of twentieth-century moralists, Williams views his character's attitude as proper; the chapter in which he is killed defending the
Graal is entitled "To-night thou shalt be with Me in Paradise."

4

TheCa-

tholic Duke desires that the Truth be preserved at all costs; his conduct
is always explained in terms of his intellectual sustenance on Roman doctrine.

In contadistinction, the Archdeacon's practical reason "and con-

templative habits lead him to open himself up toward becoming God's instrument .. . "5

In light of the earlier discussion of conceptualist aesthetics,

2Robert W. Peckham, "The Novels of Charles Williams," Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1965, pp. 27-52.
p. 28.

4

Charles Williams, War in Heaven (Grand Rapids:
1966), pp. 237-248.
5Peckham, Novels, p. 28.

Eerdmans,

1.5.5
the Way of the Body is characterized by Marnington; the Duke is a man of
intellect; and the Archdeacon is a prototype of the mystical hero, the
man of will.
Many Dimensions is, in a number of ways, a companion-piece to

~

in Heaven; both concern themselves with the relationship of nature to

supernature, and both "turn about the unity of creation with its ultimate oneness with the transcendent." 6 In Many Dimensions, as with the
Graai of the earlier book, the characters fight over a talisman of power,
this time the Stone of Suleiman {Solomon) which is capable of transporting
its bearer in time and space.

This ability to enter and manipulate time

and space and to enter it where one chooses has already been shown to be
peculiar to conceptualism (if, as in Kant, that doctrine is taken seriously), rather than as merely an element of fancy.

But it has further been

shown that Williams does not introduce elements of fancy for their own
sake.

Therefore, the operations of the Stone in the plot are part of a

conceptualist understanding of potentiality.

Also, the embodiment of

spiritual truth in matter (coupled with the free choices of each figure
f

in the book) can only be rationalistic or conceptualistic.

The discussion

of Lord Arglay, who is certainly, along with his secretary, one of the
two principal characters, takes a decided turn toward Aristotelian
universality:
There is no case byond law, the Chief Justice answered. We may
mistake in the ruling, we may be deceived by outward things and
cunning talk, but there is no dispute between men which cannot be
solved in equity. And in its nature equity is from those between
whom it exists~ it is passion acting in lucidity.?
6Tb•d
27
.=....1:_· ' p.

p.
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.

7Williams, Many Dimensions (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966),

1~

The contention here is that no rationalist could have (or would care to
have) parlayed the creation of Lard Arglay as an essential perpetrator
of action in a novel with a theme entailing the principles of spirit incarnate in matter.

Also, more than likely, the rationalist would react

adversely to the idea of the Stone; to him it would be purely evil.

Only

a conceptualist would try to keep all these processes in balance.

On the surface, the plot of The Place of the Lion appears to be
rationalistic.

The novel speculates on what might happen if the Platonic

Archetypes, the Transcendentals
upon the world.

themselve~

were accidentally unleashed

It should be borne in mind that a realist could also

write about such transcendentals, as could the conceptualist.

If, how-

ever, will and intellect are separated, and the will is shown superior to
the intellect, conceptualism is operative.
ters, Damaris Tighe, has been writing her

One of the important characdi~sertation

on Peter Abelard.

Through the years she has become an intellectual snob; when the archetypes are abroad, she has a nightmarish vision of Abelard himself, which
affects her in much the same manner that the ghosts in A Christmas Carol
affect Scrooge.

She recognizes not so much her abuse of other people as

in the Dickens story, but rather her abuse of the intellect.

As another

character later informs her:
You saw what you know ... and because it's the only thing you know you
saw like that. You've been told about it often enough; you've been
warned and warned again. You've had it whispered to you and shouted
at you--but you wouldn't stop or think or believe. And what you
wouldn't hear about you've seen, and i f you're still capable of
thanking God you'd better do it now. You, with your chatter about
this and the other, your plottings and plannings, and your little
diagrams, and your neat tables--what did you think you would make
of the agonies and joys of the masters? 0 I know such things must
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be: we must shape the patterns in what they said--man must use his
mind. But you've done more than use it; you've loved it for your own.
You've loved it and you've lost it. And pray God you've lost it
before it was too late, before it decayed in you and sent up that
stink
Damaris Is vision' Abelard stank mightil)7 which you smes t'
or bef~re the knowledge of life turned to the know.Ledge of death.

liP

(This is reminiscent of the stench of Father Zossima, the apocryphal St.
Thomas Aquinas figure in Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karama~ov.) Almost
immediately Damaris recognizes that she should not wallow in self-pity,
but "ought" (the Kantian word Williams lingers over in the text, using it
thrice in three lines) to aid one of the other characters who is in trouble.9
This last incident, of course, is an example of will b

actior atcd is de-

picted directly after the intellect is shown to be insufficient
self.

lli~to

it-

Later Damaris is to reflect to herself that "interpretations nearly

always are wrong."

10

(not knowing the thing in itself.)

Whatever may be-

come of her, "Love Dili] or wisdom, her act awaited her."

11

Once again,

this is conceptualism.
The Greater Trumps ls easily the most symbolical of all Williams 1 s
novels.

Each of the twenty-two trump cards of the Tarot pack play in a

wealth of imagery, dense even for this author.

Also, it is the hardest

of the novels from which to isolate one or two factors for discussion.
Suffice it to say that

L~

the background of the history of the

8

williams, The Place of the Lion (Grand Rapids:
1966), pp. 135-136.
9Ibid., p. 137.
10
11

Ibid., p. 170.
Ibid. , p. 171.

Eerdmans,
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Tarot that Williams invents for the story, among the seventy-eight daneing figurines that correspond to the controlling deck, stands the Fool in
the middle as the other figures wheel and gyrate to the Great Dance.
(T. S. Eliot alluded to this motionless character as a source for "the
still point of the turning world" in The Four Quartets, with the identical
meaning.)

12

Sybil Coningsby--the name symbolism from Lord Beaconsfield's

novels is intentior.al--the mystical heroine, is the only person who can
see the Fool move.

"Surely that's it, dancing with the rest; it seems as

i f it were always arranging itself in some place which was empty for it."

1

3

Peckham has analyzed this passage at length:
To the person on the road to sanctity, then, the Fool is everywhere
at once, ir.dulging in a perpetual exchange with all the figures, so
that in naturalistic terms, it is perpetually arriving at the quiet
center every fraction of a second, and therefore, always appears to
be there; only the sharp eyes of Holy Wisdom can see it dancing
everywhere, sustaining all things.14
This is the Bonaventuran view of God,whose center is everywhere and whose
circumference is nowhere.

Thus the central image of the novel contains a

mystical heroine who envisions a conceptualistic understanding of the
Deity.

At the

ve~y

climax of the book, a golden cloud clears away to re-

veal this mystic in ar. act of charity.

1

5 Williams telegraphs his symbolism

as he gathers together all the characters

i~

the denouement.

12
Grover Smith, T. S. Eliot's Poetr
Sources and Meanir.g (Chicago:
321-322.
1

3Williams, The Greater Trumps (New York:
Giroux, 1969), pp. 80-81.
14
Peckham, Novels, p. 111.
1

5Williams, The Greater Trumps, p. 220.
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pp.
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The three great orders of grace and L~tellect and corporeal strength,
L~ those immature servants of their senarat~ degrees, gathered round
the place where Sybil knelt by Jpanna, and the search within and
the search without were joined.1° (Italics of the three conceptualistic elements mine.)
That final phrase also indicates the indissoluble continuum that exists
between nature and supernature.

To a conceptualist, the distinction is

formal, and their integration is indicative of the fully mature person.
These paragraphs make no sense except as written by a conceptualist.
Descent Into Hell is the only one of Williams's fictions that does
not treat the theme of power.

Of all his imaginative works, it is the one

most redolent of ideas he presents in detail in the non-fiction, especially the themes of exchange, substitution and co-Lnherence.

Pauline

Anstruther's aeveternal acceptance of her martyred ancestor's fears, and

.

Peter Stanhope's depiction as an obvious surrogate for Charles Williams
himself as the direct mouthpiece for the doctrine explored in He Came
Down From Heaven,are but a few of many examples of its relationship to
other works in the Williams canon.

Probably the most memorable character

in the book,- and perhaps in all the novels, is Laurence Wentworth.

Through-

out the course of the book, Wentworth, a highly respected historian,
steadily loses grip with the outside world--not because he is afflicted
with the popular conception of mental disease, but because he chooses Hell.
Since a conceptualist cannot judge his character from the outside, Williams
permits the reader to observe Wentworth's thoughts and decisions from the
author-omniscient point of view.
16

Ibid.
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Early in the work, the doomed historian merely decides that telling a lie would be expedient--in this case misirSorming the participants
in a pageant that their uniform epaulettes are historically accurate
when they are not,

Step by step the man withdraws more and more from so-

ciety as the work progresses.

The author further shows us the workings

of Wentworth's mind:
A remnant of intelligence cried to him that this was the road to
mania, and self-indulgence leading to mania. Self-pr'eservation itself urged him to remain; lucidity urged bim, if not love. He stood
and looked and listened ... He went out of the room, down the soft
swift stairs of his mind into the street of his mind, to find the
phantoms of his mind. He desired hell. 17
These last three words are not a judgment, but a logical conclusion resulting from the evidence of the character's own mind.
positions, all truth is totally given in experience.
disparity

~onstantly

For the four monist
As a result, the

stressed in the book between the inner Wentworth and

the outer would have no real meaning.

Of the dualists, the realist and

the rationalist judge people by actions, i.e., the content of one's conduct is viewed as close enough to one's intention that any distinction
drawn is superficial.

For the conceptualist, wrong action may often spring

merely from misinformation or misdirection.

Evil (which it will be re-

called is a palpable state for the conceptualist) is identical with a pernicious free choice against the nature of things, the Co-inherence that
Williams outlines so clearly.

In the passage quoted, Wentworth has cho-

sen complete separation (the "In-coherence") from others and receives the
fruits of his desire.

He then rejects his betrothed for a succubus;

17Williams, Descent Into Hell (Grand Rapids:
p.

50.

Eerdmans, 1966),
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symbolically he has taken his fantasies and other chimeras
for the desired object of the will.

The more he· withdraws, the more he

is unable to communicate; he becomes what the modern psychologist would
call disassociated.

By the novel's end, no one is able to offer him any

comfort as he becomes locked in the prison of his mind.

Presently, he

confronts his main rival as an historian, Sir Aston Moffat:
If he had ever hated Sir Aston·because of a passion for austere truth,
he might even then have laid hold on the thing that was abroad in
the world and bee~ saved. If he had been hopelessly wrong in his
facts and yet believed them so, and believed they were important
in themselves, he might have felt a touch of the fire ... and still
have been saved. In the world of the suicides, physical or spiritual,
he might have heard another voice than his and seen another face.
He looked at Sir Aston and thought, not "he was wrong in his facts,"
but "I've been cheated." It was his last consecutive thought.18
The insistence by the author on the absolute nature of his character's
fre~

choice which is not directly-perceivable by the outside world is a

hallmark of conceptualist thought.

Unlike the realist, he is able to

will that which is not his own good.

To experience the collapse of Went-

worth can be harrowing for a reader:

"Guns, fast cars and fists are ra-

ther tame for anyone who has watched the soul of a Williams character
disintegrate." 19
In his last novel, All Hallows' Eve, Williams makes his most radical use of distorting space and time, both of which are constantly put
forth as matters of perception.

An obvious instance occurs when the dead

Lester Furnival first sees her husband dimly on Westminster Bridge; he
18

Ibid. , p. 219.

19
Review of Descent Into Hell, The Episcopalian, V (Aug. 1965),
p. 8.

162
appears vague and shadowy to her.
time having

elaps~

She is not particularly aware of any

since they were supposed to meet.

The husband,- Richard,

simply experiences an apparition of his dead wife a month after she was
killed in a bombing raid.

20
j

Lester and the other dead girl, Evelyn, pass easily from one time
and place to another because they occupy a temporality different from that
experienced by the living on earth.

Lester's condition, as events prove,

is purgatorial; the best that can be said for poor Evelyn is that she may
be in a state like the souls in the antechamber of Hell in Dante's Commedia;
forever unable to make up her mind, she is a whiner soon to become a
·whine.

They are both moving rapidly to that eternal state "where all times

and places coexist simultaneously. "

21

One of the living characters, one of whom has mastered
.

·~'

time~

-

space difficulties for evil purposes, can extend himself, although to
do so in this life requires a rejection of the Co-inherence.
Clerk for a terrible price

ha~

Simon the

learned how to project several duplicates

of himself to important centers of the world, much as the stone of
Suleiman could be divided physically in Many Dimensions.

Such division

is the means of Simon's undoing.
Also, more elaborately treated in this last novel than in any of
the others is Williams's idea of the City.
20

The concept of the City in a

Williams, All Hallow's Eve (Boston:

Noonday Press, 1971),

pp.4-6.
21

Alice Elizabeth Davidson, "The Fictional Technique of
Charles Williams," Indiana University Dissertation, p. 88.
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Christian writer immediately conjures up an image of the great Bishop of
Hippo.

But as Charles Moorman has noted:

Williams makes almost no use of St. Augustine's theory of knowledge,
seemingly ready-made for his purposes, and although it is certain
that they are largely in agreement as to the certainty of the presence
of God's hand in history, one is tempted by Williams's discussion
to conclude that in spite of his enormous respect for the African
doctor, Williams finds Augustine a rather inhuman and unsympathetic
subject.22
Precisely what a conceptualist would

fL~d

inhuman in the saint is his

rationalistic framework, in this context, the absolute separateness of the
City of God from the City of Man.

Here is how Moorman sees the City as

Williams understands it in All Hallow's Eve:
... the transition area between life a~d judgment, but, more importantly, as "the precincts of felicity," the actual Co-inherence of
all time and space and matter; the City is the redeemed creation
restored to the beauty and holiness of the lost Eden.23
Unique to the conceptualist position is that, unlike the Augustinian synthesis, this philosophy makes no cleavage between nature and supernature,
as has been established earlier.

When Betty's soul enters the purgatorial

world from our own, only her mortality prevents her from sharing the same
mode of knowing and experiencing as the dead girls:
She had moved on into the thing happening, for here all things were
happening at once. These were the precincts of felicity. The felicity of the City knew its own precincts, but as yet, while she was
but a vagrant here, she could not know them as such.24
The exhibition of conceptualist philosophy and theology are regulative in all seven of Charles Williams's novels is complete.
2

2

~oorman, Precincts of Felicitv~ p. 38.
3Williams, All Hallow's Eve, p. 51.

24
Ibid., p. 83.
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If it is true that every writer holds a latent system of thought
in his work, and if it is also true that by discovering what that system
is and then by showing how it is operative in his work the full pattern
of his artifact is thereby revealed, then the approach that has been
applied in this study has further implications for literary criticism.
That has been the hope of its author.

As the fragmentary hints that have

come from the novels treated in this chapter seem to indicate, the systemconstruction method of literary criticism can prove fruitful for discussing isolated themes, plots, images and characters from a work, as well as
for treating a complete literary production.

It is further hoped that

other critics who are sufficiently tutored in philosophy and theology as
well as in literature will be able to apply this method to other works and
authors.

A study of, say, William Butler Yeats as rationalist or of Dylan

Thomas as idealist would explain much about both the similarities and the
dissimilarities in the accomplishments of those two poets.

To continue to

refuse evidence other than from the received methods smacks of the myopia
which from time immemorial has been the bane of scholarship.

Alexander

Pope's famous dictum for literary critics may well serve as the best motto
for the preceding pages;
A perfect judge will read each work of wit
With the same spirit that its author writ.25

Z5Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, 11. 233-234.
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APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I
CHART

category

(e)

the

(F

POOSIBLE REAL PHILOSOPHIES

of

(i)

(o)

System

Example

Will

intuits

meaning

existence

1. Mysticism

Chesterton

Mind

perceives

categories

essence

2. Idealism

Keats

Body

senses

elements

matter

J.

D.H. Lawrence

Agent

alters

utility

relations

4. Pragmatism

Rand

Will

intuits

meaning

existence

5. Realism

Pope

Mind

perceives

categories

essence

Mind

perceives

categories

essence

6. Rationalism

Wolfe

Body

senses

elements

matter

Will

intuits

meaning

existence

?. Materialism

-:reiser

Body

senses

elements

matter

Will

intuits

meaning

existence

Mind

perceives

categories

essence

Body

senses

elements

matter
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Naturalism

8. Conceptualism Hopkins

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX II
CHART OF IDEALIST PERPENDICULARITY

Bergson's
God

Plato's
Ideas
Aristotle's
Prime Matter

Einstein's
Materialistic
Universe

(N.B. This is the Whiteheadian version OI
idealistic categories.)
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